Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff claims that in 2005 county officials told his mobile home park tenants to stop paying rent and vacate. In 2006 the health department obtained a court order to remove the remaining 13 units. Plaintiff claims that he did not appeal because he is bipolar and the county caused him stress. The owner alleges numerous illegal actions in connection with the demolition of the units and that the sheriff refused to investigate. In 2009 and 2010 the district court dismissed claims and amended claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the two-year Indiana statute of limitations. The court rejected claims of fraudulent concealment of conspiracy; the owner did not state facts sufficient to establish post-2007 conspiracy.

A real estate broker received money for contracting work never completed, used false addresses in invoices from companies that did not exist, submitted loan applications with inflated incomes and account balances, and forged documentation. At trial on charges of wire fraud, aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 2, 371, and 1343), witnesses used the words "fraud" and "misrepresentation." The district court directed acquittal on aiding and abetting and conspiracy charges and sentenced defendant to 71 monthsâ imprisonment and payment of $2,360,914.51 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction. The testimony of the lay witnesses could have been helpful and did not amount to legal conclusions about intent or "de facto" instructions to the jury. Defendant would not have been acquitted had the court struck the sporadic, repeated use of two words with potential legal baggage in otherwise appropriate testimony. The court vacated the sentence. The district court erred in considering transactions underlying dismissed counts as relevant conduct without making sufficient findings regarding the number of victims and in ordering defendant to pay restitution to victims not clearly harmed by conduct in her counts of conviction.

Plaintiffs' predecessors bought their Wisconsin land from the federal government in 1882-1884 and the railroad obtained an easement to cross the land by condemnation. The railroad abandoned the easement in 1980 by obtaining ICC permission and removing tracks. More than 20 years later, the county, wanting to construct a snowmobile trail, claimed that the land reverted to county ownership by virtue of a law enacted in 1852. The district court ruled in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit reversed, first rejecting the county's claim that only the federal government had standing to challenge non-compliance with conditions of the 1852 law. When an easement is abandoned, rights ordinarily revert to the fee owner and, under the applicable laws, plaintiffs acquired any right-of-way a year and a day after the abandonment. The county was aware of the abandonment and considered buying the easement from the railroad at that time, but "waited a quarter of a century and then claimed a right to obtain the right of way for nothing."

The "American Bottom" is a 175-square-mile floodplain of the Mississippi River in southwestern Illinois, across the river from St. Louis and contains wetlands that provide habitat for birds, butterflies, and wildlife. The owner of a landfill in American Bottom proposed a new landfill on 180 acres of a 220-acre tract between the existing facility and a state park that contains a lake. The tract has 26.8 acres of wetlands and the owner wants to destroy 18.4 acres to obtain fill for daily cover at the existing facility while the application for a new permit is pending with the Illinois EPA. The Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit requiring creation of mitigation wetlands. The district court dismissed the conservation group's suit challenging the Corps permit for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Affidavits from group members, alleging that destruction of the wetlands will diminish their enjoyment of wildlife and bird-watching at the state park, were sufficient to establish standing.

In 2004 the bank made a loan secured by a mortgage and all rents from the property. Three years later the borrower defaulted. The IRS filed a tax lien against the property. A receiver, appointed at the request of the bank, rented the property and collected $82,675. The district court held that the IRS lien had priority. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The bank had perfected its security interest in the rents under Indiana law; 26.U.S.C. 6323 gives such an interest priority over a federal tax lien if the property subject to the interest was "in existence" when the federal tax lien was filed. The property at issue is the real estate, not the rental income, and was in existence at the time the lien was filed.