Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000, plaintiff sold 6600 acres of farmland for $16.35 million to an environmental organization, which wanted to restore it as an ecologically functional floodplain for the Illinois River. Plaintiff expressly warranted that there was no petroleum contamination. The organization discovered such contamination and sued. The district court awarded $800,000 in damages, some for a separate breach, failure to clean up livestock waste from lagoons. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed and filed suit against the local drainage district, which had a right of way and equipment on the land to pump surface waters into the river. The district stored petroleum in tanks; at least one was on the organization's land. The organization, wanting to restore the land as wetlands, turned off the pumps. The district court entered summary judgment for the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A blameless contract breaker cannot invoke noncontractual indemnity to shift risk that he assumed in a contract. The suit is also barred by the economic-loss doctrine, based in part on concern with liability for unforeseeable consequences.

Plaintiff, a freight railroad, owned a spur line connecting to a plastics plant, the only shipper located on the spur. Defendant, another railroad, bought the lines, including the spur. The sales contract allowed plaintiff to continue to run trains on the lines being sold and granted plaintiff an exclusive easement to use the spur to serve the plant. Several years later, the plant entered receivership. The receiver sold all assets, including the plant. The buyer continues to manufacture plastics in the plant. Contending that the change in ownership voided the exclusive easement, defendant contracted with the buyer to ship products over the spur, leaving plaintiff with diminished use of the spur. The district court ruled in favor of defendant, reasoning that the contract referred specifically to the plastics company in business at that time. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on the language of the contract in light of extrinsic evidence, and rejected a trespass claim.

Defendant, a participant in a major mortgage fraud scheme, pled guilty to committing wire fraud as part of that scam and was sentenced to 37 months in prison and ordered to pay $1,792,000 in restitution. His role was to act as a "straw," or fake, buyer of seven properties, and to cause $4,473,161.55 to be transferred from unwitting mortgage companies to their banking partners; he received $90,000 from his co-schemers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The district court acted within its discretion in rejecting defendant's assertion that his sentence should be lower because he gave the government substantial assistance. The court should have explained its rationale in attributing a "reasonably foreseeable" loss amount to defendant. The court also erred in interpreting the minor role sentencing adjustment guideline when it stated that an act otherwise deemed minor could, if repeated, necessarily preclude the adjustment, and that a person playing a necessary role cannot play a minor role. The court should evaluate his role in context of other participants in the scheme, keeping in mind that a minor player is substantially less culpable than the average participant, not the leaders.

In 2000 the conservancy purchased property, but allowed the farmer to remain as a tenant through 2003. The farmer/seller was required to perform removal of specified substances and warranted that there were no undisclosed underground tanks. The conservancy withheld funds pending clean-up. In 2006 the conservancy sued for breach of the warranty and failure to complete the clean-up. The district court allowed the conservancy to amend and claim damages with respect to newly-discovered contamination and entered judgment in favor of the conservancy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claim is within the Illinois 10-year limitations period for actions and written contracts; the doctrine of laches does not apply.

A developer was required to make public improvements to be turned over to the city and, in 2006, obtained bonds to ensure performance, as required by ordinance. Work began, but the subdivision failed and subcontractors filed mechanics' liens. The developer notified the city that three foreclosures were pending and recommended that it redeem the bonds. The insurer refused to pay. The city did not follow up, but a subcontractor sued, purporting to bring its case in the name of the city for its own benefit. The subcontractor contends that it should be paid out of the proceeds of the bonds. The case was removed to federal court. The district court dismissed, finding that the subcontractor did not have standing to assert claims on the bonds because it was not a third-party beneficiary to the bonds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on the language of the contract.

Defendants were convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346) for participating in a fraudulent scheme to obtain mortgage loans. The scheme involved: recruiters, who enlisted buyers to buy properties with fraudulently obtained funds; financiers, who provided funds to buyers to facilitate the transactions; administrators, who bought fake documents to enable buyers to obtain mortgages; loan officers, who prepared fraudulent applications and sent them to lenders. Between 2003 and 2005, the group acquired more than 70 properties for which lenders provided $7.2 million in loans. Most of the properties went into foreclosure, resulting in losses to the lenders of $2.2 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The use of the term "straw buyer" in the confession of a nontestifying co-defendant did not obviously refer to the defendant and violate his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under the "Bruton" doctrine. The court properly applied a "sophisticated means" sentence enhancement and gave an "ostrich" instruction concerning defendant's knowledge.

The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act prevents states and their subdivisions from imposing discriminatory taxes against railroads. 49 U.S.C. 11501. In 2008, the drainage district, a subdivision of Illinois, changed its method for calculating assessments. All other owners are assessed on a per-acre formula, but railroad, pipeline, and utility land were to be assessed on the basis of "benefit," apparently based on the difference in value between land within the district and land outside the levees; annual crop rentals being paid; and agricultural production of lands within the district. Two rail carriers brought suit under a section of the Act, which prevents imposition of "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier." The district court held that the assessment was prohibited by the Act, but concluded that it was powerless to enjoin the tax. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the court has authority to enjoin the tax, but, under principles of comity, should eliminate only the discriminatory aspects, not the entire scheme. The assessment is a tax that, raises general revenues; its ultimate use is for the whole district. It imposes a proportionately heavier tax on railroading than other activities.

The railroad owns a 2.8-mile right-of-way that it has leased to the Chicago Transit Authority for almost 50 years. When the lease became too costly, the CTA sought to condemn a perpetual easement. The district court enjoined the condemnation as preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10501(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The railroad and its right-of-way fall under the Act; the proposed state condemnation would be a regulation of railroad transportation preempted by the Act. The court employed an "as applied" analysis and concluded that the condemnation would prevent or unreasonably interfere with rail transportation by changing the relationship between the parties. Under the proposed easement, the CTA's rights would not be subject to termination for any reason. The railroad would lose property rights to reclaim the property if the CTA ceases passenger transportation operations on the Right of Way or violates any term of the lease and to oust the CTA from the Right of Way if the CTA fails to meet its lease obligations.

A developer built a subdivision in a floodplain. The developer and buyers knew that the land is low-lying and prone to flooding. The developer constructed levees, floodwalls, retention ponds, and a stormwater holding system. The company that handled construction and sale of buildings in Parcel D had the developer fill one of the retention ponds, so that it could build additional homes; it also constructed duplexes where the developer had planned single-family housing. In 2003 several homes were inundated when a retention pond overflowed. In a state court suit, the company settled with homeowners for$335,000; homeowners agreed to take $35,000 from the company and seek the rest from its insurer. A federal court concluded that the company's insurance policy did not apply, reasoning that homeowners had not suffered "property damage" as defined by the policy because the state court complaint sought changes to curtail future loss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that neither party had asked the court to apportion the settlement between losses and improvements and that it was too late to do so.

Plaintiffs, evicted from their home following a state court foreclosure judgment, sought relief in federal court. The district court rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly considered the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and concluded that the doctrine applied to only two of the 22 claims: those that claimed injury caused by the state-court judgment of foreclosure, as opposed to injury caused by the defendants’ actions in enforcing the judgment. Plaintiffs offered no evidence of discriminatory motive with respect to their race or disabilities and did not allege specific facts establishing that there were material facts in dispute.