Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Claiming anxiety, depression, suicidal tendencies, insomnia, vertigo, migraine headaches, fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome, and plantar fasciitis, Farrell, then 33 year old, applied for disability insurance benefits. Her initial application was denied, but the Social Security Administration Appeals Council remanded. The Administrative Law Judge again ruled against her, in part because of her failure to establish definitively that she suffered from fibromyalgia. The Appeals Council summarily affirmed this decision, despite new evidence before it that confirmed the fibromyalgia. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Social Security Administration’s regulations require the Appeals Council to consider “new and material evidence.” The ALJ did not adequately deal with competing expert opinions. View "Farrell v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Shideler suffers osteogenesis imperfecta, “brittle bone disease.” In 2006, at age 48, he applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. 423(d), alleging an onset date of 1995. His date last insured was 2000. The ALJ found that despite Shideler’s limitations, there were a sufficient number of jobs in the regional economy available to a person with his restrictions, and denied his application. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record supported the vocational expert’s testimony concerning available jobs as a clerk, assuming certain restrictions: never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and only occasionally climb ramps or stairs; never crouch, kneel or crawl; never perform overhead reaching; avoid exposure to extreme heat and cold; and perform work that includes occasional, but not frequent, use of fingers. Despite his testimony that he had broken at least 55 bones over the course of his life, the record showed that Shideler had only four surgeries and made a full recovery. The record contained no evidence that Shideler visited any doctors between May 2000 and December 2006. View "Shideler v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his mother lived in public housing. His mother was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine and resisting law enforcement officers; she later pleaded guilty. Less than one month later she received notice that her arrest violated her lease agreement, that she had 30 days to vacate, and that she could contest termination of her lease during the eviction procedure. The Housing Authority subsequently filed an eviction action in Indiana state court. Before that hearing, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction. The district judge conducted a telephonic hearing and denied the motion, based mainly on the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, and in consideration of "the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that restrain a federal court, while recognizing the respect due the courts of a sovereign state." The state court ruled in favor of the Housing Authority, issuing an order for immediate possession of the property and eviction. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, as moot, an appeal from the denial of an injunction.

Medicare pays teaching hospitals for work by residents when a teaching physician supervises. During the 1990s, HHS concluded that many hospitals were billing for unsupervised services and began to audit invoices. There was also a GAO report and private litigation: qui tam suits under the False Claims Act, allowing relators to collect a bounty. Under 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A), suits cannot be based upon public disclosure of allegations or transactions in public agencies’ official reports unless the relator is an original source of information. A prior case concluded that the 1998 GAO report and similar public documents disclosed that billing for unsupervised work was common practice. The district court dismissed a suit filed against a teaching hospital in 2004, claiming to describe conduct, such as inadequate supervision, not previously disclosed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. No one who read the GAO report, or followed the progress of the audits, would suspect that Rush University was misrepresenting "immediate availability" of teaching physicians during concurrently scheduled procedures. The complaint alleged a kind of deceit that the GAO report does not attribute to any teaching hospital.

Petitioner, then 45 years old and having previously worked in a factory and as a health aid, applied for disability benefits in 2004, claiming an onset date in 2004. Her conditions include peripheral vascular disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, osteoarthritis, obesity, vascular dementia, depression, panic disorder, and anxiety. The Social Security Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's adverse decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ failed to adequately consider petitioner's mental impairments, her obesity, and several of her physical problems.

Plaintiff first sought treatment in 1988, at age 27, experiencing double vision, eye strain, and facial numbness, and was diagnosed with abducens nerve palsy of the left eye. He continued to work as a welder until 2004, when symptoms forced him to sell his business. In 2007, he applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging onset in 2004. In 2010 an ALJ rejected the claim, concluding that plaintiff; she noted plaintiff’s complaints of headaches, but concluded that they must be non-severe. The district court upheld the denial. The Seventh Circuit remanded to the Social Security Administration, holding that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence.

For about seven years, defendant aided undocumented immigrants in filing claims for Illinois unemployment benefits, charging a fee of $80 plus one benefit check, and using social security numbers of unsuspecting, law-abiding citizens. She arranged with a state employee to process the applications as though the undocumented aliens were citizens. She was convicted of eight counts of mail fraud and sentenced to 96 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed application of sentencing guideline enhancements: for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, for unauthorized use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and for an offense with 50 or more victims.

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, to recover benefits under long-term disability benefit plans maintained by their former employers. The plans provide for reduction of benefits if the disabled employee also receives benefits under the Social Security Act, as both plaintiffs do. They dispute calculation of the reduction, claiming that the plans do not authorize inclusion in the offset of benefits paid to dependent children. Both plans require offsets for "loss of time disability" benefits. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that children's Social Security disability benefits paid based on a parent's disability are "loss of time disability" benefits under the language of the plans.

Plaintiff contracted for satellite TV service. Equipment costs are amortized in monthly payments; a customer who discontinues service owes a fee to cover the unpaid portion of equipment cost. Plaintiff authorized a charge to her debit card should that occur. Plaintiff stopped paying the monthly charge. Defendant collected the termination fee via the debit card. Plaintiff argued that the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 407(a), provides that benefits may not be assigned or subject to attachment or garnishment at the behest of creditors, and that, unbeknownst to defendant, all funds in her account came from Social Security benefits. The district court ruled in favor of defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's arrangement was consensual, unlike "legal process." The statute does not authorize private parties to sue for damages based on assignments of Social Security benefits.

ESBC, billing agent for the Fire Department, determined that each of the individual defendants owned a vehicle involved in a collision to which the Fire Department responded and each had insurance coverage, and billed response costs incurred for each collision. The defendants refused to pay and ESBC sought a declaration that defendants were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601. Under CERCLA, the owner of a “facility” from which hazardous substances have been released is responsible for response costs that result from the release. Insurer-defendants counterclaimed for injunctive relief from ESBC’s billing practices and alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, unjust enrichment, unlawful fee collection, fraud, constructive fraud, and insurance fraud. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings and dismissed counterclaims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Motor vehicles for personal use fall under the "consumer product in consumer use” exception to CERCLA’s definition of facility