Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Townsend applied for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income in 2003, at age 44, claiming that she had become incapable of full‐time gainful employment in May 2002 when she had stopped working as a result of multiple physical and psychiatric ailments, including fibromyalgia. In 2012 an ALJ decided that she had become totally disabled in November 2008. By the time that decision was rendered she had died (of pulmonary diseases apparently unrelated to the ailments alleged to have made her totally disabled). Her father was substituted for her. The district court upheld the decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting multiple errors in determining the onset of total disability. View "Williams v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Gienapp worked at Harbor Crestnursing care facility. In January 2011 she told Chattic, its manager, that she needed leave to care for her daughter, who was being treated for thyroid cancer. Chattic granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). While on leave, Gienapp submitted an FMLA form, leaving blank a question about the leave’s expected duration. Harbor Crest did not ask her to fill in the blank, nor did it pose written questions as the 12-week period progressed. A physician’s statement on the form said that the daughter’s recovery was uncertain, and that if she did recover she would require assistance at least through July 2011. Chattic inferred from this that Gienapp would not return by April 1, her leave’s outer limit, and hired a replacement. When Gienapp reported for work on March 29, Chattic told her that she no longer had a job. The district court entered summary judgment, ruling that Gienapp had forfeited her FMLA rights by not stating exactly how much leave she would take. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Gienapp could not give a firm date; Department of Labor regulations call her situation “unforeseeable” leave, governed by 29 C.F.R. 825.303, which does not require employees to tell employers how much leave they need. View "Gienapp v. Harbor Crest" on Justia Law

Holder was an Illinois correctional officer since 2006. His wife began to suffer from mental health problems relating to opiate dependency. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles eligible employees to 12 work weeks of leave during a 12-month period to care for a spouse with a serious medical condition, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). In October 2007, Holder submitted an FMLA certification form. His wife’s psychiatrist indicated that it would “be necessary for the employee to take off work only intermittently or to work less than a full schedule as a result of the condition,” and that the need for leave would continue for an “unknown” duration. The request was approved. The state never asked for additional medical documentation and paid its share of his health insurance premium until April 18, 2008. About 130 days of absence were recorded on a day-by-day basis. On April 18, 2008, Holder was advised that his FMLA leave had expired and that additional leave would be under the Illinois Family Responsibility Leave program, which allows up to a year of unpaid leave; the state only covers insurance premiums for six months. In April-June 2008, Holder took 29 absences, citing the state program. The Warden disapproved requests for June 8-9 and on the denied form, Holder wrote “last one!!!” Eight months later Central Management Services informed Holder that the state had mistakenly paid for his health insurance premiums beyond his entitlement and began deducting 25% of his earnings until he had refunded $8,291.83. Holder sued, claiming interference with FLMA rights. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the state, but the judge entered judgment awarding Holder $1,222.10 for January 2008, but entered a judgment for the state for the rest of the months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holder v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Thomas sought disability benefits in 2009, based on sciatica, diabetes, angina, a trigger thumb in her left hand, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. She was morbidly obese. Thomas saw a consultative examiner, who noted a reduced range of motion in Thomas’s lumbar spine, hips, and knees; an x-ray appeared to show narrowed disc space. A state agency doctor determined that Thomas had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. At a hearing, Thomas testified that she could not stand for more than 15 minutes or sit for more than 20 minutes at a time and could only walk about half a block and could not do laundry or vacuum. When the inflammation was bad, she could not use her left hand at all. Thomas used her inhaler four times a day to control asthma. A vocational expert testified about Thomas’s prior work as a phlebotomist as heavy, semiskilled work, requiring lifting and moving patients and drawing their blood. The ALJ denied Thomas’s claim. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ improperly discredited Thomas’s testimony and disregarded medical evidence concerning pain. View "Thomas v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Moore applied for Social Security disability benefits, alleging that she became disabled in 2007. An ALJ concluded that Moore suffered from a number of severe impairments, including migraine headaches, asthma, morbid obesity, and rheumatoid arthritis, and less severe impairments including irritable bowel syndrome, gastroesophageal reflux disease, hypertension, hypothyroid and prolactin irregularities, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, anxiety, and possible Crohn’s disease. The ALJ found that she was, nonetheless, capable of performing her past work and not entitled to benefits. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ did not err in considering evidence that Moore’s emergency room visits may have been related to an addiction problem, but the ALJ erred in failing to even acknowledge contrary evidence or to explain the rationale for crediting the identified evidence over contrary evidence. The ALJ never related Moore’s specific limitations to certain impairments. On remand, the ALJ must make those findings and present the limitations to the vocational expert to determine whether Moore is capable of performing her past relevant work. View "Moore v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Before 1992, Chicago police officers received pension credit for time worked for the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. In 1992, the Retirement Board began denying pension credit to retiring officers for prior service with the Sheriff’s Department. In 2008, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that this practice was improper under the Illinois Pension Code. Officers who had been denied pension credit sought reconsideration. The Board concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the final rulings after the statutory 35‐day limit. The officers did not seek review in state court, but filed a federal suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated officers, alleging violations of procedural due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. and state constitutions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the officers’ complaint is, essentially, that Illinois law provides no procedure for making the appellate decision retroactive Their sole remedy lies with the political branches of Illinois government. View "Rasario v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemens' Annuity & Benefit Fund" on Justia Law

Phillips worked at CTA as a trucker for 22 years, until, in 2010, he visited CTA’s onsite health services department to report that his fingers went numb at work and to initiate a workers’ compensation claim. CTA had a written substance abuse policy that required drug testing in certain situations, including initiation of workers’ compensation claim. Refusal to submit to testing was cause for immediate suspension pending termination. An injured employee could receive medical treatment in the health services department and return to work without being required to submit to a drug test if the employee did not seek to initiate a workers’ compensation claim and the situation did not fall into one of the other categories for which drug testing was required. Phillips was advised that if he didn’t take the drug test, his employment would be terminated. He refused to take the drug test and was terminated for refusing to submit to drug testing upon his initiation of a workers’ compensation claim. Phillips did file a workers’ compensation claim and eventually received benefits. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting his claim that his termination was retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Phillips v. Cont'l Tire Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

Chhibber, an internist, operated a walk‐in medical office on the south side of Chicago. For patients with insurance or Medicare coverage, Chhibber ordered an unusually high volume of diagnostic tests, including echocardiograms, electrocardiograms, pulmonary function tests, nerve conduction studies, carotid Doppler ultrasound scans and abdominal ultrasound scans. Chhibber owned the equipment and his staff performed the tests. He was charged with eight counts of making false statements relating to health care matters, 18 U.S.C. 1035, and eight counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The government presented witnesses who had worked for Chhibber, patients who saw him, and undercover agents who presented themselves to the Clinic as persons needing medical services. Chhibber’s former employees testified that he often ordered tests before he even arrived at the office, based on phone calls with staff. Employees performed the tests themselves with little training, and the results were not reviewed by specialists; normally, the tests were not reviewed at all. Chhibber was convicted of four counts of making false statements and five counts of health care fraud. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Chhibber" on Justia Law

Pierce claimed that she injured her lower back in 2004 while moving cases of glassware at her waitressing job. She quit her job and sought medical treatment. An MRI showed signs of disc degeneration. She received chiropractic and electric-shock treatments to her back. She also took prescription pain medication. After her back improved, she started a new job at a café. In March 2006 (her alleged onset date for disability), Pierce re-injured her back to the point that she could no longer sit or stand comfortably, and she had to quit her new job. The injury disrupted her sleep, caused numbness in her legs, and prevented her from being able to sit, stand, lift, or bend for long periods. She could not work for more than five hours without pain. An ALJ found that Pierce, then more than 55 years old, was not disabled. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings, finding the ALJ’s assessment of Pierce’s credibility was flawed in several respects. View "Pierce v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Dalton worked in coal mine jobs from 1957 until 1991 and was exposed to substantial coal and rock dust. He developed trouble breathing; he quit his job and was never employed again. In 1999 Dalton sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901‐45. In 2003, an ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Dalton was a “miner,” that Frontier was the “responsible operator,” and that Dalton had established clinical pneumoconiosis, based on the opinions of pulmonary experts, but could not determine the date of onset of total disability, so Dalton’s benefits began in 1999. The Board vacated, finding that the ALJ had not properly evaluated CT scans. The ALJ again awarded benefits beginning in 1999. In 2007, the case was again remanded. A new ALJ reweighed the evidence and ordered benefits to begin in 1999. Dalton died in 2007. The ALJ denied a motion by Dalton’s children to substitute as claimant. The Board dismissed an appeal and a cross‐appeal. The District Director returned the case to its third ALJ, who allowed the children’s motion, modified the date for commencement of benefits to 1991, and awarded attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Board vacated with respect to the onset date. The Seventh Circuit remanded for entry of the 1991 onset date, rejecting a claim that the children lacked standing. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that 1991 marked the time of onset for Dalton’s total disability on account of pneumoconiosis. View "Dalton v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law