Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Boley sought Social Security disability benefits. The agency denied her request initially and on reconsideration. A person dissatisfied with such a decision has 60 days to request a hearing. Boley took about nine months because SSA had notified Boley but not her lawyer (as required by 20 C.F.R.404.1715(a)). Boley was ill at the time, preparing for a double mastectomy, and did not know, until it was too late, that her lawyer was unaware of the decision. An ALJ dismissed an untimely hearing request, finding that Boley lacked “good cause” because she had received notice and could have filed a request herself. A district judge dismissed her petition for judicial review, based on 42 U.S.C. 05(g), which authorizes review of the agency’s final decisions made “after a hearing.” The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, with instructions to decide whether substantial evidence, and appropriate procedures, underlie the decision that Boley lacks “good cause” for her delay in seeking intra-agency review. In doing so, the court overruled its own precedent and noted a divide among the circuits. View "Boley v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former laborer, applied for social security disability benefits, claiming he was unable to work a full 40-hour week because of acute lower back pain that radiates into his right leg. He has had various treatments and takes several medications such as oxycodone and percocet. His application was denied; the Appeals Council and district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that the administrative law judge was likely mistaken in believing that one physician’s report refuted the findings of the other physician. What was relevant was not the cause of the pain and numbness but the severity of these symptoms and whether they disabled plaintiff from working full time. Both physicians diagnosed radiculopathy. If the administrative law judge remains skeptical of the claim, he can order a further examination of the plaintiff by a qualified physician instructed to offer a medical opinion (if possible) on the plaintiff’s physical ability to engage in full-time work. The court stated references to the credibility of the applicant are “a recurrent feature of the government’s defense of denials of social security disability benefits” that constitutes “professional misconduct and if it continues we’ll have to impose sanctions.” View "Hanson v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Murphy had a stroke in April 2007. Before leaving the hospital, Murphy was examined by Dr. Mayer, who noted a past history of headaches and diminished fluency in speech. Murphy started seeing a physical therapist but did not complete the program. A year later, Dr. Mayer noted that Murphy still had difficulty speaking and “some significant loss of sensation.” In September 2008, Murphy applied for social security disability benefits. Her application was denied. At a hearing, a vocational expert testified that there were no sedentary jobs in the regional economy for a person who could neither work with the general public nor use her hands more than occasionally for fine manipulation, but that there were a significant number of jobs for a person who had the capacity to do light, unskilled work, but who could only occasionally perform fine hand manipulation. The ALJ ruled that Murphy was not disabled. The Appeals Council adopted that decision. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the ALJ erroneously excluded information about Murphy’s potential inability to perform light work and by not questioning Murphy further about her failure to comply with her home exercise program and the activities she participated in while on vacation. View "Murphy v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Yurt suffers from a psychotic disorder which causes him to experience auditory hallucinations and bouts of uncontrollable rage. He also has obsessive compulsive disorder, moderately severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and chronic bifrontal tension headaches. He has worked as a cook and a janitor, last working in May 2010, when he suffered a mental break and was terminated for threatening a coworker with a knife. He applied for Disability Insurance Benefits from the Social Security Administration, but an ALJ denied his application. The Appeals Council declined review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, agreeing that the ALJ erred by failing to include many of his medical limitations in the hypothetical that she posed to the vocational expert. View "Yurt v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Beardsley was 49 years old when she fell and injured her knee. She had worked as a machine operator, assembler, inspector, and cashier. After the injury, she applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Her doctors determined that she had meniscal tears and a ruptured ligament, compounded by obesity and worsening osteoarthritis. She declined surgery but received injections for the arthritis. Dr. Banyash examined her on behalf of the Social Security Administration and opined that pain and weakness restricted her ability to walk, stand, climb stairs, crouch, and kneel, but she was capable of sedentary work. Given Beardsley’s age and skills, a finding that she was capable of only sedentary work would have qualified her as disabled at the time under the grid SSA uses for making that determination. Another agency physician subsequently judged her able to stand or walk for about six hours of an eight-hour workday. The ALJ denied benefits, finding that she could still perform a range of light work. Beardsley argued that the ALJ gave too little weight to the opinion of the examining doctor and too much weight to an erroneous view of her daily activities, particularly care she provided for her elderly mother and that the ALJ improperly held against her the decision not to seek surgery. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that errors undermined the “logical bridge” between evidence and conclusion. View "Beardsley v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Townsend applied for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income in 2003, at age 44, claiming that she had become incapable of full‐time gainful employment in May 2002 when she had stopped working as a result of multiple physical and psychiatric ailments, including fibromyalgia. In 2012 an ALJ decided that she had become totally disabled in November 2008. By the time that decision was rendered she had died (of pulmonary diseases apparently unrelated to the ailments alleged to have made her totally disabled). Her father was substituted for her. The district court upheld the decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting multiple errors in determining the onset of total disability. View "Williams v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Gienapp worked at Harbor Crestnursing care facility. In January 2011 she told Chattic, its manager, that she needed leave to care for her daughter, who was being treated for thyroid cancer. Chattic granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). While on leave, Gienapp submitted an FMLA form, leaving blank a question about the leave’s expected duration. Harbor Crest did not ask her to fill in the blank, nor did it pose written questions as the 12-week period progressed. A physician’s statement on the form said that the daughter’s recovery was uncertain, and that if she did recover she would require assistance at least through July 2011. Chattic inferred from this that Gienapp would not return by April 1, her leave’s outer limit, and hired a replacement. When Gienapp reported for work on March 29, Chattic told her that she no longer had a job. The district court entered summary judgment, ruling that Gienapp had forfeited her FMLA rights by not stating exactly how much leave she would take. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Gienapp could not give a firm date; Department of Labor regulations call her situation “unforeseeable” leave, governed by 29 C.F.R. 825.303, which does not require employees to tell employers how much leave they need. View "Gienapp v. Harbor Crest" on Justia Law

Holder was an Illinois correctional officer since 2006. His wife began to suffer from mental health problems relating to opiate dependency. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles eligible employees to 12 work weeks of leave during a 12-month period to care for a spouse with a serious medical condition, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). In October 2007, Holder submitted an FMLA certification form. His wife’s psychiatrist indicated that it would “be necessary for the employee to take off work only intermittently or to work less than a full schedule as a result of the condition,” and that the need for leave would continue for an “unknown” duration. The request was approved. The state never asked for additional medical documentation and paid its share of his health insurance premium until April 18, 2008. About 130 days of absence were recorded on a day-by-day basis. On April 18, 2008, Holder was advised that his FMLA leave had expired and that additional leave would be under the Illinois Family Responsibility Leave program, which allows up to a year of unpaid leave; the state only covers insurance premiums for six months. In April-June 2008, Holder took 29 absences, citing the state program. The Warden disapproved requests for June 8-9 and on the denied form, Holder wrote “last one!!!” Eight months later Central Management Services informed Holder that the state had mistakenly paid for his health insurance premiums beyond his entitlement and began deducting 25% of his earnings until he had refunded $8,291.83. Holder sued, claiming interference with FLMA rights. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the state, but the judge entered judgment awarding Holder $1,222.10 for January 2008, but entered a judgment for the state for the rest of the months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holder v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Thomas sought disability benefits in 2009, based on sciatica, diabetes, angina, a trigger thumb in her left hand, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. She was morbidly obese. Thomas saw a consultative examiner, who noted a reduced range of motion in Thomas’s lumbar spine, hips, and knees; an x-ray appeared to show narrowed disc space. A state agency doctor determined that Thomas had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. At a hearing, Thomas testified that she could not stand for more than 15 minutes or sit for more than 20 minutes at a time and could only walk about half a block and could not do laundry or vacuum. When the inflammation was bad, she could not use her left hand at all. Thomas used her inhaler four times a day to control asthma. A vocational expert testified about Thomas’s prior work as a phlebotomist as heavy, semiskilled work, requiring lifting and moving patients and drawing their blood. The ALJ denied Thomas’s claim. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ improperly discredited Thomas’s testimony and disregarded medical evidence concerning pain. View "Thomas v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Moore applied for Social Security disability benefits, alleging that she became disabled in 2007. An ALJ concluded that Moore suffered from a number of severe impairments, including migraine headaches, asthma, morbid obesity, and rheumatoid arthritis, and less severe impairments including irritable bowel syndrome, gastroesophageal reflux disease, hypertension, hypothyroid and prolactin irregularities, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, anxiety, and possible Crohn’s disease. The ALJ found that she was, nonetheless, capable of performing her past work and not entitled to benefits. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ did not err in considering evidence that Moore’s emergency room visits may have been related to an addiction problem, but the ALJ erred in failing to even acknowledge contrary evidence or to explain the rationale for crediting the identified evidence over contrary evidence. The ALJ never related Moore’s specific limitations to certain impairments. On remand, the ALJ must make those findings and present the limitations to the vocational expert to determine whether Moore is capable of performing her past relevant work. View "Moore v. Colvin" on Justia Law