Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stepp, a former correctional officer, training secretary and coordinator, and parole probation officer, applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401. Stepp was 47 years old, 5’6” tall, and weighed 237 pounds. She primarily claimed degenerative disc disease and depression. An ALJ denied Stepp’s claim, acknowledging that Stepp suffered from chronic pain, but finding that surgery, medication, and therapy had resulted in improvement such that she retained the capacity to engage in sedentary work. Stepp submitted to the Appeals Council additional evidence in the form of medical records created just before the ALJ’s denial of her claim. This evidence, the treatment notes of pain management specialist Dr. MacKay, tends to suggest that Stepp’s condition did not improve over the course of the adjudicative period to the extent that the ALJ estimated. The Appeals Council declined to engage in plenary review and did not address Dr. MacKay’s notes. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the ALJ properly analyzed a range of conflicting testimony and medical opinions and reached a conclusion adequately supported by the record, but that the Council erred in not accepting Dr. MacKay’s treatment notes as new and material evidence. View "Stepp v. Carolyn Colvin" on Justia Law

Stepp, a former correctional officer, training secretary and coordinator, and parole probation officer, applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401. Stepp was 47 years old, 5’6” tall, and weighed 237 pounds. She primarily claimed degenerative disc disease and depression. An ALJ denied Stepp’s claim, acknowledging that Stepp suffered from chronic pain, but finding that surgery, medication, and therapy had resulted in improvement such that she retained the capacity to engage in sedentary work. Stepp submitted to the Appeals Council additional evidence in the form of medical records created just before the ALJ’s denial of her claim. This evidence, the treatment notes of pain management specialist Dr. MacKay, tends to suggest that Stepp’s condition did not improve over the course of the adjudicative period to the extent that the ALJ estimated. The Appeals Council declined to engage in plenary review and did not address Dr. MacKay’s notes. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the ALJ properly analyzed a range of conflicting testimony and medical opinions and reached a conclusion adequately supported by the record, but that the Council erred in not accepting Dr. MacKay’s treatment notes as new and material evidence. View "Stepp v. Carolyn Colvin" on Justia Law

Price, an almost illiterate, mentally retarded 44-year-old who also suffers from psychiatric ailments, intermittently received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, having been adjudged disabled in 1988, 1991, and 2007. His benefits should have been terminated in 2005 because he was sent to prison for a felony sex offense, but the record is unclear as to when benefits stopped. Paroled in 2010, he unsuccessfully applied for the same benefits that he had received before he entered prison. After reviewing the history of Price’s mental problems, his inability to function in society, doctor’s assessments, his nocturnal habits, and test scores, the Seventh Circuit remanded, finding the administrative law judge’s reasons for finding that Price was not disabled “unconvincing.” As is common in social security disability proceedings, the administrative law judge inferred from Price’s ability to perform simple household chores, such as cooking food in a microwave oven and mowing the lawn, that he could be gainfully employed, but “it’s easier—especially for someone with an antisocial psychiatric disorder—to work in one’s own home, at one’s own pace, at one’s own choice of tasks, than to work by the clock under supervision in a place of business.” View "Price v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Varga, now 42, had a 1994 medical discharge from the military because of severe endometriosis (a condition which causes pelvic pain). She then worked as a correctional officer, and later an office worker, at the Federal Correctional Institute (FCI) in Oxford, Wisconsin. She left the FCI in 2005 because of her continuing physical and mental impairments and has not worked since March 2006, when her application for disability retirement under the Federal Employees Retirement System was approved. She applied for disability insurance benefits in 2006, alleging she had been disabled since 2005. Between 2005 and 2011, Varga was diagnosed with: PTSD, endometriosis, major depression, irritable bowel syndrome, and fibromyalgia. An Administrative Law Judge denied her application. The district court, affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, agreeing that the ALJ erred by failing to include her mental limitations in the areas of concentration, persistence, and pace in the hypothetical question that he posed to the vocational expert. The flawed hypothetical led the vocational expert and the ALJ to erroneously conclude she was not disabled. View "Varga v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, residents of privately-owned Chicago building, received housing vouchers from the Chicago Housing Authority to enable them to rent apartments. They claimed that the Authority is complicit in and responsible for a deprivation of their constitutionally protected privacy by the building owners. The owners require their tenants to be tested annually for illegal drugs; passing the test is a condition of a tenant’s being allowed to renew his or her lease for another year. The requirement applies to all tenants, not just those who might be suspected of using illegal drugs. The district court denied a preliminary injunction on the ground that the drug-testing policy was private rather than state action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the plaintiffs had requested transfer from the drug-testing building in which he or she currently resides to a building that does not require drug testing. A CHA representative testified that his agency would have approved such a request. That the CHA may encourage or even request testing does not constitute state action. View "Stubenfield v. Chicago Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Engstrand, a former dairy farmer, applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Insurance because of pain caused by diabetic neuropathy and osteoarthritis, in July 2010, when he was 47. He alleged an onset of disability in July 2007, more than a year before his date last insured in September 2008. The ALJ concluded that his account of his limitations was not credible, that the opinion of his treating physician was not entitled to deference, and that Engstrand was not disabled. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that the ALJ wrongly evaluated the significance of his daily activities and did not explain his rejection of the doctor's testimony. View "Engstrand v. Colvin" on Justia Law

After years of working as a locomotive engineer, and more briefly as a limousine driver, Duncan applied for a disability annuity (Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. 231a(a)(1)(v)) in 2010. His application alleged constant back pain stemming from a 2003 workplace injury in which he slipped on ice, hit his head, and injured his back. The Railroad Retirement Board denied his application and denied it again upon reconsideration in 2011. A hearing officer denied Duncan’s application in 2012. In 2013, a three-member board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that Duncan retains the capacity to perform a reduced range of work. View "Duncan v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

The plaintiff applied for social security disability benefits in 2009, at the age of 43, claiming to be disabled by a cyst (a liquid-filled sphere) in her pineal gland, a small endocrine gland in the brain that produces melatonin, which regulates sleep. The cyst caused her to experience vertigo, blurred vision, and headaches. She has a high-school education, is married and has children, but has never held a full-time job. In 2010 she underwent brain surgery to remove the cyst. Although an MRI following the operation showed that the cyst had been removed and the site of the operation in the brain was healing normally, and her vertigo and vision problems had been resolved, within weeks she was complaining about pain and numbness in her head. She had declined suggested treatments and had continued her hobby of long-distance running. After a hearing before an administrative law judge in 2011, her application was rejected. The rejection upheld by the district court and the Seventh Circuit. The administrative law judge was entitled to find that the plaintiff, although she may well suffer from chronic pain, is capable of full-time employment and therefore not totally disabled. View "Mitze v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, then age 40, applied to the Social Security Commission in 2009 for benefits, claiming to be disabled from gainful employment as a result of psychiatric disorders (depression and bipolar disorder), chronic back and hip pain, and an anal fissure. He had been trained as a machinist and, until 2002, had worked intermittently as a machinist and an assembly line worker. The administrative law judge denied his claim on the ground that he was capable of performing unskilled sedentary work. The district court upheld the denial of benefits. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting contradictions and gaps in the ALJ’s reasoning. The court did “not say that Voigt is in fact totally disabled from gainful employment, however— only that he’s entitled to a more careful analysis of his claim by the Social Security Administration.” View "Voigt v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Hall, an aviation mechanic, was discharged in 2001 by the military because of pain from an ankle injury. He was deemed by the Department of Veterans Affairs to be 70 percent disabled and to be “unemployable” in “a substantially gainful occupation” and totally disabled, 38 C.F.R. 4.16. In 2010 he applied for social security disability benefits on the ground that pain from his ankle injury, plus back and knee pain and other ailments, had worsened and rendered him totally disabled under Social Security Act standards. From 2005-2011 he underwent physical examinations and diagnostic tests. Some results were normal but many were not, revealing torn ligaments, obesity, possible arthritis, an “alignment problem” in his back, and fibromyalgia. Hall testified about his pain and inability to perform normal functions. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of benefits. Several doctors noted that Hall had been in pain when examined, which was some corroboration of his testimony. The ALJ could have resolved her doubts by ordering an MRI or directing a further examination by a medical expert. In addition, her failure to analyze and weigh the VA determination that Hall is totally disabled was a further oversight. View "Hall v. Colvin" on Justia Law