Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009 the doctor was hired by a small rural Wisconsin critical access hospital, as the director of its emergency room. Fired just months after being hired, he sued the hospital in under Title VII, claiming that the hospital had discriminated against him because of his Indian ethnicity. He alleged that a hospital employee said to him “you must be that Middle Eastern guy whom they hired as ER director” and accused him of taking her job, spat at him, and told him he belonged to a terrorist class of people and was a danger to the hospital. Hospital personnel complained to the plaintiff’s superior that he was incompetent—that he had poor patient skills, behaved unprofessionally, misdiagnosed patient ailments, and couldn’t get along with staff. His superior urged him to resign after he had worked only 12 shifts. After delays because the plaintiff initially acted pro se, and filings that were inadequate or nonresponsive, the judge dismissed the case for failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that “the pratfalls of a party’s lawyer are imputed to the party” and that plaintiff offered no excuse for missing the deadline.View "Sheikh v. Grant Reg'l Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Lightspeed operates online pornography sites and sued a defendant, identified only Internet Protocol address, which was allegedly associated with unlawful viewing of Lightspeed’s content, using a “hacked” password. Lightspeed identified 6,600 others (by IP addresses only) as “co‐conspirators” in a scheme to steal passwords and content. Lightspeed, acting ex parte, served subpoenas on the ISPs (then non‐parties) for the personally identifiable information of each alleged coconspirator, none of whom had been joined as parties. The ISPs moved to quash and for a protective order. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the ISPs. Lightspeed amended its complaint to name as co‐conspirator parties the ISPs and unidentified “corporate representatives,” alleging negligence, violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030 and 1030(g), and deceptive practices. Lightspeed issued new subpoenas seeking the personally identifiable information. The ISPs removed the case to federal court. The district judge denied an emergency motion to obtain the identification information. After several “changes” with respect to Lightspeed’s lawyers, the court stated that they “demonstrated willingness to deceive … about their operations, relationships, and financial interests have varied from feigned ignorance to misstatements to outright lies … calculated so that the Court would grant early‐discovery requests, thereby allowing [them] to identify defendants and exact settlement proceeds.” After granting Lightspeed’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the court granted attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927, stating that the litigation “smacked of bullying pretense.” Failing to pay, the lawyers were found to be in civil contempt and ordered to pay 10% of the original sanctions award to cover costs for the contempt litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Duffy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Brandner, an orthopedic surgeon, belongs to the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons. He is no longer able to perform surgery, but does consultations and other medical endeavors that do not require fine motor control. He devotes most of his time to providing expert advice and testimony in litigation. The Academy concluded that Brandner violated its ethical standards by professing greater confidence in one case than the evidence warranted. The Academy decided to suspend him for one year. Brandner filed suit, contending that the Academy violated Illinois law and its own governing documents. The Academy deferred the suspension pending resolution of the litigation. The Academy is a private group, and Illinois law does not allow judicial review of a private group’s membership decisions unless membership is an “economic necessity” or affects “important economic interests.” The district court concluded that the suspension would devastate Brandner’s income, but that the Academy had followed its own rules. The court granted summary judgment for the Academy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed “Brandner has offered only hot air. … he has expressed his opinion with greater confidence than the evidence warrants. He has not established that a one-year suspension from the Academy would end his professional career.” View "Brandner v. Am. Acad.of Orthopaedic Surgeons" on Justia Law

In 2009, Sheth, a cardiologist, pled guilty to a single count of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. As agreed by Sheth, the district court entered an order of criminal forfeiture for cash and investment accounts then valued at $13 million plus real estate and a vehicle. The government represented that the forfeited assets represented the proceeds of Sheth’s fraud, calculated to be about $13 million. Sheth’s plea agreement specifies that forfeited assets would be credited against the amount of restitution, which the district court had determined to be $12,376,310. In 2012, before the government had liquidated all of the forfeited assets or disbursed any of the proceeds, it sought more of Sheth’s assets to apply to restitution. Sheth objected. Without resolving the factual dispute, the district court ordered turnover of the assets, which were held by third parties. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the court erred by ordering turnover of the assets without first allowing for discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Sheth" on Justia Law

E.Y., a child, was diagnosed with diplegic cerebral palsy. His mother alleges that E.Y.’s illness resulted from medical malpractice by the federally-funded Friend Family Health Center, where she received her prenatal care, and the private University of Chicago Hospital, where she gave birth. Federal law makes a suit against the Center a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that had to be filed within the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that the suit was filed about two weeks too late. The mother argued that although she was aware she might have a claim against the University Hospital more than two years before filing this suit, she remained unaware that the Friend Center might be involved until she received a partial set of medical records on December 14, 2006, making her suit timely. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Ms. Wallace the mother was unaware and had no reason to be aware of the Friend Center’s potential involvement in her son’s injuries until less than two years before she filed suit. View "E. Y., v. United States" on Justia Law

On March 28, 2008, while Salata was cleaning property owned by Weyerhaeuser, she slipped and fell, claiming loose floor tiles were the cause. On March 8, 2010, Salata filed suit. The parties attempted voluntary mediation, but when they could not reach a settlement, Salata’s then-attorneys, were allowed to withdraw, and Salata’s current counsel, Elrabadi, took over on March 14, 2012. On February 26, 2013, Weyerhaeuser moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the court’s discovery order under FRCP 37, and for a want of prosecution under Rule 41(b); Weyerhaeuser also requested attorney’s fees. The court held a hearing on the motion. Elrabadi failed to appear. The court declined to impose sanctions, but dismissed the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. On May 9, 2013, Elrabadi filed a Motion to Reinstate. Ultimately, the court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Salata v. Weyerhaeuser Co." on Justia Law

In 1983, Birkelbach founded Birkelbach Investment Securities (BIS) and served as its president. Birkelbach was registered as a general securities representative and principal, a municipal securities representative and principal, an options principal, and a financial and operations principal. Birckelbach supervised Murphy’s control of one account held by an unsophisticated investor with assets of $1.7 million, while Murphy generated more than a million dollars in commissions, incurred substantial losses, and engaged in transactions that were not part of the investor-authorized strategy. The investor was unable to understand her statements, many of which included errors that overvalued the account. Lowry similarly mishandled, and Birkelbach supervised, the management of the smaller account of a college student/member of the U.S. military. Birkelbach knew that Murphy had been previously censured, suspended, and fined by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, for trading without authorization and had a history of customer complaints. Birkelbach also had a previous disciplinary history. He had been sanctioned by the Illinois Securities Department and, in 2005, additional supervision of Murphy had been requested by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory organization formed under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o-3. Birkelbach did not do so. After FINRA investigated BIS and recommended sanctions, the Securities and Exchange Commission barred Birkelbach from participation in the securities industry for life. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that the original disciplinary complaint was untimely and the lifetime bar was an excessive punishment.View "Birkelbach v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Hill formed Blythe Corporation to acquire vacant lots in Chicago and was Blythe’s sole owner and employee. Blythe entered into a contract with Flawless Financial, which was to acquire the lots; Blythe agreed to pay legal fees of $50,000 to the attorney recommended by Flawless (DeAngelis) and deliver a $25,000 retainer fee. Blythe signed a representation agreement that had been drafted by DeAngelis, an employee of Brown Udell, on Brown Udell letterhead, but never informed Brown Udell of the representation. Blythe remitted a $25,000 check, payable to DeAngelis which was deposited into the “John A. DeAngelis Client Fund Account.” DeAngelis never shared fees received from Blythe with Brown Udell. Blythe investors transferred $250,000 to the DeAngelis Client Fund Account. Following Hill’s instructions, DeAngelis transferred $249,978 to a Flawless account. None of those funds were ever used to purchase lots on behalf of Blythe. Forte, a Blythe investor, contributed an additional $250,000. DeAngelis submitted an Application for Purchase of Redevelopment Project Area Property to obtain the vacant lots. The Department of Planning and Development reviewed the application and indicated steps necessary to move forward. Blythe, however made no effort to amend its application or to pursue necessary approvals. Blythe did not respond to inquiries by DeAngelis; Hill “[could] not recall” what happened to the funds received from Forte. Blythe sued DeAngelis and Brown Udell, claiming legal malpractice and unjust enrichment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Blythe Holdings, Inc. v. DeAngelis" on Justia Law

Chhibber, an internist, operated a walk‐in medical office on the south side of Chicago. For patients with insurance or Medicare coverage, Chhibber ordered an unusually high volume of diagnostic tests, including echocardiograms, electrocardiograms, pulmonary function tests, nerve conduction studies, carotid Doppler ultrasound scans and abdominal ultrasound scans. Chhibber owned the equipment and his staff performed the tests. He was charged with eight counts of making false statements relating to health care matters, 18 U.S.C. 1035, and eight counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The government presented witnesses who had worked for Chhibber, patients who saw him, and undercover agents who presented themselves to the Clinic as persons needing medical services. Chhibber’s former employees testified that he often ordered tests before he even arrived at the office, based on phone calls with staff. Employees performed the tests themselves with little training, and the results were not reviewed by specialists; normally, the tests were not reviewed at all. Chhibber was convicted of four counts of making false statements and five counts of health care fraud. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Chhibber" on Justia Law

Attorney Stilp represented Miller in claims concerning the construction of Miller’s house by contractor Herman. The district court dismissed. Stilp recommended that Miller terminate the action based on state law. Miller told Stilp that needed time to consider whether to refile., Herman filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Herman’s bankruptcy attorney, Jones, prepared schedules listing the addresses of all creditors. Miller was listed as a creditor on the bankruptcy schedules and creditor matrix, but his address was listed as “c/o Thomas Stilp, Attorney” at Stilp’s office address. Notice of the bankruptcy was delivered to Stilp’s office but was routed to another attorney. Neither Stilp nor Miller was informed of the notice. Miller subsequently informed Stilp that he wanted to refile his complaint against Herman. Stilp then discovered that Herman had filed for bankruptcy protection. Miller did not take immediate action and, about a month later, the bankruptcy court entered a discharge order. About 13 months after he learned of Herman’s bankruptcy petition, Miller moved to reopen the case (11 U.S.C. 727(a)(4)(A)). The bankruptcy court denied the motion. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Miller had been properly served when notice was delivered to Stilp’s firm.View "Miller v. Herman" on Justia Law