Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lawyers, who represented the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case, were sanctioned for improperly joining a defendant that had never employed the plaintiff and were ordered to pay attorneys' fees of $1,475. The judge also dismissed the entire suit with prejudice. The lawyers filed notice of appeal from the sanctions after expiration of the 30-day deadline, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, rejecting an argument that since the award of fees was based in part on Rule 11, the award was outside the scope of Rules 54 and 58(a)(3), required a separate document, and did not become final until that document was filed. A post-judgment sanctions order, made while the judgment is already on appeal, does not fit the ordinary understanding of "judgment," and if it is not a judgment, no separate judgment document was required.

The court issued an directing the attorney to show cause why she should not be subject to discipline, up to and including disbarment, for abandonment of her client in a criminal case. She ignored two previous orders directing her to explain her inaction on her client's opinion, gave incomplete responses to two others, and did not respond to final order. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the attorney is unfit to practice law, stating that abandonment of a client in a criminal case is reprehensible and ignoring orders entered by a court is inexcusable. The court ordered refund of all fees she may have been paid for handling the case.

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit, alleging race discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 2000e. She failed to file a timely response to her employer's motion for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in denying an extension. Plaintiff's counsel offered no explanation for missing the filing date by more than a month. There was no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; there was evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any salary differences among workers in plaintiff's position. Plaintiff never complained to her employer that any actions taken against her by co-workers or by anyone at the company were related to race and nothing about cited incidents gave any hint that race was at issue.

Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC accusing her employer, the Department of the Navy, of discriminating on account of race, sex, national origin, age, and disability. The EEOC found the charge unsupported. In the district court, neither party conducted discovery. Plaintiff sought judgment on the pleadings. The district judge denied the motion. After more than a year of inaction, the district judge dismissed the case for want of prosecution. Plaintiff's lawyer then filed an ex parte motion for relief from judgment, but did not serve the motion on his adversary or explain why a secret motion was authorized. The district judge denied the motion. Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Local Rule 41.1 (the basis for dismissal for want of prosecution) violates the due process clause as "almost unintelligible." The court characterized the appeal as frivolous, stating that It bypassed the only possible argument:that the district judge abused his discretion by dismissing the suit without first warning about the risks of procrastination. The court gave plaintiff's attorney 21 days to show cause why he should not be subject to monetary sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal and violating Circuit Rule 30, and why he should not be censured, suspended, or disbarred on account of his apparent inability to practice competently and diligently in the federal courts.

Plaintiff filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging arrest without probably cause and assault. The judge allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis. After plaintiff delayed in responding to a draft pretrial order, the judge imposed a sanction of $9,055 against the plaintiff and an attorney who had agreed to represent him. Plaintiff was unable to pay and the judge rejected his offer of $25 per month. When plaintiff did not pay within the 30 day period set by the court, it dismissed his suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the fine was actually paid by the attorney after plaintiff complained to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The attorney admitted being unfamiliar with the federal rules and that he had never before filed a pretrial order.

The owner of an outdoor amphitheater in a rural area claimed that the sheriff forced him to hire off-duty deputies as a private security force for events and threatened to close the road leading to his property if he did not comply. After giving plaintiff's attorney three tries at producing a complaint that complied with Rules 8 and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that each iteration of the complaint was generally incomprehensible and riddled with errors, making it impossible for the defendants to know what wrongs they were accused of committing. The Seventh Circuit ordered plaintiff's attorney to show cause why he should not be suspended from the bar of the court or otherwise disciplined under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and directed that a copy be sent to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

The parties agree that the company attempted to collect an overdue hospital bill in a way that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 and that plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages of $1,000. Plaintiff's lawyer endeavored to transform the case into a class action, and the district court, frustrated by the effort, dismissed the whole action. The Seventh Circuit held that dismissal for want of prosecution was an abuse of discretion. All of the errors at issue were the fault of the lawyer and had nothing to do with the claim. The court should have considered other alternatives before dismissal.

A Polish citizen, who entered the U.S. on a visitor's visa in 1994, overstayed, and allegedly tried to bribe an immigration officer in a 1999 sting operation. Before her removal proceedings began, she married a U.S. citizen, who filed a petition for an alien relative visa. In 2006, after the petition was approved, she applied to adjust her status under 8 U.S.C. 1255. The IJ found her removable, denied her motion to suppress evidence collected in the sting, and decided that she was not entitled to adjust her status. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal and forwarded information about petitioner's attorney to the state disciplinary board. The petition included a single, underdeveloped legal argument: that evidence gathered during the sting should have been suppressed because the operation was an egregious violation of petitioner's right to due process, an argument foreclosed by an earlier case. The court noted its jurisdictional limitations, but stated that the agency's evaluation of the equities was not particularly persuasive and that it would have required more than weak circumstantial evidence that an alien had bribed a federal immigration official.

Plaintiff suffered a stroke and claimed that the VA hospital failed to properly diagnose and take appropriate measures. He and his wife sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-80, and also sued their attorney for malpractice. The district court ruled in favor of the government and the attorney. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal as forfeited because plaintiff had supplied only a transcript of the testimony of the government's expert witness Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3) and had failed to supplement. The district court properly refused to sanction plaintiff's attorney for ex parte communication with treating physicians. The court also properly credited the government expert and held that the hospital's actions were not the proximate cause of the stroke.

The doctor was convicted of conspiring to defraud the government and Medicare fraud (42 U.S.C. 1320a) for accepting a salary from the hospital in return for referring patients and sentenced to 72 months imprisonment followed by two years of supervision and to payment of $497,204 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not err in refusing to admit substantive reports from meetings or the minutes of the meetings, although it allowed the government to use the minutes to establish the doctor's non-attendance at meetings. The doctor was allowed to argue that certain reports concerning his services were made and tendered during the meetings. Upholding a jury instruction, the court stated that nothing in the Medicare fraud statute implies that only the primary motivation for remuneration is to be considered and that the conviction is valid even if the payments were, in part, compensation for services. Findings concerning the level of loss supported the sentence.