Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Glick, without a written agreement, provided home daycare for Clayton’s infant daughter, Kenzi, for $25 per day, paid in cash at the end of the week. On January 29, 2018, Kenzi died while in Glick’s care. The coroner’s office indicated that her death resulted from bedding asphyxia after being placed prone on a couch cushion covered with a blanket to nap. The Glicks’ Liberty Mutual insurance policy, covered personal liability for “bodily injury” except for liability “[a]rising out of or in connection with a ‘business’ engaged in by an insured.” A separate endorsement stated: If an “insured” regularly provides home daycare services to a person or persons other than “insureds” and receives monetary or other compensation for such services, that enterprise is a “business.” Mutual exchange of home daycare services, however, is not considered compensation. The rendering of home daycare services by an “insured” to a relative of an “insured” is not considered a “business.”Liberty Mutual denied coverage. In Clayton’s wrongful death lawsuit, the district court granted Liberty Mutual summary judgment and expressly declared Liberty Mutual has no duty to defend or indemnify Glick in the underlying lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Clayton’s claim “did not even potentially fall within the scope of coverage.” View "Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Clayton" on Justia Law

Bensenberg, age 85, was driving her 2008 Chrysler SUV when she lost consciousness during a medical episode. Her car entered a ditch beside the highway at 45-65 mph, hit a raised earthen driveway, became airborne, and struck a concrete post. The side-curtain airbag deployed when the vehicle’s sensors detected a potential roll-over, but the front airbag did not deploy. Bensenberg's seat belt deployed properly. Bensenberg suffered an undisplaced fracture of the second cervical vertebra in her neck. She wore a cervical collar for three months but did not require surgery. She died of unrelated causes three years later, after filing suit against the car manufacturer, alleging strict liability based on a manufacturing defect and a design defect in the airbag system.The district court granted a motion in limine to exclude the opinion of Bensenberg’s expert that the vehicle’s airbag was defective because the expert did not identify any purported defect in the airbag system but simply assumed from the airbag’s failure to deploy that it must have had a defect. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The opinion of the plaintiff’s expert is admissible to show that the vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed sufficient to command deployment of the front airbag when it collided with the post; this is sufficient to make a prima facie case of a non-specific defect in the airbag system within the parameters that Illinois courts have established. View "Bensenberg v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

At a Speedway convenience store, Weaver tripped on the curb in front of the doorway, fell to the ground, and sustained injuries. Weaver sued for negligence, alleging that Speedway failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. After discovery on liability, a magistrate granted Speedway summary judgment, reasoning that any danger posed by the curb was obvious and that Speedway had no reason to anticipate that Weaver would not protect herself from such a situation. The court cited evidence that, in the last five years, only one other person had reported falling over that curb; Weaver herself had visited the same store multiple times without tripping. Although the company policy to paint the curbs outside store entrances was relevant, a violation of that policy would not by itself establish a breach of Speedway’s duty.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although a policy manual may be admissible, it cannot, alone, set the standard for a landowner’s duty of ordinary care. Here, there is no evidence that the area surrounding the curb renders the curb particularly dangerous. Weaver has no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the curb posed any unusual danger to those entering the store in the normal course of doing business. View "Weaver v. Speedway, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that Hyles committed sexual abuse and assault at Hammond, Indiana's First Baptist Church, and its affiliated school, Hyles-Anderson College, in the late 1970s and that the institutions conspired to conceal the abuse. One plaintiff alleged that she paid fees and tithes to the institutions while being abused as a teenager. In 2020, they filed a civil claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.The district court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs had not alleged the injury to “business or property” required for RICO’s civil cause of action, 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries during the exercise of a property right (while expending money to participate in Church-related activities) that had an “indirect, or secondary effect” on the value of the property right. That is insufficient to satisfy the business or property element of a civil RICO claim. They contend that the institutions misappropriated their funds by using them to fund a sham investigation in the 2010s but did not describe how money paid in the 1970s could plausibly have been used to fund a phony investigation decades later. The allegations are too “speculative and amorphous” to permit their RICO claim to proceed. View "Ryder v. Hyles" on Justia Law

In 2015, Talignani, a U.S. military veteran, consulted a VA neurosurgeon, who recommended that he undergo neck surgery. Because the VA could not perform a timely surgery, the surgeon suggested Talignani obtain evaluation and treatment at Saint Louis University Hospital. Talignani agreed and expressed a preference for the Hospital because he had previously undergone surgery there. A nurse obtained the VA’s approval to secure treatment for Talignani at a non-VA provider. The VA agreed to pay for “evaluation and treatment rendered pursuant to the non-VA provider’s plan of care.” The VA then sent a request for outpatient services to the Hospital. The Hospital agreed to treat Talignani and asked the VA to conduct several pre-operative tests. In January 2016, Dr. Mercier performed neck surgery on Talignani using the Hospital’s facility and staff. Talignani died shortly after being released.Talignani’s estate alleged he was prescribed excessive pain medication prior to his discharge, which proximately caused his death. An administrative complaint with the VA was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The Act waives sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by “employee[s] of the Government.” The estate’s claim does not involve a government employee. View "Talignani v. United States" on Justia Law

DiDonato fell and seriously injured her head in the bathroom of Panatera’s home Panatera, a Chicago paramedic, found DiDonato disoriented and badly bleeding but allegedly only rinsed the blood from DiDonato’s head, wrapped it in a towel, moved her to his bed, and sexually assaulted her. When DiDonato regained consciousness the next afternoon, Panatera drove her home. DiDonato went to an emergency room. She had sustained head trauma and a concussion.DiDonato filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Panatera violated her due process rights by failing to provide medical care, with state law claims for assault, battery, and negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of DiDonato’s section 1983 claim. DiDonato had to allege that a state actor failed to adhere to a duty to protect and care for a person with whom the state had a “special relationship.” States and municipalities are not in a “special relationship” with all residents and do not shoulder a constitutional duty to provide medical care to anyone needing help. There was no allegation that DiDonato was ever in the city’s care or custody. DiDonato also failed to plausibly allege that Panatera acted “under color of state law.” Section 1983 does not cover disputes between private citizens; an individual’s employment by the state does not render any and all action by that person state action. DiDonato’s need for help and medical care arose during entirely private interaction. View "Didonato v. Panatera" on Justia Law

Bourke was exposed to fumes during his employment with the Veterans Administration. He received treatment at a VA hospital and contends that medical malpractice there caused him serious injuries. He sought compensation from the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act for on-the-job injuries and from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice. The Department of Labor processed Bourke’s claim but found that he had not shown that his asserted injuries had been caused by exposure to fumes. The VA (handling the FTCA claim) concluded that, once Bourke applied to the Department of Labor, all other sources of relief were precluded. Bourke sued under the Tort Claims Act, conceding the Department of Labor’s conclusion that conditions at work did not cause the medical issues for which he was treated by the VA, and alleging medical malpractice.The district court rejected his complaint on the ground that the Federal Employees Compensation Act offers his sole avenue of relief.; once the Department of Labor adjudicates a claim, the applicant must accept the result because 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) forecloses other sources of relief and 5 U.S.C. 8128(b)(2) blocks judicial review of the Department’s decisions.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Bourke is not seeking judicial review of the Department of Labor’s decision. Someone who loses before the Department cannot contest that outcome in court but may pursue other remedies that are compatible with the Department’s views. View "Bourke v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ludwig hiking group purchased vehicle passes from the ranger station in Oregon's Mount Hood Wilderness, federal land administered by the Forest Service, which provides parking areas and trail access. As the hikers crossed the Sandy River on a wooden seasonal bridge installed by the Service, a logjam ruptured, sending a wave of water and debris at the bridge. Ludwig was thrown into the river and drowned.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government in a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671. Oregon statutes create immunity for a landowner from tort claims for any death that arises out of the use of the land for recreational purposes unless the owner charges for that recreational use; tort immunity applies if the owner charges only a “parking fee of $15 or less per day.” The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act allows the Service to charge a standard amenity fee for an area that contains designated parking; a permanent toilet facility; a permanent trash receptacle; picnic tables; and security services. The Forest Service requires Ramona Falls visitors to purchase a $5 "National Forest Recreation Pass" to park; it tells users to “DISPLAY IN VEHICLE.” The Service does not require a pass or collect fees from hikers, bikers, and horseback riders who do not park a vehicle. It does not matter that the Service included other amenities; the charge was, ultimately, for parking. View "Ludwig v. United States" on Justia Law

Suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a) Clanton alleged that nurse practitioner Jordan, an employee of the U.S. Public Health Service, failed to educate him about his severe hypertension or to monitor its advancement; his hypertension developed into Stage V kidney disease so that Clanton required dialysis and, at the age of 35, a kidney transplant. The district court rejected the government’s comparative negligence argument as to Clanton and awarded Clanton nearly $30 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit upheld the damages calculation but remanded for the court to assess Clanton’s comparative negligence under Illinois’s reasonable-person standard, noting that Clanton had external clues that he was seriously unwell, such as two employment-related physicals which showed dangerously high blood pressure.On remand, the court again concluded that comparative negligence was inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court made findings as to what an objectively reasonable person would understand as to hypertension and found that a reasonable person would not understand the potential for damage absent any symptoms, and therefore would not understand the need to take medication or see a medical provider when asymptomatic. Based on those findings, the court held that Clanton’s actions were not inconsistent with the due care that would be expected of a reasonable person. The government did not challenge whether the fact-findings and conclusion were supportable; the court properly identified and applied the standard. View "Clanton v. United States" on Justia Law

Dollar General contracts separately with Capstone and CHEP for work at its Marion, Indiana distribution center. Dollar General owned certain power equipment at the distribution center, including all pallet jacks. Capstone and CHEP employees were permitted to use Dollar General’s jacks. Dollar General personnel were responsible for maintaining the jacks. Capstone and CHEP employees who had an issue with a jack were to take it to the Dollar General maintenance shop and fill out a “red tag.”Capstone employed Seekins to unload trucks at the distribution center. Seekins lost his left foot as a result of an accident involving a jack and sued CHEP. Seekins alleged that the jack had possibly been used by a CHEP employee before Seekins and that CHEP’s alleged failure to remove the jack from service meant that CHEP effectively supplied it to Seekins.The district court entered summary judgment, holding that CHEP did not owe Seekins a duty of care under Indiana negligence law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. CHEP was not a “supplier” as that term is used in the Indiana statute. The sharing of equipment owned, controlled, and maintained by a third company does not create a duty of care. View "Seekins v. CHEP USA" on Justia Law