Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Collins, a regular heavy drinker, had suffered alcohol withdrawal, and kept a bottle of Librium to treat withdrawal and anxiety. Collins had Librium with him when he was arrested for DUI. The jail physician, Dr. Al‐Shami, who approved Collins’s use of the Librium while in custody. Collins was taken to a cell; officers checked on him every 15 minutes. The next day Collins began to complain of shaking from alcohol withdrawal. He was given Librium and vitamins. By lunchtime, Collins was better and eating normally. In the afternoon, he began to complain again. A nurse called Dr. Al‐Shami, who ordered that Collins be given the normal treatment for alcohol withdrawal. After being treated for additional incidents, Collins was taken to the hospital. The examining physician concluded that Collins was not suffering from delirium tremens. Collins was returned to the jail. Collins continued to display strange behavior, interspersed with periods of normalcy. Officers continued to check on Collins every 15 minutes. Eventually, Collins was again taken to the hospital. Collins was hypothermic, had low blood pressure, and was suffering from dehydration, sepsis, and acute respiratory failure. He was in a medically‐induced coma for several days. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in Collins's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, concluding that the level of care was reasonable. View "Collins v. Al-Shami" on Justia Law

While lifting a heavy door at his prison job in 2008, Cesal heard a “snap” in his back and felt pain in his leg and hip. He sought treatment from the prison’s medical staff but was dissatisfied with their response. He alleged that he received a three-year runaround, during which his pain was ignored, that the Clinical Director canceled Cesal’s insulin prescription in retaliation for Cesal’s filing a complaint about the inadequate care. Without the prescription, Cesal, an insulin-dependent diabetic, was unable to control his blood sugar and suffered additional pain and harm. He filed a second complaint with the prison about the insulin deprivation. Cesal, acting pro se, sued the Clinical Director and another Pekin physician. At the screening phase, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the district court identified an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a First Amendment retaliation claim related to the withholding of insulin. The court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that the statute of limitations had run and that, in any event, there was no question of material fact that would justify allowing his case to proceed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that "Cesal’s allegations are troublesome," but noting important differences between ordinary, or even aggravated, medical malpractice, and an Eighth Amendment violation View "Cesal v. Molina" on Justia Law

Inmate Diggs injured his knee in a fight in 2006 and complained to medical staff about knee pain and instability 14 times. In 2009, Dr. Ghosh, the prison’s medical director, recommended that Diggs be assigned to a lower bunk and ordered an MRI, which revealed that his right ACL had a complete tear. Ghosh got approval from Wexford, the private company that contracts with Illinois to provide prison medical care, for Diggs to receive orthopedic follow‐up. Notwithstanding recommendations by the outside providers, Diggs received no physical therapy and no follow‐up. After several delays and changes in staff, Diggs unsuccessfully filed an emergency grievance, requesting surgery and complaining that his placement effectively confined him to his cell. In 2015, a Wexford physician reportedly stated that no local doctor would perform the surgery. Diggs sued, alleging that the doctors and warden were deliberately indifferent to his torn ACL and intentionally had caused him emotional distress. He sought an injunction to compel the warden to authorize surgery. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding that the doctors had treatment choices and that Diggs did not establish that the warden knew about the supposed mistreatment nor that the defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, finding that a reasonable jury could rule in favor of Diggs on the deliberate indifference claims. View "Diggs v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

Rasho, an Illinois inmate since 1996, has a history of mental illness. After he stopped taking his medication and had escalating symptoms, he was transferred to Pontiac’s Mental Health Unit, where he remained until 2006, when he was transferred to the Segregation Unit. Rasho believes that he was transferred, not because he no longer required specialized treatment, but in retaliation for complaints he lodged against prison staff. According to Rasho, after he was transferred, he was denied minimally adequate mental health care for more than 20 months. Rasho filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Rasho put forward sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could decide that two doctors caused him to be transferred for reasons unrelated to medical judgment. The court affirmed with respect to defendants with more tenuous connections to his mental health treatment: two doctors who allegedly failed to supervise properly the contract between IDOC and its medical provider and the warden. An individual defendant is liable under section 1983 only if personally responsible for the constitutional violation. View "Rasho v. Elyea" on Justia Law

Glisson was diagnosed with laryngeal cancer. His larynx, part of his pharynx, portions of his mandible and 13 teeth were removed. He was fitted with a voice prosthesis, and received postoperative radiation treatment. Later, doctors inserted a gastrojejunostomy tube to help with nutrition and a cancerous lesion on his tongue was excised. Glisson also suffered memory issues, hypothyroidism, depression, smoking, and alcohol abuse. Glisson was sentenced to incarceration for giving a friend prescription painkillers. Prison medical personnel noted spikes in Glisson’s blood pressure, low pulse, low oxygen saturation level, confusion, and anger. His condition worsened, indicating acute renal failure. After a short hospital stay, Glisson died in prison. The district court rejected his mother’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, rejecting a claim that failure to implement an Indiana Department of Corrections Health Care Service Directive, requiring a plan for management of chronic diseases, violated the Eighth Amendment. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed. The Department’s healthcare contractor, Corizon, was not constitutionally required to adopt the Directives or any particular document, but was required to ensure that a well-recognized risk for a defined class of prisoners not be deliberately left to happenstance. Corizon had notice of the problems posed by lack of coordination, but did nothing to address that risk. Glisson was managing his difficult medical situation successfully until he fell into the hands of the Indiana prison system and Corizon. View "Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Lake, a prisoner at Illinois’ Hill Correctional Center, claimed, in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that Dr. Jackson, the prison’s dentist had refused to send him to an outside dentist to extract a decayed tooth that was causing him pain. Lake claimed that Wexford, the contractor serving the prison, has policy of withholding medical care to save money. Although Dr. Jackson assured him that his mouth could be numbed successfully, Lake refused to let her pull the tooth and complained to Wexford that he was suffering needlessly because of its refusal to provide him with outside treatment. Lake later agreed to let a different prison dentist extract the tooth. A local anesthetic was used during the extraction, but Lake complained afterward that the procedure had been painful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Lake’s claims, and agreeing that a jury would have to find that Dr. Jackson had been exercising professional judgment in predicting that administering a local anesthetic would enable her to extract the decayed tooth without inflicting significant pain. View "Lake v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Harper, an Illinois prisoner, sued a prison doctor and a nurse under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to his pain following nine abdominal surgeries, the management of his diet, and inattention to a possible renal cell tumor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Harper had not produced evidence from which a jury could find that either defendant ignored a substantial risk of harm. Harper was evaluated and treated each time that he appeared at the health center, given a treatment plan, and told to return if his symptoms persisted. Harper is not entitled to dictate how he should have been treated or whether he should have been transferred. View "Harper v. Santos" on Justia Law

Dr. Kohli, a board-certified neurologist with extensive training in the treatment of chronic pain, operated the Kohli Neurology and Sleep Center in Effingham, Illinois. Irregularities in the practice eventually caught the attention of federal officials; he was indicted on three counts of healthcare fraud, two counts of money laundering, and 10 counts of illegal dispensation of a controlled substance (Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)). During a 15-day trial, the jury learned about Dr. Kohli’s prescribing practices from law enforcement and healthcare professionals, expert witnesses, and his patients and their family members. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions and finding the verdict supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected an argument that the district court somehow conflated the standards for civil and criminal liability, or that it otherwise misled the jury into believing that it could find Dr. Kohli criminally liable for engaging in mere civil malpractice. View "United States v. Kohli" on Justia Law

When Chelsea was five months old, she was dropped and suffered a skull fracture. As the fracture expanded, a cyst formed. The fracture and cyst were not a problem until, at age 17, she was hit in the head and suffered a loss of consciousness, blurred vision, and dizziness. After CT and MRI scans confirmed the extent of the fracture and the cyst, Chelsea underwent “cranioplasty” surgery. She was discharged after one day and was found dead in her bed three days later. A board‐certified forensic pathologist was unable to identify a cause of death and, based on the opinion of a neuropathologist, concluded that Chelsea had died from a seizure brought about by surgical damage. Neither doctor was aware of or had reviewed the pre‐surgery CT and MRI scans when they made their findings. Chelsea’s mother sued the hospital and doctors, arguing that anti-seizure medicine should have been prescribed. The defendants argued that no seizure had occurred and that a heart‐related ailment was the likely cause of death. A jury found in the defendants’ favor. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that one defense expert lacked the requisite qualifications to opine that a heart ailment was the likely cause of death and that there was a significant chance that the erroneous admission of the testimony affected the trial’s outcome. View "Hall v. Flannery" on Justia Law

McDonald, an Illinois inmate in the segregation unit, suffered an asthma attack in his cell. There were no emergency call buttons. Hours later. his cellmate banged on the door to alert the guards. A guard eventually escorted McDonald to the prison’s healthcare unit, run by Wexford, a private company. McDonald was wheezing and using his accessory muscles to breathe. Nurse Reuter started him on oxygen and administered medications, then phoned Dr. Larson, who was the only on-call doctor for several correctional facilities. He slept through the call. He finally returned her call and prescribed several medications. Thirty minutes later, McDonald was still using his accessory muscles to breathe. Larson then ordered his transfer to a hospital via ambulance and called ahead. In the ER, Dr. Reyes treated him with medications for about two hours, then inserted a breathing tube. McDonald died. The court rejected his estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the warden and Wexford, which focused on the lack of a permanent medical director and the lack of emergency call buttons in segregation cells. Claims against Larson, Reuter, and the guards tried to a jury, which returned a defense verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the warden consciously disregarded a substantial risk of harm to McDonald nor establish that a Wexford policy caused a constitutional injury. View "Chatham v. Davis" on Justia Law