Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Attorney Mehta was charged with converting escrow funds and lying to a state court. After a hearing, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended disbarment. While the recommendation was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a ruled to show cause why he should not be suspended, rejected Mehta's arguments, and suspended his license. Mehta sued the court and the IARDC under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the suspension violated his right to due process. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the meantime, Mehta was disbarred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, rejecting Mehta's argument that the suspension was not a final order that was subject to the doctrine. Illinois law provides that an interim suspension order is a final judgment in the Rule 774 proceeding in which it is issued.

Officers, responding to an assault in progress, saw defendant, who voluntarily submitted to a pat down. A pistol was found in his coat pocket. Charged possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant insisted that the police had planted the gun. His lawyer believed that he could not argue that the firearm was the fruit of an unreasonable search. Following his conviction, defendant brought a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance in that his attorney did not move to suppress the firearm as the product of an unreasonable and did not explain to defendant that his testimony at a suppression hearing could not be used at trial as evidence of his guilt. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant’s insistence that the police planted the gun neither justified nor compelled counsel to refrain from challenging the search that produced the weapon. The court remanded for determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by that failure.

The attorney, purporting to represent the guardian of Cristina’s financial interests, filed suit in state court, alleging that Cristina, a minor, had been abused by six defendants. Her general guardian had discharged the attorney. The attorney dismissed the suit. The defendants sought sanctions. The attorney filed a notice of removal to federal court. Within a month, and following a "deluge of motions" from the attorney, the federal court remanded the proceeding to state court. The defendants requested an award of attorneys' fees for wrongful removal, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). The district judge concluded that the attorney had vexatiously multiplied the proceedings, 28 U.S.C. 1927 and ordered him to pay $10,155 to one defendant and $2,432 to another. The Seventh Circuit affirmed under 1447(c). The removal "was worse than unreasonable; it was preposterous."

In 2000, husband and wife, with an estate valued at $3 to $4 million, revised their estate plan with the assistance of their Illinois lawyer, a Minnesota lawyer, and a law partner of their son-in-law. The plan included a trust that treated their son and his daughter, India, less favorably than their two daughters and other grandchildren. When they died within a month of each other in 2004, their son and India sued the three lawyers, alleging malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court rejected a conflict-of-interest argument and dismissed most of the claims as untimely or barred. India's minor status tolled the limitations period, but the court dismissed her claim as premature. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that India's claim should have been dismissed with prejudice. The district court properly chose Illinois's statute of limitations over Minnesota's; and properly rejected waiver and equitable-tolling arguments. The court properly dismissed the fiduciary-duty claims as barred by res judicata; there had been state court litigation concerning sale of the family home. There was no evidence to support India’s contention that her grandparents intended her to receive more than the documents provide.

Lawyers, who represented the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case, were sanctioned for improperly joining a defendant that had never employed the plaintiff and were ordered to pay attorneys' fees of $1,475. The judge also dismissed the entire suit with prejudice. The lawyers filed notice of appeal from the sanctions after expiration of the 30-day deadline, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, rejecting an argument that since the award of fees was based in part on Rule 11, the award was outside the scope of Rules 54 and 58(a)(3), required a separate document, and did not become final until that document was filed. A post-judgment sanctions order, made while the judgment is already on appeal, does not fit the ordinary understanding of "judgment," and if it is not a judgment, no separate judgment document was required.

Plaintiff filed a class-action in state court seeking overtime wages under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/4a, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). After the state court denied class certification, plaintiff filed suit in federal court, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for his overtime claim in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). After the state suit was resolved for less than $5,000 and the federal case resulted in an award of about $11,000, plaintiff's attorney moved for attorneys' fees of $112,566. The district court awarded $1,864, reasoning that if the attorney had not misrepresented damages until the start of trial, the case would have settled quickly. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Although a district court has discretion in determining the lodestar, it cannot base its decision on an irrelevant consideration or reach an unreasonable conclusion. It was unreasonable for the court to cut almost all of the attorney's hours based on its conclusion that the case should not have gone to trial.

An associate, dismissed from the law firm after five years, sought bonuses and fees with respect to cases on which he worked that settled after his departure. He filed attorney's liens in Illinois state courts. When that strategy failed, he filed in federal court. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to contract claims and claims under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/2), but otherwise affirmed. No court has ever decided whether plaintiff's employment agreement entitled him to compensation for work he did on the cases at issue and he made a plausible case that the agreement entitles him to some portion of the revenues. His contract required the firm to give him 30 days' notice before terminating his employment, but it failed to do so.

In 2007, plaintiff applied for admission to the Indiana Bar. The Board of Law Examiners requested that he attend hearings to investigate his application and be evaluated by mental health professionals and ultimately denied the application. After exhausting appeals to the Indiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, plaintiff brought suit, claiming that evaluation of his application focused on his religious beliefs (ostensibly Roman Catholic) and violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and found that the defendants were immune from civil suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the gravamen of the claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 required review of a state court decision and could have been raised in his appeals.

The court issued an directing the attorney to show cause why she should not be subject to discipline, up to and including disbarment, for abandonment of her client in a criminal case. She ignored two previous orders directing her to explain her inaction on her client's opinion, gave incomplete responses to two others, and did not respond to final order. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the attorney is unfit to practice law, stating that abandonment of a client in a criminal case is reprehensible and ignoring orders entered by a court is inexcusable. The court ordered refund of all fees she may have been paid for handling the case.

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit, alleging race discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 2000e. She failed to file a timely response to her employer's motion for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in denying an extension. Plaintiff's counsel offered no explanation for missing the filing date by more than a month. There was no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; there was evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any salary differences among workers in plaintiff's position. Plaintiff never complained to her employer that any actions taken against her by co-workers or by anyone at the company were related to race and nothing about cited incidents gave any hint that race was at issue.