Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

More than 13 years ago, lawyers around the country began class actions challenging the installation of fiberoptic cable on property without landowners’ consent. The cases began to settle on a state-by-state basis, leaving the lawyers to allocate awarded and expected attorney’s fees. The lawyers informally grouped themselves based on their negotiation and litigation positions. The Susman Group participated in mediation and agreed to a fee division, but balked at signing a written agreement, ostensibly because Susman disliked its enforcement terms. The district court held that Susman is bound by the agreement despite his failure to sign. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, given the parties’ lengthy course of dealing, Susman’s failure to promptly object to the written agreement can objectively be construed as assent. A finding that Susman’s refusal to sign was a case of “buyer’s remorse” rather than a genuine objection to the enforcement terms in the agreement was supported by the record. View "McDaniel v. Qwest Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Convicted of robbing three banks, Johnson was sentenced to 220 months’ imprisonment. At trial Prince told the jury that he and Johnson had planned and executed the robberies together. Williams testified that Prince asked her to give him a ride one day and was accompanied by a stranger. She drove them several places, lastly a grocery store. Prince and the stranger entered the store and robbed the branch bank inside. Williams picked a photo of Johnson from an array of six photos. On appeal, Johnson argued that the judge should not have allowed Williams and the agent who conducted the array to testify about the identification because the Seventh Circuit has suggested that police show photographs sequentially rather than in an array. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, noting that Johnson did not attempt to show that all photo spreads are unnecessary and suggestive, or make it impossible for counsel to use the tools of the adversary process to explore an identification’s reliability. All six photos met Williams’s description and the array was not suggestive. The court also imposed a fine on Johnson’s attorney for omitting, from his brief, the court’s reasons for declining to exclude the identification. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Off-duty Officer Macon argued with Richardson about Macon’s former girlfriend. Macon fired his gun at Richardson but missed. When on-duty officers arrived, Macon said that Richardson had struck him with a baseball bat. Richardson was arrested and charged with assault and battery. After the charges were dismissed, Richardson filed suit, with 39 claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against Chicago, Macon, the arresting officers, and others. Chicago was dismissed before trial because municipalities are not vicariously liable under section 1983, and the district judge found that none of the city’s policies (including its training regimens) was constitutionally deficient. The jury rejected claims against the other defendants, but decided in Richardson’s favor on one claim, concerning the shot Macon fired, and awarded $1 in nominal damages plus $3,000 in punitive damages. Macon did not appeal, nor did Chicago, which under Illinois law must indemnify Macon for the $1 but not the punitive award. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, Richardson sought more than $675,000 in fees. The district judge awarded $123,000, noting that the firm’s billing did not allow non‑compensable time to be separated out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award as “generous, considering Richardson’s recovery.” View "Richardson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the court ruled on motions to seal settlement agreements. In Goesel, the law firm filed a motion to maintain under seal documents disclosing the amounts of a personal injury settlement and of the lawyers' costs and fees. In Massuda, defendants sought to keep the redacted settlement agreement, in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty, kept under seal. The court concluded that the parties in both cases have failed to rebut the presumption of public access to judicial records. In neither case have they offered any reason for secrecy except that they have a confidentiality agreement and that was insufficient. The court denied the request in Goesel where an outsider to the litigation could not evaluate the dispute over the district judge's modification of the settlement without knowing the amount of the settlement before and after the modification. The court dismissed the request in Massuda where, inter alia, there was no indication that the amount of the settlement figured in the district court's decision. View "Goesel, et al. v. Boley Int'l, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against B&B and others, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962. The alleged scheme involved "Population Equivalents" (PEs), specified quantities of sewage that a house or other building was estimated to dump into the local sewage system. The complaint alleged that B&B had improperly taken control of the Wasco Sanitary District and used that control to divert to itself permit fees that should have gone to the district to finance an expansion of its sewage system. The district court dismissed the claim for want of RICO standing because plaintiffs could not demonstrate an injury to their business or property. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their application for an award of attorneys' fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) and (2). The court concluded that plaintiffs' suit, while meritless, was not frivolous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Fiala, et al. v. B&B Enterprises, et al." on Justia Law

Wells Fargo sued the Younans for breach of contract. The defendants moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction over Sherry Younan because of lack of minimum contacts in Illinois and insufficient service of process. The district court ruled that the opposing parties were not of diverse citizenship and that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Instead of amending, Wells Fargo moved, nine months after filing its original complaint, to be allowed to dismiss without prejudice. The defendants asked that dismissal be conditioned on Wells Fargo’s paying their legal expenses of $56,000. The judge dismissed, conditioned on Wells Fargo reimbursing defendants for $11,000 in legal expenses incurred in seeking dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the defendants did not justify their “extravagant‐seeming request, which included more than $9,000 for two briefs each of which was just half a page long and merely incorporated by reference another lawyer’s brief.” View "Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Younan Props., Inc." on Justia Law

Re and Leach owned warehouses in Englewood, Florida. After leasing space in Leach’s warehouse, Daughtry told his agent that he did so because Leach stated that a sewer line essential to Re’s warehouse crossed Leach’s property without permission and lacked permits. The agent shared the information who Re, who hired assailants to beat Leach and threaten worse unless he broke the lease. Re was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for using extortion to injure Leach’s business in interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Re claimed that his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance: trial counsel by stealing from Re and appellate counsel by omitting an argument certain to prevail. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that threatening someone without “obtaining” money, or value, in return, does not meet the Hobbs Act definition. A jury could find that Re’s goal in having Leach beaten was to obtain Daughtry as a tenant to get rental payments. A post-trial crime by a lawyer against his client does not spoil the trial as a matter of law; prejudice must be shown. Re could not establish prejudice. The lawyer who embezzled his funds played only a peripheral role in the trial. View "Re v. United States" on Justia Law

Attorney Stilp represented Miller in claims concerning the construction of Miller’s house by contractor Herman. The district court dismissed. Stilp recommended that Miller terminate the action based on state law. Miller told Stilp that needed time to consider whether to refile., Herman filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Herman’s bankruptcy attorney, Jones, prepared schedules listing the addresses of all creditors. Miller was listed as a creditor on the bankruptcy schedules and creditor matrix, but his address was listed as “c/o Thomas Stilp, Attorney” at Stilp’s office address. Notice of the bankruptcy was delivered to Stilp’s office but was routed to another attorney. Neither Stilp nor Miller was informed of the notice. Miller subsequently informed Stilp that he wanted to refile his complaint against Herman. Stilp then discovered that Herman had filed for bankruptcy protection. Miller did not take immediate action and, about a month later, the bankruptcy court entered a discharge order. About 13 months after he learned of Herman’s bankruptcy petition, Miller moved to reopen the case (11 U.S.C. 727(a)(4)(A)). The bankruptcy court denied the motion. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Miller had been properly served when notice was delivered to Stilp’s firm.View "Miller v. Herman" on Justia Law

Steidl and Whitlock were convicted of 1987 murders, largely based on testimony by two supposed eyewitnesses. Long after the convictions, an investigation revealed that much of the testimony was perjured and that exculpatory evidence had been withheld. The revelations led to the release of the men and dismissal of all charges. Steidl had spent almost 17 years in prison; Whitlock had spent close to 21 years. They sued. By 2013, both had settled with all defendants. Because the defendants were public officials and public entities, disputes arose over responsibility for defense costs. National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the defense of former State’s Attorney, McFatridge, or Edgar County, agreeing to pay their costs under a reservation of rights until the issue was resolved. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of National Casualty. In another case McFatridge sought a state court order that the Illinois Attorney General approve his reasonable expenses and fees; the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim. In a third case, National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that another insurer was liable for costs it had advanced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the other company is liable. It would be inequitable for that company to benefit from National’s attempt to do the right thing, especially since it did not do the right thing and contribute to the defense costs under a reservation of rights. View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. White Mountains Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Brindley and Thompson entered appearances as counsel for one of two defendants charged with drug offenses. A joint trial was scheduled. Both moved for continuance; the court set a hearing and ordered defendants counsel to be present. Thompson was present; Brindley was not. At a subsequent status conference, the court scheduled a jury trial and set a deadline for pretrial motions. Britton did not file any motions. On November 6, the court set a status conference for November 26 to discuss pretrial motions and ordered Brindley “to be present in person … not through other counsel.” Defendant appeared, but Brindley and Thompson did not and did not contact the court. The court set a show cause hearing; Brindley moved for continuance, claiming that he had not seen the order and had obligations in another trial. He apologized. The district court denied the motion and ordered Brindley to appear on November 30. Brindley appeared, but the court rejected his explanations as lies, held Brindley in contempt under Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b), and remanded him to custody for two days. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court erred in using Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b)ʹs summary contempt procedures, which apply only when there is a compelling reason for an immediate remedy, contempt occurred in the judge’s presence, and the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct. The court noted that if the district court chooses, on remand, to proceed under 18 U.S.C. 401, a different judge will preside. View "United States v. Britton" on Justia Law