Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Legal Ethics
Moje v. Federal Hockey League LLC
Moje, playing minor league hockey, lost an eye during a game, and sued Oakley, which made his visor, and the League. Instead of notifying its insurer, the League hired LoFaro. Oakley’s attorney called the League’s President, to ask why it had not answered the complaint. LoFaro claimed that an answer had been filed, but the docket did not reflect any filing. Moje moved for default. LoFaro did not respond, nor did he respond after the court entered the default and permitted Moje to prove damages. The court entered a final judgment of $800,000 against the League. After the League learned of collection efforts, it notified its insurer. A lawyer hired by the insurer unsuccessfully moved, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) to set aside the judgment within six months of its entry. Rule 60(b)(1), allows relief on account of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Abandoned clients who take reasonable steps to protect themselves can expect to have judgments reopened under Rule 60(b)(1), but the League is not in that category. Its remedy is against LoFaro. View "Moje v. Federal Hockey League LLC" on Justia Law
Pierce v. Visteon Corp.
Plaintiffs (a class of 1,593) alleged that Visteon failed to deliver timely notice to ex-employees, offering them an opportunity to continue health insurance at their own expense, under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). An employer has 44 days after the end of a person’s employment to provide notice and essential details, 29 U.S.C. 1166(a)(2). The court found that Visteon had provided untimely notice to 741 former employees, and that the notice averaged 376 days late for those persons. The court awarded $2,500 to each class member who had received untimely notice (a total of about $1.85 million), a sum that does not depend on how long the delay was for any given person. While the suit was pending, Visteon was reorganized in bankruptcy. The plan provides that debts of this kind will be paid 50¢ on the dollar, so each of the 741 will receive $1,250. The court also ordered Visteon to pay class counsel $302,780 as attorneys’ fees plus costs of about $11,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees, but otherwise dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge to the penalty as untimely, having been filed several months after the district court’s delayed entry of judgment. View "Pierce v. Visteon Corp." on Justia Law
Sik Gaek, Inc. v. Harris
SGI sued Yogi’s, alleging trademark infringement. Attorney Harris filed trademark applications for Yogi’s. SGI served Harris with a subpoena, for his deposition. The deposition did not take place. The court ordered Harris to be deposed at his office at noon on October 29. SGI sent Harris, who did not attend the hearing, a copy of the order by mail and facsimile on October 23. On October 29, SGI’s attorney, Park, arrived at the office. Harris was not there. The two spoke by phone. According to Park, Harris stated that he was aware of the order, but that it would take him at least an hour to arrive. Park told Harris that if he did not arrive by 1:00 p.m. it would be treated as a “no show.” The deposition did not occur. Harris faxed a letter stating his intention to comply and willingness to be deposed telephonically or by video. SGI did not respond or attempt to reschedule, but moved to hold Harris in contempt, seeking fees and expenses of $6,800. Harris filed an affidavit, explaining that during the week of October 22, he was in New York, and that he first became aware of the court order on October 29, when speaking with Park. On November 6, Harris sent Park a letter via email, facsimile, and certified mail, stating that he was available for deposition. On November 8, Harris called Park to reschedule. Park did not return the call; Harris sent another email. There was no response. On December 17, the court ordered SGA to take Harris’ deposition that same day. SGI complied. The court declared the motion for contempt and sanctions moot. SGI filed a renewed motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed its denial. View "Sik Gaek, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics
City of Milwaukee v. Stadtmueller
The City of Milwaukee is defending several lawsuits brought by scores of plaintiffs alleging that its police officers conducted unconstitutional stops and searches, including strip‐searches and body‐cavity searches. Judge Stadtmueller was assigned to preside over several cases. Milwaukee, asserting that some of the judge’s comments in opinions and conferences in the related cases raise questions about his impartiality, moved for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a). The judge declined. Milwaukee sought a writ of mandamus. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion. The five challenged statements were made during the course of litigation; “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep‐seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Judge Stadtmueller is presiding over several of these cases. It is not surprising that he might draw conclusions about the nature of the issue or problem. He is expected to look for and consider common threads and possible systemic problems to manage the cases effectively and decide them fairly. Even considering all the challenged statements together, nothing reasonably suggests deep-seated antagonism. View "City of Milwaukee v. Stadtmueller" on Justia Law
Lee v. United States
Humphrey sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of her daughter Teniscia, alleging that medical malpractice during Teniscia’s 2008 birth left her permanently disabled. Teniscia’s father, Lee, participated in the litigation, but did not ask to be joined as a party. Humphrey and Lee are not married; Teniscia lives with Humphrey, but both are Teniscia’s legal custodians. The case was settled for $13 million, used to buy an annuity to provide care over the course of Teniscia’s life. Porter, who represents Lee, demanded a share of the 25% contingent fee that had been negotiated between Humphrey and her lawyer, who opposed this request, arguing that Lee was not a party and that Porter had not performed any of the legal work that led to the settlement. After the settlement Lee moved to file an amended complaint naming himself as a plaintiff. The district court denied Lee’s motion, stating that Lee not only had approved the settlement but also had not filed an administrative claim, as the FTCA requires. Lee then moved to intervene. The court denied that motion as untimely. Porter unsuccessfully sought fees notwithstanding Lee’s non-party status. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court could not have allowed intervention even on a timely motion. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law
Hess v. Kanoski & Associates
Hess, an attorney, had worked on a number of medical-malpractice cases before his law firm, Kanoski terminated his employment. Many of these cases settled after Hess’s termination, and Hess was not compensated. He sued under his employment agreement and under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, adding claims of tortious interference, wrongful discharge, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. In 2011, the district court dismissed each of Hess’s claims. On remand the district court held that Hess was not entitled to compensation for the post-termination settlements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on its interpretation of Hess’s employment contract provisions that Hess would receive bonus pay in the amount of 15 percent of all fees “generated over the base salary (or $5,000 per month),” that the bonus shall increase to 25 percent “on all fees received annually in excess of $750,000.00,” and that that, “where the Corporation retains clients upon Employees [sic] termination that Employee has no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the Employee is to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for all work done while an Employee of the Corporation.” View "Hess v. Kanoski & Associates" on Justia Law
PNC Bank v. Spencer
Spencer stopped paying her mortgage in 2008. In Wisconsin state court foreclosure proceedings, Spencer’s attorney, Nora, adopted an “object-to-everything litigation strategy and buried the state court in a blizzard of motions.” While a hearing on a summary judgment motion was pending in state court, Nora removed the case to federal court. Finding no objectively reasonable basis for removal, the district court remanded the case and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the lender, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). The Seventh Circuit dismissed Spencer’s appeal as frivolous; the district court did not order her to pay anything. The court affirmed the award as to Spencer “because she has not offered even a colorable argument that removal was reasonable” and ordered Nora to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for litigating a frivolous appeal. Several months later, noting Nora’s similar behavior in another case, the court imposed an increased sanction of $2,500, suspended until the time, if ever, that Nora submits further inappropriate filings, and directed the clerk of court to forward a copy of the order and earlier opinion to the Office of Lawyer Regulation of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. View "PNC Bank v. Spencer" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
HSBC initiated a Wisconsin foreclosure action on the Rinaldi’s mortgage. The Rinaldis counterclaimed, alleging that the mortgage paperwork had been fraudulently altered and that HSBC lacked standing to enforce the mortgage. The Rinaldis lost at summary judgment and did not appeal. The court later vacated its foreclosure judgment after HSBC agreed to modify the loan. The Rinaldis filed a new state lawsuit reasserting their counterclaims. Before the court ruled on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Rinaldis filed for bankruptcy. In those proceedings, HSBC filed a proof of claim for the mortgage. The Rinaldis objected and filed adversary claims, alleging fraud, abuse of process, tortious interference, breach of contract, and violations of RICO and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The bankruptcy court found in favor of HSBC and recommended denial of the adversarial claims. The district court agreed, noting the Rinaldis’ failure to comply with Federal Rules. The court dismissed the Rinaldis’ adversary claims as meritless and warned that the Rinaldis would face sanctions if they filed additional frivolous filings because their tactics had “vexatious and time- and resource-consuming” and their filings “nigh-unintelligible.” After additional filings of the same type, the Rinaldis voluntarily dismissed their bankruptcy. Their attorney filed additional frivolous motions. The court ordered the attorney to pay $1,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sanction. View "Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law
Sprinkle v. Colvin
Sprinkle applied for supplemental social security income. After exhausting administrative remedies, Sprinkle sought judicial review of a final decision that he was not disabled. The district court held that the agency failed to properly evaluate evidence of Sprinkle’s disability and reversed. Sprinkle sought attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. While the EAJA contains a presumptive rate cap of $125 an hour, courts may award enhanced fees if justified because of an increase in the cost of living. The court found that Sprinkle was entitled to fees, but rejected his request for a cost-of-living enhancement. The Seventh Circuit vacated. An EAJA claimant seeking an adjustment need not offer proof of the effects of inflation on the particular attorney’s practice or proof that no competent attorney could be found for less than the requested rate. The claimant may rely on a readily available measure of inflation such as the Consumer Price Index, as well as proof that the requested rate does not exceed the prevailing market rate in the community for similar services by lawyers of comparable skill and experience. An affidavit from a single attorney testifying to the prevailing market rate may suffice to meet that burden. View "Sprinkle v. Colvin" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Legal Ethics, Public Benefits
Rojas v. Town of Cicero
Rojas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Cicero fired him because he supported a political opponent of the town president. A jury awarded him $650,000 in damages, but the judge granted a new trial, concluding that Kurtz, Rojas’s lawyer, had engaged in misconduct by making misleading statements, eliciting hearsay responses to prejudice the defendants even though the judge would strike them, arguing in a way that informed the jury about excluded evidence, and undermining the credibility of a defense witness by asking questions that presented him in a bad light, without a good-faith basis for the questions. The parties settled, providing Rojas with $212,500 compensation for the discharge and Kurtz with fees of $287,500. The settlement did not resolve motions for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927, which authorizes sanctions against lawyers who needlessly multiply proceedings, and under FRCP 26(g)(3) based on not revealing bankruptcy proceedings that could have affected whether Rojas was a proper plaintiff. The judge denied sanctions, reasoning that Rojas and Kurtz lost about $400,000 apiece when the settlement replaced the verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to section 1927, but vacated with respect to the rule, which does not afford judges the same discretion. View "Rojas v. Town of Cicero" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics