Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, Green County's chief juvenile-intake worker from 1997-2008, alleged that Green County (county) deprived her of a property interest in her job without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, where the county Board of Supervisors removed the juvenile-intake position from the auspices of the circuit court and created a new juvenile-intake position within the Human Services Department. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The court concluded that the evidence indicated that the county reorganized to save costs and, had the county reorganized merely to terminate plaintiff's employment, its decision to rehire her for the new position would be inexplicable. The court also concluded that because nothing in the record suggested that saving money was a pretext for something else, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the county eliminated plaintiff's court-attached juvenile-intake position in conjunction with a legitimate governmental reorganization. Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to due process and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The warden at the prison where plaintiff worked suspended him pending discharge and recommended termination after concluding that plaintiff had sexually harassed a female subordinate and had lied about the matter. An independent state agency responsible for hiring and firing unionized employees then had 30 days to act on the recommendation. Instead of objecting, plaintiff resigned and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming that the firing was because he is black. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff had no direct evidence of race discrimination and did not show that the stated reasons for termination were pretextual.

Plaintiff began working at an auto dealership finance department in 2006. Her son began working in the department days later, but both were terminated about three months later. They filed a complaint in federal court alleging a variety of federal and state claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the dealership. The employees appeal only their claim for unpaid wages under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, Ind. Code 22-2-5-1, dealing with frequency of payment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs should have proceeded under the Wage Claims Statute, Ind. Code 22-2-9-1, which deals with claims by discharged employees.

The company closed paper mills and eliminated a health-care subsidy for retirees. The union filed suit in Ohio under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132. The company filed a declaratory judgment suit in Wisconsin; the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Although the suit does not seek equitable relief as described in Sect. 502 of ERISA, Sect. 2201 does authorize declaratory relief. The court further reasoned that the district court acknowledged its jurisdiction over the LMRA suit and that the union's suit came within the 502 grant of jurisdiction, so this mirror-image suit by the planâs sponsor also is within federal subject-matter jurisdiction. In dismissing the Wisconsin litigation, the district judge assumed that the controversy would be resolved in Ohio. That is no longer true because the union mistakenly named a parent company that was not a party to the collective bargaining agreements; the case has been dismissed.

After being diagnosed with fibromyalgia, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression, plaintiff was awarded long-term disability benefits under an employee benefit plan issued and administered by defendant. Benefits were discontinued about 24 months later, when defendant determined that plaintiff had received all to which she was entitled under the planâs self-reported symptoms limitation. Because plaintiff had retroactively received social security benefits, defendant also sought to recoup equivalent overpayments as provided by the plan. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded for reinstatement. The self-reported symptom limitation violates ERISA, 29 U.S.C., 1022; the policy sets out that long-term benefits will be discontinued after 24 months if disability is due to mental illness or substance abuse, but does not mention that the time limitation applies if a participantâs disability is based primarily on self-reported symptoms. The Social Security Act does not bar recovery of overpayments occasioned by receipt of social security benefits.

Plaintiffs, 23 Liberian children, charge defendant with using hazardous child labor on its rubber plantation in violation of customary international law. The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, confers on the federal courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, despite disagreeing with the district court holding that a corporation cannot be held liable under the statute. The court also stated that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust remedies in which alleged violations occurred. Plaintiffs did not establish an adequate basis for inferring a violation of customary international law; the company does not employ children, they work to help their parents meet quotas, and there was no evidence about work expectations for Liberian children living off the plantation.

A sergeant was asked by town supervisors to investigate charges of "double dipping" against the police chief, who reportedly told the sergeant that he would "get him." The sergeant was acting chief while the chief was on administrative leave. Although independent investigation substantiated the sergeant's report, the chief was reinstated and began to work on retribution, ranging from "slights" to defamatory statements made to cause criminal prosecution. The sergeant took medical leave and did not return to work before the police department was disbanded. The district court granted a motion to dismiss that claimed qualified immunity and that the sergeant's complaint did not adequately allege constitutional violations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that the sergeant failed to establish good cause for modifying the scheduling order to permit amendment of the complaint. The sergeant failed to respond to "myriad" arguments presented in the motion to dismiss.

An African-American salesperson was fired after his white boss concluded that the salesperson violated the company's zero-tolerance employee guidelines by processing a noncommissionable transaction as a commissionable one. The salesperson was reinstated after the customer whose transaction was allegedly botched clarified the type of service he had requested. Shortly after he returned to work, the company made changes to its compensation scheme that the salesperson believed adversely affected his future earnings potential. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981(a) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employee did not demonstrate a real link between the bigotry and an adverse employment action. A rational jury could not infer from this evidence that the compensation plan was enacted for discriminatory reasons or that the company unlawfully retaliated against the employee.

The tow truck driver sued his former employer for failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). The district court held that the driver was not entitled to overtime pay because he was subject to the motor carrier exemption to the FLSA. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Employers subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation under the Motor Carrier Act. 49 U.S.C. 31502 are exempt from the overtime requirement, but an affidavit provided by the employer did not show that the company engaged in interstate commerce within a reasonable period of time prior to the time during which it claims the exemption. The use of the word "routinely" was too vague.

The employee sued for retaliatory discharge and civil conversion under Indiana law, claiming that the employer wrongfully terminated his employment for filing a workersâ compensation claim and unlawfully retained his personal property after termination. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting evidence that the company terminated employee for his post-accident statement that he might not pass a drug test (he later passed the drug test) and refusal to sign an agreement requiring him to undergo counseling and random drug testing to retain his job. The employee did not show that the proffered reason for termination was a lie to cover up retaliation. His property was stolen from an office where it was being temporarily held; the company did not have the required intent to commit conversion.