Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff began working as a correctional officer for DOC in 2006, assigned to duty that required walking. In 2007, she was reassigned to a control room and no longer required to walk. In 2007, plaintiff received a warning for excessive absenteeism and was switched to a different schedule. She never worked under the new schedule. She took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act and returned to the bettr schedule. After her return, she was in an automobile accident, but did not disclose physician's restrictions on activity until a 2008 hearing on her refusal of overtime. In early 2008, plaintiff used vacation time to visit her brother, who had been injured. When she returned, she had been reassigned to watch tour duty. She refused some duties, stating that she physically could not do the job and that it violated her medical restrictions. Her supervisor asked for her resignation. She was barred from entering and never returned to work. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOC on claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a material issue of disputed fact under the indirect method of proof analysis.

The company terminated plaintiff's employment in 2008 because he failed to meet his sales quota. A suit for unpaid wages under Wisconsin's wage-claim statute, alternatively seeking recovery under equitable contract doctrines, was rejected and the district court denied leave to amend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although plaintiff was an at-will employee, his commission-based compensation was the subject of an express contract, which, under Wisconsin law, precludes quasi-contractual relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because the motion came unjustifiably late.

Returning to work after 12 weeks of FMLA leave (29 U.S.C. 2615) to receive treatment for gastroesophageal reflux, employee was assigned to a different position. He received the same pay and benefits, but considered the change a demotion. Weeks later, he took additional leave for esophageal surgery. A few months later, he took leave to undergo total esophagectomy. He never returned and was terminated. He alleged that the esophagectomy was necessary because a supervisor caused him to suffer stress, high blood pressure, and reflux, which exacerbated his pre-existing medical condition. Following a 2008 Seventh Circuit decision, employee waived all claims except for retaliation by way of harassment between his second and third leaves. The judge barred evidence of a causal connection between the medical conditions and employer's alleged misconduct and held that employee exhausted his FLMA leave during his first leave. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The cause of an injury is irrelevant under the FMLA, and, in any case, the employee exhausted his FMLA rights before the alleged misconduct. Another employee, who accepted a settlement on an FMLA retaliation claim, was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees that would be triggered by a judgment.

In 2007 employee retired when the steel plant, at which he had worked for 42 years, shut down. Under a plan negotiated by the union, his pension payment, without any offset, was $688.13 a month. Employee was told that payment of his pension would be deferred for more than 10 years because the plan required that employee pay back workers' compensation settlements that he had received after sustaining on-the-job injuries in 2005 and 2006. The plan refers to offset for payments for "disability in the nature of a permanent disability for which the Company is liable." The district court entered judgment for the employee. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The committee's decision was within its discretion; the plan's specific mention of workers' compensation supports its characterization.

When an employee left the company in 1997, took a $47,850 lump sum distribution of his pension. He later believed that the payment should have included the present value of future cost of living adjustments that would have been included had he received his pension as an annuity. In 2002, he filed a class action suit. The district court granted summary judgment on liability in favor of the class and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a COLA is an accrued benefit, as defined in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(23)(A). Before the district court ruled, the parties reached a settlement that each early retiree would receive roughly 3.5% of her original lump sum, unless the COLA on a normal-retirement-age-based annuity outweighed her early-retirement subsidy, a rare situation. The district court approved the proposed settlement and awarded attorney's fees. Objectors were not allowed to opt out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding determinations that the settlement was reasonable; that class counsel had adequately represented the early retirees and that further subclasses were unnecessary; that opt-out should be denied; and concerning attorney fees.

Plaintiffs provide in-home care through Medicaid-waiver programs run by the Illinois Department of Human Services; some work through a Rehabilitation Program and others through a Disabilities Program. In 2003, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was amended to designate personal care attendants and personal assistants working under the Home Services Program as state employees for purposes of collective bargaining. 20 ILCS 2405/3. Rehabilitation Program assistants designated a union, which negotiated an agreement that includes a "fair share" provision, requiring assistants who are not members to pay their proportionate share of costs of collective bargaining. Disabilities Program assistants voted against unionization. Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs claim that fair share fees violate the First Amendment by compelling association with, and speech through, the union. Disabilities Program plaintiffs argue that they are harmed by the threat of fair share fees. The district court dismissed both. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and remanded for dismissal of the Disabilities plaintiffs' case without prejudice because it was unripe. Because of the significant control the state exercises over all aspects of personal assistants' jobs, the assistants are employees of the state. The state's interests in collective bargaining are such that fair share fees withstand First Amendment scrutiny in a facial challenge to the imposition of the fees.

The company employed plaintiff as activity director in a nursing home in from August 2006 to March 2007. In January 2007, plaintiff learned she was pregnant. Her doctor placed her on bed rest for two weeks, and, later, placed her on light duty restrictions. The company denied a request for accommodation and terminated plaintiff, who did not qualify for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act The district court entered judgment for the company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and claims alleging retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The company's modified work policy was not direct evidence of discrimination and complied with the PDA because it treats nonpregnant employees the same as pregnant employees; both are denied an accommodation of light duty work for non-work-related injuries, which is all the PDA requires. Plaintiff did not identify a similarly situated, nonpregnant employee who was treated more favorably. Her physical impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity; there was no evidence that the company misperceived the nature of her condition, or denied her request for light duty work based on a stereotype of pregnant women suffering from complications.

When plaintiff, a 14-year employee, was terminated from his position he negotiated a severance package based, in part, on his belief that he would be receiving a pension in a certain amount from the company's pension plan. The administrator for the plan, who was also the company's human resources manager, miscalculated. After signing off on the severance agreement, plaintiff learned of the error and brought an estoppel claim against the plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the plan. Plaintiff did not present the extraordinary circumstances necessary for the court to entertain a claim for estoppel against an ERISA Plan and there was no evidence of intentional misrepresentation or detrimental reliance.

City employees accepted early retirement incentives in 2004 while their unions were still negotiating new collective bargaining agreements for 2003-2007. In 2005, after two years of negotiations, the city and unions agreed to make raises retroactive to July 2003, but only for current employees, not for the plaintiff retirees. The district court granted the city summary judgment on federal due process and equal protection claims and a state law breach of express contract claim, but granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their state law implied contract claim and awarded the class $1,773,502 in retroactive pay, plus attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the implied contract claim and otherwise affirmed. Because express contracts, the 1999-2003 CBAs, governed wages, an implied contract claim cannot succeed. Plaintiffs hoped for wage increases, but had no right to them, and there was no evidence that the city made misrepresentations to induce early retirement.

Plaintiff began working as a dentist at a facility for jail detainees in 1982. By 2006, Cook County had a budget shortfall of 500 million dollars. It was determined that the facility could provide sufficient care with only one of its five dentists and that the remaining dentist had to have some management experience, and a history of flexibility, productivity, emergent clinical skill, and responsiveness to other physicians' needs. Plaintiff was not selected. Provided with an explanation of the decision, a hearing officer denied an appeal. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that political considerations infected the decision, in violation of the Shakman decree and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that the choice to lay her off was predicated on her Caucasian ethnicity and female gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to meet her prima facia burden. The claim did not explain what evidence shows background circumstances of discriminatory conduct. If she had satisfied her prima facie case, the claim would fail because she did not establish that the reasons for the decision were pretextual.