Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a law firm marketing director, took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act just before the birth of her child and continuing after the birth. While she was on leave, her supervisors informed her that her position was eliminated as part of an organizational restructuring and terminated her employment. She filed suit, alleging pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; interference with rights under the FMLA; retaliation under the FMLA; and a violation of her right to a bonus under the FMLA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed.Statements allegedly made by the human resources director, fell within the scope of the h.r. director's employment and should have been admitted as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Those statements provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent and of a connection between taking leave and termination.

During a radio call-in show, plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, called in response to critical comments regarding defendant's (county sheriff) involvement with an African-American community organization dedicated to reducing crime and indicating that defendant was not a good fit for his position. Defendant called in and retorted by describing plaintiff as a "slacker" and mentioning a disciplinary action taken in 2004 against plaintiff for "sexual harassment." In actuality, the disciplinary action was for violation of a department rule that prohibited offensive conduct or language. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for disclosure of plaintiff's disciplinary history, a claim under Wisconsin's Open Records Law, and a claim under Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was no Records Act violation; there was no request to inspect a disciplinary record, no permission granted, and no balancing test undertaken. The information at issue is a matter of public record, so there was no Privacy Act violation. Rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim, the court noted that there was no threat, coercion, or intimidation.

In 2004 plaintiff began working with a new supervisor,who removed many of plaintiff's job duties because he thought plaintiff, age 57, was too old. Plaintiff complained to the vice president of the company and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The vice president investigated and eventually fired the supervisor. In the meantime, plaintiff took leave, under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. When he returned, a new supervisor assigned plaintiff to revamp a training class. Plaintiff suffered a psychological breakdown, exhausted his disability leave, and retired. He sued for discrimination and retaliation (Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621) and for interference with reinstatement under the FMLA. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the evidence, viewed in plaintiff's favor, established that the 2004 supervisor discriminated against him because of age, the ADEA provides no remedy because the discrimination did not cause any loss and was not linked to the disability that precipitated early retirement. There was no evidence of retaliation based on plaintiff's complaining about discrimination. There was no claim under the FMLA because when plaintiff returned to work after medical leave, the company assigned him equivalent duties without regard to his medical leave.

Plaintiff was terminated as a probationary police officer. A supervisor stated that plaintiff violated departmental rules by revealing confidential information to another recruit during a training exercise, repeatedly failed to pass the firearms qualifying test, and admitted not reading the firearms manual (another rules violation). Plaintiff's father, then a deputy sheriff, argued for his son's reinstatement. Believing that the father had placed a threatening call to a school attended by the supervisor's children, the supervisor filed a complaint that resulted in a recommendation of termination and the father's early retirement. The father's suit under 42 U.S.C 1983 was dismissed; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's (son) suit, alleging bias based on his Polish ethnicity was also rejected by the district court. While both suits were proceeding, father and son pursued administrative remedies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, obtained right-to-sue letters, and jointly filed a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 200e. The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff had previously worked for the employer before being hired as a full-time employee in 2005. When budget cuts necessitated layoffs, plaintiff thought his job was secure until he requested leave for surgery and was let go. The district court entered summary judgment for employer on claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, which guarantees employees 12 workweeks of leave for serious health conditions, including the knee surgery plaintiff had, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. Because there was evidence from which a jury could infer that termination was based on the leave request, summary judgment was inappropriate. A memo made by a supervisor, for purposes of discussing the termination with the employer's attorney, did not fit within the crime-fraud exception and is protected by attorney-client privilege.

Seven months after the bank recruited plaintiff to serve as a vice presidents, it fired her. She had no performance issues, no attendance problems, and no complaints against her. She had dinner with a member of the board of directors, who told her the fantasies he had about her. She declined his advances and complained to human resources. The board member resigned. Shortly after that, the bank's new president told its then-president that he heard plaintiff had done something that she should have been fired for. About two months after the new president assumed office, plaintiff was fired. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on her retaliation claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A retaliatory discharge case must be tried unless defendant presents unrebutted evidence that it would have taken the adverse employment action against the plaintiff in any case.

Plaintiff was fired from his position as senior vice president and claimed that it was based on his actions in opposing actions by a mid-level supervisor that he claimed amounted to sexual and racial discrimination. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer on claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not present evidence challenging the veracity of the company's legitimate, performance-based concerns or evidence that those concerns were pretextual.

Plaintiff, an attorney, was fired from his job as an associate and filed suit, asserting defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the suit was dismissed and while a state appeal was pending, he brought claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 for discrimination on the basis of race and national origin, with a supplemental claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court issued a stay based on the abstention doctrine, reasoning that the claims would be barred by res judicata once the state judgment became final. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Abstention requires more than pendency of another lawsuit. Although claims for defamation and emotional distress center on negative performance evaluation, plaintiff's federal discrimination claims (he says) encompass a broader scope of alleged misconduct over a longer period of time, including unfavorable treatment regarding assignments, promotions, disciplinary measures, salary, and work conditions.

A part-time school custodian, suffering mental disability, applied for full-time positions and was rejected. His performance had been evaluated as unsatisfactory. He filed a charge with the EEOC. A few months later the employer again evaluated his performance and fired him. In a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employee did not establish the elements of a valid discrimination and retaliation claim under the ADA: that he was meeting his employer' legitimate employment expectations, and was performing his job satisfactorily.

Plaintiffs, employed by the Department of Homeland Security, filed a six-count employment discrimination suit in 2007. After the district court granted a motion to dismiss two counts, DHS failed to answer the complaint, apparently due to an oversight. In 2009, court granted plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, (FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)). One of the plaintiffs was facing criminal charges and they wanted to wait for the resolution of that case. Nine months later, after expiration of the limitations period, plaintiffs moved to reinstate the case under FRCP 60(b). The court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A case dismissed under Rule 41(a) is generally treated as if it had never been filed. The district court retained jurisdiction, but did not abuse its discretion in denying the extraordinary relief of reinstatement simply because plaintiffs made a mistake.