Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The EEOC filed suit on behalf of two servers, alleging that the servers were sexually harassed (Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e) while employed at the franchise restaurant. A jury found hostile work environment and awarded compensatory damages to both and punitive damages to one plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. A rational jury could have found: that plaintiff was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment; that defendants did not exercise reasonable care in instituting an effective sexual harassment policy with a reasonable complaint mechanism and in taking corrective action; that the policy was ineffective in advancing education and protection of employees rights; and that certain policy language was inserted to discourage complaints. Because the district court injected a new theory of the case after the time that defendants could present rebuttal evidence, and because the district court reserved ruling on an issue ultimately found to be a question for the jury, the district court’s ruling with respect to corporate liability was reversed and remanded.

The Postal Service terminated plaintiff's 32 years of employment as a clerk, claiming that it fired her because she told her psychiatrist she was having thoughts of killing her supervisor, and it believed she posed a danger to fellow employees. Plaintiff is an African-American woman and claimed discrimination and retaliatory discharge. In support of her disparate treatment claims she presented evidence that two white male employees at the same facility had recently threatened another employee at knife-point, yet received only one-week suspensions from the same manager who fired her. The district court granted the Postal Service summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the similarly-situated inquiry is flexible, common-sense, and factual. A reasonable jury could infer, in light of all the circumstances, that an impermissible animus motivated the firing. Plaintiff's evidence could also demonstrate pretext.

Former Illinois Department of Transportation employees alleged they were wrongfully terminated because of their political beliefs and party affiliation. They were among about 190 employees laid off in 2004 as part of budget cuts. They filed their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims exactly two years after the effective date of the terminations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period began to run when plaintiffs received unequivocal notices of termination.

A tax employee of defendant, terminated after reporting an alleged tax fraud scheme to the company and federal enforcement agencies, filed suit asserting claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and 1962(d). The district court dismissed, finding that the predicate acts alleged were either unrelated or did not proximately cause plaintiff's injuries. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The retaliatory actions were related to the alleged tax fraud scheme, under the Supreme Court's "continuity plus relationship" test. Since enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e) retaliation against an employee constitutes racketeering. Retaliatory acts are inherently connected to the underlying wrongdoing exposed by the whistleblower, even though they occur after the coverup is exposed. In this case, the retaliatory acts were not isolated events, separate from the tax fraud. Plaintiff properly alleged that his termination was proximately caused by a RICO predicate act of retaliation.

Plaintiff injured his back while working for defendant. Following worker's compensation leave, he returned to work as a long-haul driver and worked without incident for two years. With the birth of his child, he asked to switch to a city route. After the switch, plaintiff began having problems with his back and asked to switch back, but the collective bargaining agreement did not allow another change within a year, so the request was denied. He took medical leave, but sought to return to work as a long-haul driver, presenting a medical release which limited him to "road driver work" and "limited dock work." Defendant would not allow plaintiff to return, saying that it needed clarification on medical restrictions and that he could not return to work as a driver unless he received a medical release without restrictions. The district court granted employer summary judgment in a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12102(2). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working because he is capable of long-haul driving; at most, he is unable to work as a city driver because it involves short hauls and dock work that requires him to frequently load and unload cargo.

The law firm successfully represented plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation suit against her employer. The jury awarded $65,000 in damage. The attorneys then sought attorneys' fees of 131,665.88. The district court awarded $70,000. The Seventh Circuit vacated, acknowledging concerns about excessive fees. The district court looked to impermissible considerations in calculating the award; most significantly, it reduced the statutory award based on the existence of an agreement, which specifies that the agreed contingent fee will not apply to the statutory award of fees(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k)). The court should have provided plaintiff with an opportunity to respond before applying the Consumer Price Index and the Laffey Matrix (a chart of hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals in the Washington, D.C. area, prepared by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to be used in fee-shifting cases), and should have provided a clear explanation as to how it arrived at the hourly rate of $400. The district court also erred in reversing its award of fees to outside counsel.

Plaintiff claimed that she regularly arrived at her employer's factory 15 to 45 minutes before the start of her 5:00 a.m. shift and spent about 5 minutes unlocking doors, turning on lights, turning on the compressor, punching in on the time clock, and preparing coffee. She spent 5 to 10 minutes reviewing schedules and gathering and distributing materials to subordinates' workstations, so that they could immediately start work. Any remaining time was spent preparing models for production, cleaning the work area, or checking patterns. She was not told to come in before her shift, nor did she request an early start time or report errors in her pay based on pre-shift work. There was some evidence that early arrivals at the factory were used for socializing. The district court held that she was not entitled to overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employer had no reason to know, or even suspect, plaintiff was acting in direct contradiction of a company policy that she herself was partially responsible for enforcing.

The McCaskill–Bond Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 42112, provides that "combination of multiple air carriers into a single air carrier" requires the combined business to merge seniority lists of employees. Republic acquired Midwest. Seniority lists for mechanics, baggage handlers, and administrative personnel have been integrated, but Republic furloughed flight attendants, requiring them to apply for "new" jobs; if they are rehired, the Teamsters Union, which represents flight attendants at Republic's older carriers, places them at the bottom of its seniority roster. The Union maintained its position, even after the National Mediation Board concluded that the flight attendants who worked for Midwest became part of a single bargaining unit at an integrated air transportation business. The district court held that Republic's abandonment of Midwest's federal air transportation certificate, and the return of its planes, meant that Republic had acquired some assets but not an "air carrier" and entered judgment in favor of the Teamsters. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that Midwest was completely integrated into Republic.

Plaintiff resigned from her probationary employment with the department of corrections after she was charged, by the state's attorney, with failure to cooperate in an investigation. She had been a witness in a criminal investigation; she sued the detective conducting the investigation, alleging that when she refused to lie to further the investigation, he tortiously interfered with her employment. She sued the sheriff and the director of personnel, claiming First Amendment retaliation, retaliatory discharge, and violation of procedural due process rights. Claims against the detective were dismissed for failure to state a claim; the court granted the county summary judgment on all remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that the detective had anything to do with the charge against plaintiff. There was no evidence that the investigation of plaintiff or the charges were in retaliation for refusal to lie. Because she was in her probationary period, plaintiff had no property interest in her position.

Plaintiff, a financial advisor, sued her employer for allegedly discriminating based on her gender and retaliating against her because of her complaints of gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that a realignment of territories or disciplinary action against plaintiff were based on her gender. While both inappropriate and condescending, a supervisor referring to plaintiff as "cutie" 5 to 10 times over the course of two months was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment by itself, especially since it is undisputed that he stopped when asked. Plaintiff did not prove constructive discharge. The supervisor's patently offensive response to her resignation, "good riddance bitch," was not direct evidence of gender discrimination.