Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following a vote by employees of the truck transportation company, the NLRB certified a local union as representative for the employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board's decision that a ballot with irregular markings should be counted as indicating the clear intent of the voter. The ballot, which had an apparent erasure of a vote for a competing union, was the deciding vote.

Plaintiff was hired as a teller in 1980 and promoted to branch manager in 1995. She received an overall rating of "improvement needed" on 2004 and 2005 performance evaluations, based on complaints from customers and employees about negative attitude and unprofessional behavior. Complaints continued until she was terminated in 2006 at age 44. The district court entered summary judgment for the bank on her retaliation claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not show retaliation for her objection to age discrimination. Complaints about pension plan contributions and about staff cutbacks did not qualify. She filed a claim with the EEOC after she was fired.

Plaintiff worked as a manager for defendant, a food broker, from 2001 until she quit in 2007. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), claiming that the company maintained a hostile work environment, in which conditions for women were inferior to those for men, and paid women less than men for the same work. The district court granted summary judgment to the company. The Seventh Circuit remanded with respect to claims about salary, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find discrimination rather than random assignment of salaries. The court affirmed with respect to hostile environment, noting that the offender responsible for most of the obnoxious conduct had been disciplined and had quit two years before plaintiff left.

Plaintiff was terminated from her position as a lead technologist in a medical radiology department. She admits that there were issues with her job performance, but claimed discrimination on account of her race (white) because the employer terminated her employment rather than demoting her as it had some employees of other races. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer in her suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the plaintiff did not provide direct or indirect evidence of a discriminatory reason for the decision to terminate her position.

The company operates stores. The union was concerned about use of nonunion contractors who did not pay prevailing wages for construction and remodeling of stores. Unsatisfied with the company's response, the union urged a consumer boycott. Union representatives distributed handbills that were "extremely unflattering" outside the stores. Some pictured a rat to represent the company. The company ejected the representatives from the property. The NLRB issued a complaint alleging violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), for discriminatory practice in prohibiting the union from handbilling while permitting nonunion solicitations and distributions. An ALJ found that as a nonexclusive easement holder at 23 of the stores, the company did not have a state property right to exclude handbillers, and had violated the Act. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted the Board's petition for enforcement.

Defendant employed plaintiff as a security supervisor. After she complained that her supervisor, Spann, made sexually offensive remarks and favored males, Spann gave her negative evaluations and accused her of misconduct, including theft. Defendant transferred her to a non-supervisory position at a distant location. Spann told her to turn in keys and empty her locker. Believing that she had been fired, she did not return. In her 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) suit, the judge instructed the jury that to find for plaintiff it had to find that a decision-maker fired plaintiff because she was female or because she complained about sexually harassing comments. In response to a request for clarification, the judge indicated that the decision-maker reference meant that "he was the sole decision-maker." The jury responded "no" to the question corresponding to the decision-maker instruction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, calling the "cat's paw" theory of liability "a dreadful muddle" and "judicial attractive nuisance," referring to an employee being subjected to adverse employment action by a supervisor who has no discriminatory motive, but who has been manipulated by a subordinate with such motive. Injecting “sole decision-maker” into deliberations created confusion, Spann was not a cat’s paw; "he was the monkey."

The employer operates a municipal landfill and had five permanent employees, including Jarvis, the "Landfill Supervisor." Jarvis and others discussed unionizing, but the company asserted that Jarvis was ineligible for inclusion. The Regional Director of the NLRB found that Jarvis was not a supervisor. Eight days before the election, Jarvis was terminated for what was later called "an egregious violation" in failing to cover the garbage. At the time, Jarvis was told that there was a reduction in force. Regardless, Jarvis cast a vote, and the result was 3-2 in favor of unionizing. The company refused to bargain; an ALJ found that Jarvis was improperly discharged. The NLRB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied the company's appeal and granted enforcement of the NLRB orders. Jarvis lacked authority "responsibly to direct" other employees (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 152(11)) and was discharged based on protected union activity.

In 2003, the airline established guidelines that address accommodating employees who, because of disability, can no longer do essential functions of their current jobs, even with reasonable accommodation. The guidelines specify that the transfer process is competitive, so that an employee in need of accommodation will not be automatically placed into a vacant position, but will be given preference over similarly qualified applicants. The EEOC challenged the policy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court ruled in favor of the airline. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, invalidated a prior holding that the ADA does not mandate reassignment.

Plaintiff began work as a police officer in 1976. In 1992 he was charged with misconduct related to an improper arrest and, following a hearing, was fired. The state trial and appellate courts affirmed the Police Board; the highest court rejected an appeal. Plaintiff then filed a complaint with Illinois Human Rights Commission, for the first time alleging racial and age discrimination and retaliation. While the matter was pending, he filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 and state laws. The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The IHRC awarded $274,283.05 for lost wages, holiday and overtime pay, lost pension annuity interest, and other prejudgment interest, plus attorney's fees of $400,555.50. Neither party appealed the IHRC’s final determination. Plaintiff filed a federal suit, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The district court rejected the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the suit barred by claim preclusion.

The employer sought an early withdrawal from its obligation to make pension contributions to a multiemployer pension fund; it entered into a new collective bargaining agreement, six weeks before expiration of the existing agreement, that abrogated its obligation to make payments to the fund. The fund sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1145. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the agreement was ambiguous in providing that the employer could not “prospectively” change its obligation.