Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dass, born in India, was first hired as a teacher in 1991. In 2002, Dass was hired at Casals. Donaldson was the principal and rated Dass's overall performance through 2005 as excellent, but never recommended Dass for tenure based on concern that Dass was not a strong disciplinarian. Donaldson retired in 2005 and non-renewed Dass for the 2005-2006 school year. Dass was rehired for the year, but because of an error, was displaced after that school year when Casals lost teaching positions due to budget constraints. Dass won a grievance and was reinstated. Dass received medical leave in December 2006. She did not return the rest of the school year. In 2007, the principal recommended non-renewal. The Board accepted the recommendation. Dass filed suit, alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101.; and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Assignment to teach seventh grade was not an adverse employment action and there was no evidence of discrimination based on national origin.

Penske provided transportation services for a newspaper, its only customer, 1999 to 2009, but lost the bid for the contract and informed the union that it would cease operations. The collective bargaining agreement expired two days after operations shut down. Penske and the union engaged in "effects bargaining." Penske agreed to give workers extended recall rights, preferential treatment should they apply for employment at other firms within the Penske group, pay for unused vacation time, severance pay of one week's wages, and assistance in preparing resumes and securing letters of recommendation. Employees filed claims they characterized as a "hybrid" breach of contract and Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185 suit. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the suit was "doomed" because the plaintiffs did not even contend that Penske failed to implement the collective bargaining agreement. The court also dismissed a claim that the union did not bargain hard enough.

For more than 30 years, Blue was an administrative assistant at IBEW and had an excellent record. In 2006 Phillips filed a complaint against IBEW, alleging that his information was removed from the referral book and his initiation fee returned because of his race (African-American). Around the same time, Blue questioned a supervisor about a white electrician, allowed to sign the referral book without paying his initiation fee. Blue was stripped of essential job duties, denied over- time opportunities, and subjected to a hostile work environment. She was disciplined for minor infractions, suspended without pay, and had to take leave to escape the stress. She filed her own complaint with the local agency, alleging retaliation. The district court denied a motion to exclude documents relating to Phillips's complaint. A jury awarded Blue $202,396.76. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the documents relevant and the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict.

The Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2011, requires that nuclear generators implement access authorization programs. Many employees at privately-owned nuclear power plants must receive a security clearance with "unescorted access" privileges. When such access is denied or revoked, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires owner-licensees to provide the aggrieved worker with a review procedure. From 1991 to 2009, the Commission took the position that labor arbitrators could review access denials at unionized facilities. Courts agreed. In 2009, the Commission completed post-9/11 overhaul of security requirements. New language was ambiguous as to whether the Commission had changed its policy to prohibit arbitral review. The district court entered declaratory judgment that the amendments prohibited arbitration of access denial decisions. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the Commission did not "flip-flop on an important, longstanding, and controversial policy without clearly indicating either in the text of the rule or at any point in the rulemaking history that it was doing so."

Plaintiff sued Allstate on behalf of a putative class, alleging a nationwide pattern or practice of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). She alleged gender-based earning disparities based on salary, promotion, and training policies that left significant discretion in the hands of individual managers. The district court denied class certification. In response to enactment of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-2, plaintiff again moved for class certification, focusing on Allstate's uniform compensation policies. The court again denied certification, citing lack of common issues. On appeal, plaintiffs argued disparate impact, claiming that a policy of awarding merit increases based on a percentage of base pay and of comparing salaries to its competitors caused gender-based disparities in earnings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of class certification, stating that plaintiffs did not meaningfully develop the disparate impact claim before the district court, where plaintiffs argued only a pattern-or-practice claim, a type of intentional discrimination.

Plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury. The following day, managers decided to terminate her position as part of a national reduction in force. Informed of this decision upon her return from medical leave, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim and, later, sued the company for terminating her in retaliation for exercising workers’ compensation rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the company established nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision. Plaintiff did not show a causal link between her decision to seek medical attention and the termination.

Plaintiff, a part-time mail handler for the USPS since 1987, injured his back on the job in 1998. He returned to "light-duty" work until 2003, when he reinjured himself at work. Except for one week, he did not return to work nor did he provide documentation concerning his injury. In 2005, a supervisor notified him that he would be terminated. Plaintiff's union filed a grievance and the settlement required plaintiff to see a doctor and either return to "full duty" or apply for disability retirement by a certain date. Physicians cleared him to work with several permanent restrictions. A USPS physician determined that plaintiff was unfit for "full duty." He was terminated for violation of the agreement. The EEOC found no discrimination. He filed a claim that, although he was not legally disabled, he was "regarded as" disabled. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After determining that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), prior to 2009 amendments, applied, the court found that plaintiff did not establish that USPS regarded him as disabled. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the "100% healed" requirement of the settlement agreement under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff, hired by IDOT in 1989, was suspended in 2003, pursuant to a "last chance" agreement, for fighting in the workplace. There had been prior disciplinary measures. In 2005, plaintiff was involved in a worksite altercation with a co-worker and a supervisor. IDOT initiated discharge proceedings. Plaintiff disputed that he had physical contract with his supervisor, but did not alleged that the attempt to discharge him was retaliation for his filing a race discrimination charge in 2001. An ALJ conducted a hearing at which plaintiff was represented by counsel and concluded that plaintiff had engaged in an altercation but that discharge was not warranted. A state trial court overturned the decision and sustained the discharge. Three years later, after obtaining a right to sue letter from the EEOC, plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the retaliation claim does not arise from the same set of operative facts as the claim made in the state court. The claim could have been raised in that forum.

Employers must maintain a log of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses, 29 C.F.R. 1904.4(a); an incident is "work-related" if "the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition." Employees in the company's packing department fill containers, a process requiring repetitive hand movements, and pronation. When an employee developed lateral epicondylitis, painful swelling of ligaments and tendons around a joint, in her right arm, the company did not log the injury. The Department of Labor assessed a $900 penalty for failing to log a work-related injury. An ALJ sustained the penalty. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined review. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that substantial evidence was not enough to sustain the administrative decision. The ALJ was required to take account of competing evidence and inferences; the ALJ ignored strong indications that its favored witness was wrong. The court noted that inclusion of the work-relatedness requirement, requiring employers to judge the source of injury, "is a puzzle."

Hanners, then a Master Sergeant with the Illinois State Police, used his work computer to send an email to 16 fellow employees, including pictures and descriptions of "fictitious Barbie Dolls," depicting stereotypical area residents. After investigation, an EEO officer concluded that, although the email related to race, sexual orientation, parental status, pregnancy, family responsibilities, and the characteristics of gender, no person receiving it reported being offended. The EEO officer recommended discipline for Hanners and three employees who had forwarded the email. The disciplinary review board recommended, and the director imposed a 30-day suspension. Hanners's promotion rating was reduced. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hanner did not establish that individuals outside the protected class (Caucasians) received systematically better disciplinary treatment or identify any instance where defendants engaged in behavior or made comments suggesting discriminatory attitude against Caucasians generally or against him because he is Caucasian.