Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, hired as a police officer in 1992 and promoted to sergeant and shift supervisor in 1996, publicly criticized several departmental officials at two police officers’ union meetings. Roughly during that same time period, he also committed several violations of departmental policy and was punished accordingly with, among other things, a written reprimand and a two-day suspension. After plaintiff failed to clear a fitness-for-duty evaluation, the department filed termination charges. The matter was assigned to arbitration where he was suspended but not terminated. The district court rejected his claims of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the employment actions that plaintiff complained about followed close on the heels of his purportedly protected speech. The context in which these actions were taken indicates that they were not related to his speech. Significant intervening, particularly plaintiff's own negative behavior, were the cause of the negative or disciplinary employment actions.

KSM failed to reinstate strikers after the union made an unconditional offer to return to work in 1997. In 2001, the NLRB ruled that KSM violated the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3), and ordered backpay. The parties entered into partial settlement 2006, but there was no further progress. The ALJ attempted a remedial order in 2007, but the case was held up for a year and a half pending the Board having the necessary quorum. In 2010 the Board issued a Second Supplemental Decision and Order requiring KSM to compensate 42 former striking employees with backpay totaling $383,461.11. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition to enforce that order, upholding a seniority method of recall and rejecting challenges to pay for specific workers.

In 1997 Javier unlawfully entered the U.S.; he married in 2001. In 2007 the bank hired wife. Husband, attempting to start a business, could not open a bank account without a social security number. He obtained an individual tax identification number. Wife named him a joint owner on her account and helped use his ITIN to open accounts of his own. The business failed. Husband returned to Mexico to deal with his citizenship. Wife revealed the situation to her supervisor, requesting time off to help husband obtain citizenship. The supervisor agreed and called the bank security officer, who was concerned that the accounts might implicate bank fraud laws. During a meeting, the security officer became angry and berated wife. Wife refused to attend another meeting without her attorney The bank terminated her employment and reported her activity to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and a consortium of area banks. Wife sued, claiming blacklisting, defamation, emotional distress, and employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the bank summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any discrimination was not based on race or national origin, but on an unprotected classification, husband’s status as an alien lacking permission to be in the country.

The State of Illinois, facing a significant and unprecedented fiscal deficit, brokered a series of compensation agreements with the exclusive bargaining representative for 40,000 state employees. The parties trimmed several hundred million dollars in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 by deferring general wage increases and instituting a voluntary furlough program. Despite these measures, the fiscal year 2012 budget did not contain sufficient appropriations for deferred wage increases due employees of 14 state agencies. The state froze the pay of those employees, repudiating agreements with the union. The district court dismissed a suit that alleged violations of the Contracts Clause and the Equal Protection Clause and state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Contracts Clause claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that the state’s actions did not bar a breach of contract suit. There was a rational relationship between those actions and a legitimate governmental purpose, precluding an equal protection claim.

Plaintiffs, hourly steel workers, argued that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 by failing to compensate for time spent putting on and removing work clothes in a locker room and walking to and from the locker room. The union contract does not require such compensation. Plaintiffs argued that the Act requires compensation and overrides contractual provisions. The district court ruled that the Act does not require compensation for changing time, but may require that walking time be compensated, and refused to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit held that the suit has no merit and should be dismissed. The court included a picture of the clothing and stated: "From a worker's standpoint any time spent on the factory grounds is time 'at work' in the sense of time away from home or some other place where he might prefer to be … But it is not time during which he is making steel, and so it is not time for which the company will willingly pay. If the workers have a legal right to be paid for that time, the company will be less willing to pay them a high wage for the time during which they are making steel."

Plaintiffs in consolidated cases claim that, during their tenures as pharmaceutical sales representatives employed by Lilly and Abbott, they were misclassified as exempt employees and denied overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-19. The employers argued that the administrative exemption and the outside sales exemptions removed the sales representatives from overtime protections. The two district courts reached opposite conclusions. After considering an amicus brief from the Department of Labor, the Seventh Circuit held that, under regulations of the Department of Labor, the pharmaceutical sales representatives are classified properly within the administrative exemption to overtime requirements. The court did not address the outside sales exemption. The sales representatives were compensated on a salary basis and their work is directly related to the general business operations of the pharmaceutical companies; they were required to exercise a significant measure of discretion and independent judgment, despite the constraints placed on them, and on all representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, by the regulatory environment in which they work.

Plaintiff had worked for defendant for 19 years when she had a heart attack requiring bypass surgery and went on medical leave. While on leave, she also received treatment for carpal tunnel syndrome. After six months of leave, defendant terminated her employment pursuant to its established leave policy. Defendant told plaintiff that she was eligible for re-hire to her position once she was medically cleared to work again. Hunt then filed suit, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for her intention to file a workers’ compensation claim related to her carpal tunnel syndrome. The district court granted defendant summary judgment on the retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff offered no evidence that the relevant decision-maker even knew of her potential workers’ compensation claim or was influenced by anyone who did know.

Dr. Jajeh, a Syrian-born Muslim, became an attending physician at the county hospital in 1991. Starting in about 2002 he had conflicts with another doctor and regularly complained about that doctor. In 2006 he complained that the conflict involved religious and ethnic discrimination. There was no evidence that problems continued after that time. In 2007 extensive budget cuts forced the county to lay off more than 200 physicians, including Dr. Jajeh. Dr. Jajeh brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming that he was subjected to discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin, and terminated in retaliation for his complaints about the discrimination he suffered. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, finding no evidence of discrimination or that he was laid off in retaliation for his complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Hicks worked as a mechanic for the Forest Preserve District for two years and received 28 disciplinary action forms from his supervisor. Hicks, who is black, participated in an investigation of his supervisor for discrimination, and later filed his own discrimination complaint. Eventually the FPD offered Hicks a choice: either accept a demotion to a non-mechanic position and take a significant pay cut, or face further disciplinary action up to and including termination. On advice of his union, Hicks took the demotion, but then brought suit for retaliation. He was awarded $30,000 and reinstated to his former position as a mechanic. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to a jury instruction on retaliation.

The village fired its village manager, at the same time restructuring its work force by abolishing three positions and creating one new slot. Plaintiff occupied an abolished position: executive coordinator to the village manager. Her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claimed that she was fired because she was associated with the village manager, who had lost a political struggle. Because the village implemented its plan by ordinance, the district court dismissed on the ground of legislative immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. An ordinance adopted through the legislative process, and having the force of law, is covered by legislative immunity no matter the motives of those who proposed, voted for, or otherwise supported the proposal. The court acknowledged that the ordinance made the termination an official village policy, for which the village does not enjoy immunity, but: "It is common to hold a person's associations against him ... it is an important part of the new officeholder's own right of association to be able to choose who to work with, the better to promote his ideas and policies." A position as a policymaker"s right-hand woman is "confidential" in nature.