Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The sheriff’s department ran a supervision program for non-violent pretrial defendants to reduce jail overcrowding and provide supervised employment, job training, and substance abuse treatment. Passananti was deputy director from 2002 until 2007, when county-wide budget cuts eliminated the position. Passananti sued, claiming sexual harassment by her supervisor and that she was fired based on her sex. A jury awarded her $4 million in compensatory damages against Cook County, and $70,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages against the supervisor. The district court granted defendants judgment as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit remanded for entry of a judgment of $70,000, assuming: that the supervisor repeatedly called Passananti a “bitch” in front of co-workers; that he fabricated an accusation that she had had sexual relations with a supervisee; that, as a result, Passananti was temporarily transferred and ultimately sustained a five-day unpaid suspension. The court reversed on the sexual harassment claim and reinstated the verdict as to liability, but affirmed on the discriminatory termination claim, which lacked evidentiary support. The county is the proper defendant on that claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Punitive damages are not available against the county itself. View "Passananti v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired in 2003 by Northwestern University, was denied tenure in 2007 and fired in 2008. The district court dismissed her sex discrimination suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding that only the denial of tenure occurred within the 300-day window for filing a charge of discrimination, and finding that no reasonable jury could infer that plaintiff was denied tenure because she is a woman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff’s history with respect to publication and obtaining grants. View "Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are current and former drivers for FedEx delivery service who allege that they were employees rather than independent contractors under the laws of the states in which they worked and under federal law. The district court used the Craig. case, which was based on ERISA and Kansas law, as its “lead” case; certified a nationwide class seeking relief under ERISA and certified statewide classes under FRCP 23(b)(3). The Kansas class has 479 members. They allege that they were improperly classified as independent contractors rather than employees under the Kansas Wage Payment Act, Kan. Stat. 44-313, and that as employees, they are entitled to repayment of costs and expenses they paid during their time as FedEx employees. They also seek payment of overtime wages. The district court granted FedEx summary judgment in Craig and other cases; 21 cases are on appeal. The Seventh Circuit stayed proceedings and certified questions to the Kansas Supreme Court: Given the undisputed facts, are the plaintiff drivers employees of FedEx as a matter of law under the KWPA? Drivers can acquire more than one service area from FedEx. Is the answer different for plaintiff drivers who have more than one service area? View "Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Samuel Milligan, then a freshman at Southern Illinois University, had uncomfortable encounters with a professor emeritus at, and substantial donor to, SIU, during which Meyers touched Milligan inappropriately and complimented him on what Meyers believed to be his feminine features. SIU banned Meyers from campus pending completion of an investigation and warned that he would be subject to arrest for trespass. Milligan saw Meyers on campus more than times after the ban was imposed. SIU public safety personnel escorted Meyers off campus each time they became aware of his presence but, on instructions from the Director of Public Safety, he was not arrested. Although Milligan lost his campus job, he was able to get another and to gain admission to graduate school. Milligan sued SIU under Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and Title IX for creating a hostile work and educational environment and also for retaliating against him for complaining about Meyers’ harassment. The district court granted summary judgment to SIU. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutes do not set a higher standard for “more vulnerable” student workers and that SIU responded appropriately to the situation. View "Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. IL Univ." on Justia Law

In 2000, C&D hired Jones, who had periodic leg and back pain and bouts of anxiety, requiring him to see a physician once every two or three months and to undergo tests two or three times per year. He took prescription medication. In 2003, C&D implemented an attendance policy that assesses points for policy violations. Points are not assessed for preapproved leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 260. By October 1, 2009, Jones had accrued two and one-half points; three points results in termination. In September 2009, Jones spoke with C&D’s FMLA Coordinator, about his medical condition. His treating physician, Lubak, faxed FMLA certifications indicating that Jones required periodic treatment. Jones missed his entire scheduled shift on October 1. He claims to have left a voicemail for his supervisor prior to his absence, but the company disputes this. On October 1, he visited the doctor’s office to check on paperwork and obtain a prescription refill, but was never examined or evaluated by Dr. Lubak. C&D terminated Jones’s employment. The district court granted C&D summary judgment, reasoning that Jones was not entitled to leave on October 1 because he did not receive medical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Ekstrand taught kindergarten from 2000 to 2005. In 2005, she was reassigned to teach a first-grade class at her own request. She was relocated to a classroom with no exterior windows in a busy, loud area of the school. Ekstrand repeatedly requested a change of classroom. The principal worked to make the classroom more hospitable, but denied requests to switch rooms. After the school year began, Ekstrand experienced symptoms of seasonal affective disorder, a form of depression. Both her psychologist and her primary care physician recommended a leave of absence. Her initial leave was only three months, but the following winter, her doctor advised that Ekstrand would be unable to return to teach for the remainder of the 2005-06 term. The leave of absence was later extended to include the 2006-07 term. The district court granted the district summary judgment, but on remand, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Ekstrand under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide that Ekstrand was a qualified individual with a disability and that the school district knew of that disability, but failed to accommodate her with a new classroom.

Arizanovska, born in Macedonia, was employed part-time by Wal-Mart, as an overnight stocker. After experiencing some vaginal bleeding while pregnant, she informed Wal-Mart that her doctor told her that she could not lift more than 20 pounds. She was assigned to stock the baby food and toothbrush aisles. She miscarried. When she became pregnant again she provided a medical restriction; she was not to lift more than 10 pounds. She could no longer perform the essential lifting functions of her position as a stocker. She told human resources that she would not take a leave of absence and that she wanted to fold clothes. No such position existed. Arizanovska did not return to work and miscarried again. She filed suit, claiming violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, failure to accommodate her under Wal-Mart’s Accommodation in Employment Policy because of her pregnancy and/or national origin, and retaliation for filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She also claimed intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and liability for employees’ actions. The district court granted summary judgment against Arizanovska. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

From 2005-2007 plaintiff, an African-American, was employed as a driving instructor for defendant, a trucking company. After a number of incidents involving reported use of racial slurs and warnings about attendance, plaintiff's employment was terminated and he sued, alleging racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. He also alleged that the company retaliated against him for having filed a workers’ compensation claim, in violation of Indiana law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Plaintiff appealed only the retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff made a number of assertions, none of which could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the stated reason for his firing was pretextual. He argued that his termination was unfair, but did not provide any evidence to refute that his cumulative exercise of leave was excessive or to demonstrate that his absences did not affect his job performance and ability to instruct.

Nation left his position as CEO of Spring Air in 2007 with a severance package of $1.2 million to be paid over 15 months provided he did not work for competitors through 2008. Spring Air paid Nation more than $836,000, but in August 2008 ceased making payments due to liquidity problems. Spring Air ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Nation sued defendant, Spring Air's majority shareholder and primary creditor, asserting tortious interference with contract: that defendant used its majority position on Spring Air's board of directors to induce the company to breach his severance agreement. The district court dismissed, finding that defendant was conditionally privileged based on its status as Spring Air's majority shareholder and that Nation had not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the privilege. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Illinois law recognizes that a corporation's directors, officers, and shareholders are conditionally privileged to interfere with the corporation's contracts. The privilege is an aspect of the business-judgment rule. Nation failed to overcome the privilege with evidence that defendant induced breach for the specific purpose of injuring him or to further its own goals and that it acted against the best interests of the corporation.

Smith claimed (42 U.S.C. 1981) that he endured serious racist harassment from his immediate supervisor at former defendant Equistar and was fired for complaining about it. Equistar was an affiliate of another former defendant, Lyondell, but both are now bankrupt. Smith has settled his claims against the primary wrongdoer, his former supervisor Bianchetta. He also brought claims against Equistar’s human resources manager, Bray, who, Smith says conspired with Bianchetta to retaliate against him. The district court granted Bray for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The retaliation claim did not satisfy the causation element of the direct method of proof because Smith did not present sufficient circumstantial evidence showing that his complaints about discrimination motivated Bray to seek his termination. Constructive discharge occurs when working conditions become so unbearable that an employee is forced to resign; the evidence showed that Smith was fired.