Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Levin worked as an Illinois Assistant Attorney General from 2000, until his termination in 2006. Levin was over the age of 60 at the time of his termination and believes he was fired because of his age and gender. He was replaced by a woman in her 30s. He brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied a motion to dismiss the individual-capacity defendants on grounds of qualified immunity with respect to Levin’s section 1983 age discrimination claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At the time of the alleged wrongdoing, it was clearly established that age discrimination in employment violates the Equal Protection Clause. Although age is not a suspect classification, states may not discriminate on that basis if such discrimination is not “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Whether the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs suffering age discrimination in employment is irrelevant; a constitutional right was clearly established. View "Levin v. Madigan" on Justia Law

ITT is a for-profit corporation that runs “ITT Technical Institutes” throughout the country, including Lathrop, California. Halasa was the Lathrop Campus’s College Director for six months in 2009. ITT says that Halasa was fired for poor management skills and delivering inadequate results; Halasa alleges that he was fired in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), after identifying and reporting several irregularities in the way ITT was handling its federally subsidized loans and grants for students. The district court granted ITT summary judgment and costs. Even if Halasa did engage in protected conduct under the Act, he did not establish that he was fired because of this conduct. There was no evidence that decision-makers were made aware of his reporting. View "Halasa v. ITT Educational Servs., Inc" on Justia Law

Nicholson was a sales associate for Pulte, a national homebuilder. When she failed to make her sales quotas for several months in a row, Pulte put her on a performance-improvement plan and later fired her when her sales did not improve. Nicholson claimed that her termination was related to her need to care for her ailing parents and sued under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, alleging that the company interfered with her statutory rights and retaliated against her in violation of the Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Pulte. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Nicholson did not put Pulte on adequate notice that she needed FMLA-qualifying leave to care for her parents. At most, she made a few casual comments to her supervisors about her parents’ ill health. At the time the decision to terminate her employment was made, she had asked for only a single day off to attend a doctor’s appointment with her father, which her supervisor allowed. View "Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp." on Justia Law

In 2000, TIN hired Pagel as an outside salesman. The position allows flexibility in scheduling sales calls. In 2006, Pagel began reporting to Kremer and was, for the first time, given performance evaluations. Kremer requested daily sales and two-week itinerary reports. Pagel experienced chest pain and labored breathing, and visited physicians in July 2006. Tests revealed a blockage in his heart. On August 24, Kremer met with Pagel to discuss his declining performance. On August 29, Pagel was admitted to the hospital for angioplasty and stent placement. The following week, Pagel’s symptoms returned and he was re-admitted. A CT scan revealed an unrelated mass in his lung. Pagel claims each absence was covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and that he gave Kremer prior notification of each absence. While Pagel was in a clinic for a PET scan, Kremer called to say that he wanted to do a ride-along the next day. Pagel hastily attempted to schedule calls for September 19. The day went badly, Paget was terminated. The district court entered summary judgment for the company, rejecting claims under the FLMA. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that issues of material fact remained unresolved. View "Pagel v. TIN Inc." on Justia Law

Magnus was hired by the church in 2006 to work evenings and weekends. When the church was unwilling to accommodate her request to not work weekends, so that she could be with her daughter, who otherwise resided in an assisted living facility, Magnus alleged associational discrimination under the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(4). The church presented evidence that it terminated Magnus because of unsatisfactory performance and refusal to work weekends. The district court ruled in favor of the church. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.. Magnus’s true complaint is that the church, by mandating she work weekends, failed to accommodate her need to care for her disabled daughter. The ADA does not require employers to reasonably accommodate employees who do not themselves have a disability. View "Magnus v. St. Mark United Methodist Church" on Justia Law

Walsh is a nationwide builder; superintendents have discretion over hiring and pay of hourly workers. Walsh has rules against racial discrimination but superintendents are generally in charge. Plaintiffs worked for Walsh in 2002 and earlier and claimed that superintendents practiced, or tolerated, racial discrimination. Plaintiffs submitted a statistics indicating that black workers were less likely to work overtime; contended that some superintendents used words such as “nigger” or failed to prevent journeymen from doing so; and claimed that derogatory graffiti appeared in toilets or break sheds. Walsh claims that these were the work of subcontractors’ employees and that sites had different superintendents whose practices differed. The district court certified hostile work environment and overtime classes for the 262 Walsh sites in the Chicago area. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The 12 named plaintiffs cannot represent either class, since none worked for Walsh after 2002, but the classes extend into the indefinite future. The overtime class defined members as persons who did not earn more “because of their race.” Using a future decision on the merits to specify the scope of the class makes it impossible to determine who is in the class until the case ends. Plaintiffs may choose to propose site- or superintendent-specific classes. View "Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Three named plaintiffs in a class action suit to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b) and parallel state laws appealed the district court’s decertification of the classes. Proceeding as individual lawsuits by the three plaintiffs, the case settled, reserving plaintiffs’ right to appeal the decertification. The Seventh Circuit denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. If appeals such as this were held to be precluded on standing grounds, there would be no judicial economies, since if the named plaintiffs settle after denial of class certification and then exit the scene another member of the class can step forward and take the quitters’ place. View "Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Scruggs worked for Carrier since 1986. In 2004, Scruggs’s mother was moved to a nursing home. He sought intermittent leave to assist in her care and submitted Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, certification paperwork five times. Four certifications permitted leave for nursing home visits and transportation to doctor’s appointments. The fifth certification, in effect at his termination, permitted Scruggs to take his mother to doctor’s appointments once every six months and did not mention nursing home visits. In 2006, Carrier implemented a new plan to combat suspected FMLA abuse. Carrier hired McGough to watch about 35 employees who were suspected of misusing leave or had unexcused absences. McGough followed Scruggs, but found no evidence of misusing FMLA leave on the first two occasions. After Scruggs reported that he was taking FMLA leave for an entire day, an investigator recorded that Scruggs did not leave home. Following his suspension, Scruggs provided documentation from his mother’s doctor and the nursing home that he was assisting his mother on the date at issue. After further investigation, Carrier concluded that Scruggs had misused FMLA leave and terminated his employment. The district court rejected his FMLA suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Carrier had an “honest suspicion.” View "Scruggs v. Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

In 2004 Caterpillar hired Hanson as a supplemental assembler. Under the plant’s collective bargaining agreement, supplemental employees work 40 hours per week on a temporary but indefinite basis. They are not entitled to seniority rights and benefits in the same way as full-time employees. Two weeks into her stint as an assembler, Hanson injured her neck while installing a hydraulic hose. Hanson did not seek medical attention nor did she report her injury to plant management until five weeks later. Hanson claims that a union representative cautioned her against doing so. She was temporarily placed on light-duty work, filing papers. Her temporary position ended, but a doctor Hanson’s progress had plateaued and that her medical restrictions would continue indefinitely. Although another doctor indicated that she was fit to return to work, Hanson’s employment was terminated. In her suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the district court granted summary judgment for Caterpillar, reasoning that Hanson was not a “qualified individual with a disability.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Caterpillar placed her in three different positions, all within her medical restrictions and did not regard Hanson as impaired as to a broad range of jobs. View "Hanson v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

The Union established two funds for its members—a Pension Fund and a Health & Welfare Fund. DLF entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Union, under which DLF agreed to be bound to all Collective Bargaining Agreements between the Union and various employer associations in the geographical jurisdiction of the Union. Under the CBA, DLF is required to make fringe benefit contributions to the Funds on behalf of members of the Union. An audit of DLF’s payroll records showed that DLF had failed to make contributions on behalf of Mata, a cement mason who also performed other work (such as painting), for 1,119.5 hours in 2007 and for 234.5 hours in 2008, a total $11,955.05 in fringe benefit contributions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Funds, The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejecting DLF’s argument that, under the MOA, it is not contractually bound to make contributions for non-bargaining unit work. The MOA binds DLF to the CBAs and establishes the type of employee covered under the CBA. It was not intended to, and does not, define bargaining unit work for purposes of fringe benefit contributions. View "McCleskey v. DLF Constr., Inc." on Justia Law