Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Filus, a 50-year-old former truck driver, has twice applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming that back problems have left him incapable of gainful employment. An administrative law judge concluded that Filus could perform some light work and denied his most recent application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supports the denial. The ALJ adequately considered Filus’s testimony about the limiting effects of his pain along with his testimony that he regularly completed his daily household activities without any pain medication, not even over-the-counter products.View "Filus v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Beatty injured his back on the job at Olin’s manufacturing plant. At the direction of Olin’s medical department, he was evaluated by his physician, who instructed him to remain off of work for a week. He gave that doctor’s note to the medical department. With the exception of two days of light duty, he did not report for work for the next six weeks. He eventually got a retroactive medical excuse from his doctor, but Olin’s medical department sought an independent examination, anticipating a workers’ compensation claim. In the meantime, a clerk told Olin’s labor-relations manager that Beatty had not been at work for several weeks and had not called in. Olin’s policy requires employees to call in daily if they cannot come to work; failure to call in for three workdays in a row is grounds for termination. Based on Beatty’s noncompliance with the policy, the labor-relations manager terminated his employment. Beatty later filed a workers’ compensation claim, which eventually settled. He then sued for retaliatory discharge. The district court granted summary judgment for Olin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the manager who made the termination decision was entirely unaware of Beatty’s status vis-á-vis Olin’s medical department. View "Beatty v. Olin Corp." on Justia Law

Couch was employed as a truck driver by B&B, a private company that has Highway Contract Route contracts with the Postal Service. While Couch was making a delivery to a postal facility in Illinois, a U.S. Postal Service employee ran over his foot with a forklift. Two years later, Couch died, allegedly as a result of complications from the injury. After her husband died, plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which provides a cause of action for personal injuries negligently caused by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The district court granted the United States summary judgment, finding that Couch was a “borrowed employee,” so that workers’ compensation would provide Couch’s only remedy against both the borrowing and lending employers. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The private trucking company does not merely “lend employees” to the Postal Service but provides mail transportation and delivery services. The company trains, equips, pays, and supervises its own employees using its own equipment to provide these services. View "Couch v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, George, a vice president of JA, discovered that money withheld from his pay was not being deposited into his retirement account and health savings account. He complained to JA’s accountants and executives, including Burk. He contacted the Department of Labor but declined to file a complaint. He raised the issue with board members, then received checks for $2,600 for the missed deposits plus interest. His employment agreement ran until June 30, 2010, but he had discussed, with Burk and others, retiring in April 2010. On January 4, 2010, Burk told George not to return to work. Burk later discovered that George had drawn down the account containing his deferred compensation. J A concedes that George was entitled to withdraw the funds, but it did not rescind his discharge. George claimed violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1104(a) and retaliation for reporting that violation. The district court granted JA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. An employee’s grievance is within ERISA’s scope of protection against retaliation whether or not the employer solicited information. George notified JA of the potential breach of its fiduciary duties and asked what would be done. Those conversations involved an “inquiry.” View "George v. Jr. Achievement of Cent. IN, Inc." on Justia Law

Trinity terminated Dr. Assaf’s employment in 2009t. Assaf filed suit for breach of contract. While the case was pending, Assaf negotiated with Trinity’s new CEO, Tibbitts, Apparently without attorneys, Assaf and Tibbitts signed an agreement that provided that Assaf would receive a salary of $50,000 each year from 2009 to 2011. After that, his employment would automatically renew for a year unless either party gave notice of termination. Trinity refused to honor the agreement. The district court decided to enforce the agreement, but granted Trinity’s motion to bar any evidence of Assaf’s lost professional fees. Trinity never re-employed Assaf, claiming that “there is a policy against ordering specific performance of a personal services contract.” The court ordered Trinity to reinstate Assaf. Rather than reinstating Assaf, Trinity filed a “motion to clarify or stay.” The court reversed its earlier order, proceeded, without trial, to award Assaf his salary for the years 2009 through 2011, attorney’s fees, and compensatory damages. The court did not award any amount in lost professional fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed, declining to address specific performance because Trinity properly reterminated Assaf in 2011. The district court abused its discretion in barring evidence of lost professional fees. View "Assaf v. Trinity Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University and an outspoken critic of the university on a number of issues, including its failure to hire more Latino professors and its willingness to host military and CIA recruiters at campus job fairs. She claims that university officials have defamed her, refused to make her department chair, and denied her an award (among other things) because of her speech. In her 42 U.S.C. l983 claim, she sued University President Hahs and Provost Frank, asking for an injunction against future retaliation, and damages under Illinois law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal claims as unripe. The prospect of retaliation by Hahs or Frank is no more than conjecture. The district court incorrectly reached the merits of Capeheart’s federal claim. View "Capeheart v. Terrell" on Justia Law

Feldman worked the day shift at Olin. Because of fibromyalgia and sleep apnea, his doctors had advised him to work regular day positions, without rotation and overtime. When Olin realigned its workforce, causing Feldman’s position to require rotating shifts, he tried to work under the new regime for a few weeks, but found it impossible. When he presented Olin with a medical restriction, Olin laid him off. It did not place him in a different position, claiming that no positions were available that did not require overtime or flextime. When a straight-day position opened Feldman successfully bid for it. Since then, Feldman has continued working at the plant. Feldman sued, alleging that failure to offer a reasonable accommodation in the form of a straight-day shift, without overtime, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111 and that, once he returned to work, Olin retaliated against him for having filed administrative complaints. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Feldman can prevail if genuinely disputed points are resolved in his favor: whether he is “disabled” under the ADA, and whether he is “qualified” to work certain positions. Feldman’s retaliation claims were properly dismissed for lack of evidence that adverse employment actions were caused by protected conduct. View "Feldman v. Olin Corp." on Justia Law

More than 50 times, 2002-2005, May, a pipefitter at Chrysler’s plant, was the target of racist, xenophobic, homophobic, anti-Semitic graffiti. Messages included: “Otto Cuban good Jew is a dead Jew,” and “fuck Otto Cuban Jew nigger lover.” May found several death-threat notes in his toolbox and had his bike and car tires punctured. Sugar was poured in the gas tanks of his cars and a dead bird wrapped to look like a Ku Klux Klansman was placed in his work station. May contacted police and the FBI and complained to Chrysler. Human resources met with tradesmen and reminded them that harassment was unacceptable, a procedure was implemented to document the harassment, efforts were made to discover who was at the plant when the incidents likely occurred, and a handwriting analyst was retained. The harasser was never caught. May sued Chrysler in 2002 under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Only his hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment; a jury awarded $709,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages. May accepted remittitur to $300,000 and the court vacated the award of punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit The district court affirmed on liability, but reversed for reinstatement of the verdict. View "May v. Chrysler Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

Coleman was fired from the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Coleman was told that his position had been eliminated by budget cuts; he contends that his politics were the real cause for his discharge and a decision not to rehire him. Coleman’s job is not in the category for which politics is a legitimate consideration. Coleman sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and invoked the Shakman consent decrees, which allow parties aggrieved by certain Cook County patronage to bring civil contempt proceedings. The district judge dismissed the civil rights claim but declined to dismiss the Shakman claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dunlap is not protected by absolute immunity pursuant to the order under which he was appointed. In 2002 the Juvenile Detention Center and inmates settled a case; the court retained jurisdiction and in 2007 appointed Dunlap as administrator in an order, stating that Dunlap would have immunity: “[Dunlap] and his staff shall have the status of officers and agents of this Court and as such shall be vested with the same immunities as vest with this Court.” Dunlap’s decisions were administrative, not judicial. The order did not direct adoption of any particular personnel plan nor direct specific employment decisions. View "Coleman v. Dunlap" on Justia Law

Multiemployer pension plans are created by collective bargaining agreements to provide benefits to employees of different firms. When an employer withdraws from an MPP, the plan remains liable to employees who have vested pension rights, but can no longer look to the employer to cover these obligations. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461, assesses the employer with an exit price equal to its pro rata share of the funding shortfall (difference between present value of fund assets and present value of future obligations). Estimating the shortfall depends on estimating the amount by which current assets can be expected to grow with compound interest. To avoid having an employer new to a plan inherit withdrawal liability where existing members failed to fund the plan adequately in prior years, the statute creates default rules for assigning each employer a share of only so much of the shortfall as occurred while the employer was participating, 29 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2)-(4). Disputes about withdrawal liability are resolved by arbitration. The arbitrator in this case ruled that MMP trustees had over-assessed CPC’s withdrawal liability by $1,093,000. The district judge upheld the ruling. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the “Hideous complexities” involved and its own lack of expertise. View "Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. CPC Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law