Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anderson, a U.S. Postal Service worker, suffers from asthma. While he is virtually symptom-free outside of the workplace, his asthma regularly flared up at his job as a part-time mail processor. Between 2002 and 2009, Anderson filed numerous Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, an Occupational Health and Safety Administration complaint, and union grievances relating to his condition, requesting reasonable accommodations. He was absent from work for extended periods of time throughout the 2002-2009 period. Anderson sued USPS, for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and the Americans with Disability Act, for retaliation, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Anderson cannot point to temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action on the part of USPS. Nor did he present evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that USPS acted pretextually. View "Anderson v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

In 2010, Dunne filed a discrimination complaint under 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2), with the Mine Safety and Health Administration, a division of the Department of Labor, claiming that had terminated his employment for engaging in protected safety-related. The Secretary of Labor determined that the complaint was not frivolously brought, and Vulcan agreed to a temporary (economic) reinstatement pending a determination on the merits. The Secretary later determined not to prosecute Dunne’s complaint before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and Vulcan moved to dissolve the reinstatement order. The Commission denied Vulcan’s motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in favor of Vulcan, which argued that the term “complaint” in the statutory phrase “final order on the complaint,” refers only to the complaint brought by the Secretary after she determines that section 815(c) has been violated. Placement of the temporary reinstatement provision in the same subsection that describes the Secretary’s investigation, merits determination, and complaint, suggests that Congress meant for temporary reinstatement to continue only during the Secretary’s involvement. View "Vulcan Constr. Materials, L.P. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Fleishman began working for Continental in 1984 as a trial attorney defending workers’ compensation claims. Izzo oversaw the attorneys. Beginning in 2003, Fleishman suffered a series of medical problems related to a brain aneurism. He took intermittent medical leaves between July 2003 and June 2005. Izzo mentioned to Fleishman that his numbers “were off” because he was out on leave and inquired whether Fleishman thought about retirement. Fleishman declined and did not request another leave or accommodation after his return, although he had a noticeable dent on the side of his head. He was assigned to a new group that handled high-value cases. And his supervisor began receiving a series of performance-related complaints that ultimately led to his termination in 2007 at the age of 54. Fleishman filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623 (a)(1) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court granted Continental summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Fleishman offered no evidence of age discrimination and does not meet the definition of disabled under the ADA. View "Fleishman v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Carroll and Kelliher worked at Merrill Lynch. Carroll lodged a complaint that led to the firing of two employees. Restructuring followed and a supervisory position opened. Although Carroll did not apply, she felt “overlooked” when Merrill Lynch hired another. Carroll felt that Kelliher, apparently not involved with the earlier human resources complaint, was performing some of her duties. Around 9:00 PM on Thanksgiving, Carroll called Kelliher at home. As Carroll later admitted, she “fucking snapped;” she acknowledged that, if she received a similar call, she would feel “threatened.” Mrs. Kelliher overheard loud accusations and began listening from another receiver. Increasingly frightened, she pushed the “record” button on her answering machine. The Kellihers did not call the police, but called a Merrill Lynch supervisor. At his supervisors’ request, Kelliher played the recording and reported Carroll’s call to the police. Two months later, Carroll filed a police report, accusing the Kellihers of violating the Illinois eavesdropping statute. Merrill Lynch fired Carroll for her conduct on the call. Carroll sued Kelliher and Merrill Lynch. The district court entered summary judgment on her claim under the Illinois statute, concluding that the recording fell within the statute’s fear of crime exemption. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carroll v. Merrill Lynch, Jim Kelliher, and Pat Kelliher" on Justia Law

USA Cleaning is a proprietorship with fewer than 10 employees that provides janitorial services to a cement plant owned by Essroc. After an inspection of the plant the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ordered three janitors to undergo 24 hours of safety training. The Administration issued a “withdrawal order,” forbidding the janitors from reenterng the plant until they completed training, 30 U.S.C. 814(g)(1). Essroc provided legal assistance to challenge the order; within a week the lawyers billed $22,000. A week after issuing the order, the Administration vacated it, without acknowledging error. The review commission dismissed USA Cleaning’s contest proceeding. USA Cleaning requested $22,000 in legal fees that Essroc had paid (Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504). The Administration refused; the review commission upheld the refusal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that not the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, but a separate body, the Federal MineSafety and Health Review Commission, was named as respondent along with the Secretary of Labor. The review commission is the equivalent of a court. It did not issue the order challenged by the petitioner, but merely upheld the refusal of the mine-safety administration to award attorneys’ fees. View "USA Cleaning Serv. & Bldg. Maint. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Comm'n" on Justia Law

While working at an animal shelter, Povey injured her wrist moving a dog. She had surgery and underwent physical therapy. Jeffersonville’s Human Resources Director explained that the shelter did not have light duty positions. Povey’s supervisor nonetheless limited her duties and exempted Povey from working weekends because it would entail heavy lifting. Co-workers complained. Although an investigation concluded that there was no illegal harassment, Povey reported that she felt harassment “behind her back” and filed a complaint. Jeffersonville then received medical notice of Povey’s permanent physical restrictions which prohibited repetitive hand movement or lifting, pushing or pulling more than five pounds with her right arm. Povey’s employment was terminated. Povey sued under 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted Jeffersonville summary judgment, finding that Povey did not demonstrate that her wrist injury impaired her from completing daily tasks; her perceived impairment foreclosed her from accepting a broad range or class of jobs; she was perceived unable to perform manual tasks; she was a qualified individual as defined under the ADA; or that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her rights under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Povey v. City of Jeffersonville" on Justia Law

In 2007, CSI entered into a contract with Sunrise to install carpets, countertops, flooring, and wall tiles at a new condominium within the geographical jurisdiction of the union’s Local 13. Though CSI was not a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with Local 13, most other workers at the job site were union members. The union became aware that Sunrise was using non-unionized workers and began picketing and a strike. A union organizer stated that Sunrise should get rid of CSI and that if it used CSI on other job sites in the future, Local 13 would set up pickets at those jobs as well. Due to the threat, Sunrise canceled another contract and moved CSI workers to night hours at the condominium project. CSI’s president claims that the union organizer attacked him at the job site and brought claims for lost profits, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair labor practices (secondary pressure) under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 187. The district court ruled in favor of defendants Regional Council, Local 13, and the union organizer on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carpet Serv. Int'l, Inc. v. Chicago Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

Naficy began working for IDHS in 1996. According to Naficy, her co-worker and eventual supervisor, Bailey, mocked her accent and suggested that Naficy should not have been promoted because she is Iranian. Naficy filed complaints of discrimination, relating to treatment during a layoff and unfavorable performance evaluations. In 2010, in connection with closure of another facility, IDHS followed provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Naficy and others received a letter alerting them to the possibility of a layoff and outlining potential bump options. Naficy was reassigned to a part-time position; she returned to her former position with the same schedule and salary two months later. Naficy filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that the reassignment was discriminatory and retaliatory. She received a right-to-sue letter and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the claims, reasoning that as a state agency, IDHS is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that Naficy had no direct evidence of discrimination by anyone involved in her reassignment, of retaliation, or of a similarly situated IDHS employee who received better treatment than Naficy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Naficy v. IL Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2005 brokers sued Merrill Lynch under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII raising claims of racial discrimination and seeking to litigate as a class. They alleged that the firm’s “teaming” and account-distribution policies had the effect of steering black brokers away from the most lucrative assignments and prevented them from earning compensation comparable to white brokers. That litigation is ongoing. Three years later, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, and the companies introduced a retention-incentive program that would pay bonuses to Merrill Lynch brokers corresponding to their previous levels of production. Brokers filed a second class-action suit. The district court dismissed. The court held that the retention program qualified as a production-based compensation system within the meaning of the section 703(h) exemption and was protected from challenge unless it was adopted with “intention to discriminate because of race.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). The court then held that the complaint’s allegations of discriminatory intent were conclusory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not enough to allege that the bonuses incorporated the past discriminatory effects of Merrill Lynch’s underlying employment practices. The disparate impact of those employment practices is the subject of the first lawsuit, and if proven, will be remedied there. View "McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, the airline established guidelines that address accommodating employees who, because of disability, can no longer do essential functions of their current jobs, even with reasonable accommodation. The guidelines specify that the transfer process is competitive, so that an employee in need of accommodation will not be automatically placed into a vacant position, but will be given preference over similarly qualified applicants. The EEOC challenged the policy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court ruled in favor of the airline. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the ADA does mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer. The court concluded that contrary precedent did not survive in light of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law