Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vaughn started working for the U.S. Forest Service in 1974. Vaughn filed internal complaints in 1997, 2004, 2005 and 2006, asserting discrimination based on race and age, and retaliation for exercising his right to bring such complaints. Vaughn filed suit, but in 2007 signed a settlement agreement. Two days later, he received a “letter of direction” describing a change in his work schedule. He would no longer work regular weekday hours. After receiving the letter, Vaughn was passed over for a temporary assignment and was denied overtime. During roughly the same period, Vaughn’s relationship with a co-worker ended, she accused him of harassment, and he was placed on administrative leave. She continued to complain after he returned and filed an EEOC complaint and a state court order of protection. Vaughn sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, claiming retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The district court granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vaughn failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he has failed to demonstrate that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations. The employer put forward, and he failed to rebut, a legitimate reason for the action that was taken. View "Vaughn v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Collins, an African-American woman, worked for Red Cross. In 2006, Collins called the Red Cross’s 24-hour confidential hotline to complain that her co-workers put tacks on her chair, damaged her property, demanded private information, stole her files, required her to pay business costs from her own pocket, and otherwise harassed and sabotaged her. She later filed a racial discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which gave her a “right-to-sue” letter. Collins did not sue at that time. A few months later, several of Collins’s co-workers complained that Collins told others that the Red Cross was out to get minorities; said she could not work with homosexuals; instructed an employee to falsify records; coerced a subordinate into teaching a class for free; and gave out blank certifications for Red Cross courses. Red Cross fired her after an investigation concluded that Collins committed multiple acts of employee misconduct. Collins sued under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), claiming that she was really fired because of illegal retaliation and discrimination. The district court granted Red Cross summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Collins v. Am. Red Cross" on Justia Law

Sanchez sued her employer for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Before trial, Sanchez accepted an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which permits a defendant to serve on an opposing party “an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued.” If the offer is rejected and the “judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.” The district court entered judgment in Sanchez’s favor but denied her request for attorney fees and costs in addition to the amount specified in theoffer. The employer’s offer said that it included “all of Plaintiff’s claims for relief” but made no specific mention of costs or attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the Rule 68 offer was silent as to costs and fees, so costs and fees were not included. Offers of judgment under Rule 68 are different from contract offers; plaintiffs who receive Rule 68 offers are “at their peril whether they accept or reject a Rule 68 offer.” Therefore, any ambiguities are resolved against defendants. View "Sanchez v. Prudential Pizza, Inc." on Justia Law

Yassan sued his former employer, Chase, approximately nineteen months after the termination of his employment, claiming that Chase had terminated him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and public policy and that Chase had committed fraud by inducing him to sign a severance agreement through “explicit and false representation[s].” Before Chase’s deadline to answer the complaint, Yassan’s counsel failed to appear at a status hearing and the state court judge dismissed for want of prosecution. Unaware of this dismissal, Chase filed a notice to remove the case to federal district court. The district court concluded that the removal after dismissal constituted a procedural defect that had been waived by Yassan’s failure to object within 30 days, then granted Chase’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that removal of the case to federal court was properly accomplished and noting that Yassan received valuable consideration for a release he signed when his employment was terminated. View "Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co." on Justia Law

Alam filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Miller Brewing, his former employer. The case settled in 2006. Subsequently, Alam, whose company provides software and consulting services to the brewing industry, approached MillerCoors about developing a software prototype for MillerCoors and its distributors. MillerCoors is a joint venture between Miller Brewing and Coors Brewing Company. After Alam spent two months working to develop the prototype and collaborating with MillerCoors employees, an executive at MillerCoors indicated that it would no longer consider working with Alam because of Alam’s prior lawsuit. Alam received a letter from counsel for MillerCoors, quoting the settlement agreement provision that: “I agree not to reapply for employment with or otherwise work for or provide services to Miller Brewing Company . . . or any of its parent, affiliates or subsidiaries.” After the EEOC issued Alam a right-to-sue notice, he filed a retaliation claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and a state law claim for promissory estoppel. The district court ultimately dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Alam had not exhausted EEOC remedies with respect to Miller and, with respect to MillerCoors, was not an employee nor seeking employment opportunities for purposes of Title VII. View "Alam v. Miller Brewing Co." on Justia Law

Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Teruggi worked for CIT from 1997 until his 2009 discharge, as vice president. In 2002, Teruggi suffered a workplace injury to his right hand. In 2006, doctors amputated the little finger on his right hand and removed the connecting bones to his wrist. Teruggi filed a workers’ compensation claim and requested reasonable accommodation with respect to computer use. After other incidents involving sharing email, Terruggi, then 59 years old, was discharged for failure to protect confidential information. He sued, alleging retaliation and discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court granted summary judgment in CIT’s favor, finding that Teruggi’s “mosaic of circumstantial evidence” less than convincing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The bits of evidence Teruggi offered were essentially isolated events or comments with no apparent connection to the termination decision and did not support a reasonable inference of discrimination or retaliatory discharge, either individually or collectively. View "Teruggi v. CIT Group/Capital Fin., Inc" on Justia Law

A new owner informed paper mill employees that it was closing the mill with a likely shut-down date in late April. In March, plaintiffs received letters stating that their employment was being terminated effective May 2 and that, in exchange for a release, they would receive a severance package. Before plaintiffs submitted their executed release forms, the company indicated that it was no longer accepting release agreements and that it had decided to keep the plant open until October. Plaintiffs nonetheless signed and submitted the release and separation agreements they had received two weeks earlier. The company later stated that it would be extending a new severance offer and a bonus as an incentive to stay with the mill until October. Plaintiffs both stopped working at the mill on May 2 and started new jobs. The mill continued to operate. After leaving the mill and not receiving severance, plaintiffs requested it from the company’s severance plan. The plan administrator concluded that the two had voluntarily terminated their employment and denied their requests. Plaintiffs sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).. The district court granted the plan summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reddinger v. SENA Severance Pay Plan" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this employment discrimination case on behalf of Shepherd, a former sales clerk at AutoZone, alleging that AutoZone had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. Shepherd had a back injury that was aggravated by mopping floors, and he claimed that AutoZone required him to mop floors despite his requests for relief. The EEOC alleged that AutoZone had failed to accommodate Shepherd’s disability. The magistrate judge initially granted AutoZone summary judgment on the accommodation claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. On remand, a jury returned a verdict in Shepherd’s favor. The judge then approved $100,000 in compensatory damages, $200,000 in punitive damages, $115,000 in back pay, an injunction on AutoZone’s anti-discrimination practices, and the EEOC’s motion to vacate a prior award of costs to AutoZone from the first trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but remanded the injunction for imposition of a reasonable time limit. The award of compensatory damages was not excessive when compared to Shepherd’s pain and suffering; the jury heard sufficient evidence of AutoZone’s reckless indifference to Shepherd’s federal employment rights and because the punitive damages award was not grossly excessive under the Due Process Clause. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law

The railroad fired a locomotive engineer, Narron. The union filed a grievance, which eventually came before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, which ordered the railroad to reinstate Narron with back pay but authorized the railroad to offset the back pay by any earnings that he had obtained between his firing and his reinstatement. The union filed a petition in the district court challenging that part of the award. The district judge remanded for determination of whether Narron had had any such earnings and ordered the earnings-offset provision vacated. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, holding that the district court exceeded its authority. A district court may set aside a Board order only “for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of [the Railway Labor Act]” or “to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division’s jurisdiction,” or “for fraud or corruption by a member of the division,” 45 U.S.C. 153. View "Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainment v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law