Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Majors worked at GE’s Bloomington plant for 32 years. In 2000, she suffered a work-related injury to her right shoulder that left her limited to lifting no more than 20 pounds and precluded her from work above shoulder level with her right arm. The restrictions were considered temporary at first, but according to her medical file maintained by GE, the restrictions later were determined to be permanent. After GE denied her temporary and permanent positions to which she was otherwise entitled under the seniority-based bidding procedure, Majors sued under Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming retaliation for filing EEOC charges after being denied hours, and that GE constructively discharged her when she elected to retire. The district court granted GE summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Majors couldn’t perform an essential function of the position she sought without an accommodation that was not reasonable and presented insufficient evidence of retaliation. View "Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Cromwell was fired from his position as a Momence police lieutenant, after an incident of alleged misconduct involving alcohol that was followed by lying and insubordination during the investigation. Cromwell sued, arguing that his termination was procedurally inadequate and that that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued public employment derived from the city’s Police Department Rules and Regulations, which provide that probationary employees may be terminated at any time for any reason but omit similar language with regard to nonprobationary employees. The district court rejected this argument and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulations on which Cromwell based his claim do not contain the clear language needed to overcome Illinois’s presumption of at-will employment. Something more than inference from silence is required. View "Cromwell v. City of Momence" on Justia Law

Cloe started working for the City of Indianapolis in 2007 as an Unsafe Buildings/Nuisance Abatement Project Manager. In 2008, she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, a chronic, incurable neurological disorder that rendered her disabled and significantly impaired her day-to-day life. In 2009, the city terminated her, ostensibly for poor performance. Cloe sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that the city discriminated against her because of her disability; failed to reasonably accommodate her disability; and retaliated against her for requesting accommodations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the reasonable accommodation claims, but reversed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, noting “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn.” View "Cloe v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Allegedly in retaliation for Modrowski’s unwillingness to skimp on building repairs, defendants fired him, withheld $11,000 in wages, had Modrowski jailed, and locked Modrowski out of his personal Yahoo email account. Modrowski sued, challenging the refusal to relinquish control over his email account. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, but Modrowski discovered that years’ worth of personal correspondence had vanished. Modrowski claimed violation of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701), the Federal Wire Tapping Act (18 U.S.C. 2511), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030). The district court dismissed the first two claims because Modrowski acknowledged that he voluntarily linked his personal account with the defendants’ business account. The district court dismissed without prejudice the Computer Fraud Act claim for failure to allege an injury of at least $5,000. When Modrowski returned his first amended complaint, defendants moved for summary judgment. The window for fact discovery had closed and neither party had sought an extension. Modrowski responded by attacking perceived deficiencies of the defendants’ motion. Noting Modrowski’s failure to offer “any evidence in response to defendants’ motion, let alone evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact,” it granted defendants’ motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Modrowski v. Pigatto" on Justia Law

Steine was a subcontractor for installation of thermal units at a Wal-Mart store in Gas City, Indiana. Steine rented a boom lift from NES. Steine foreman Crager signed a one-page, two-sided NES “Rental Agreement” with a signature line is at the bottom of its front side. Above the signature line, the Agreement states: “Signer acknowledges that he has read and fully understands this rental agreement including the terms and conditions on the reverse side” and “Please note that there are important terms on the reverse side of this contract, including an indemnification provision.” Menendez, a Steine employee, died from injuries he suffered while operating the 40-foot boom lift. His family filed sued NES and others, alleging negligence. NES sought indemnification from Steine. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Steine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The indemnification clause in the rental agreement does not expressly state, in clear and unequivocal terms as Indiana law requires, that Steine agreed to indemnify NES for NES’s own negligence. View "NES Rentals Holdings, Inc.l v. Steine Cold Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

Although Hall has been a plumber for the City of Chicago since 1995, she was on disability leave from 1999 to 2003 due to a work-related injury. Hall returned to the City’s employ with the limitation that she could not lift over 25 pounds. Hall and the City agree this restriction precluded her from resuming work as a plumber, so Hall began working in the House Drain Inspectors Division of the Department, which was composed of 13 male house drain inspectors and the supervisor’s female secretary. Hall claims that the supervisor created a hostile work environment by assigning her menial work and prohibiting coworkers from interacting with her. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in her Title VII suit, finding that the conduct was not hostile in comparison to other employees’ responsibilities and that Hall failed to produce evidence that the supervisor’s conduct was because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a jury could infer that deliberate isolation of Hall was sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment and that the supervisor’s comments to Hall could indicate that Hall’s gender played a part in his actions. View "Hall v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The original named defendants in the case, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to overtime pay, were JT Packard, the plaintiffs’ employer, and Packard’s parent, Bray. A parent corporation is not liable for FLSA violations by its subsidiary unless it exercises significant authority over the subsidiary’s employment practices. The district judge allowed substitution of Betts, which had purchased Packard’s assets and placed them in a wholly owned subsidiary. After a conditional settlement for $500,000 in damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, Betts appealed the substitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no good reason to reject successor liability in this case. Packard was a profitable company. It was sold, not because it was insolvent, but because it was the guarantor of its parent’s bank loan and the parent defaulted. View "Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Northington worked for H & M. She dated a fellow employee who was also involved with employee Sims. Sims made threats. Northington reported Sims’ behavior to manager Collins, who was then dating (subsequently married) Sims’ mother, the assistant manager. Sims ultimately physically assaulted Northington away from H & M property. The state court issued a protective order. Northington provided the order to the Union, but not to H & M. Northington complained to H & M officers, but did not complain that the harassment was based on race or gender. Based on her behavior during a safety inspection, the inspector suspected that Northington was under the influence of drugs. Northington left the testing facility without giving a required urine sample. Three company officers concurred in terminating her employment, unaware of her criminal complaint against Sims. Northington claimed retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court found that H & M’s conduct in deleting inactive email accounts was negligent but not willful; assessed H & M costs and fees; deemed specific facts admitted; and precluded H & M from making certain arguments, but granted H & M summary judgment, finding that Northington did not establish that she had participated in protected activity under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The discovery sanction did not preclude summary judgment. View "Northington v. H & M Int'l" on Justia Law

Tompkins began working in 1978 and was a participant in the Fund, a multi-employer pension fund established and administered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. In 1999, Tompkins was granted a disability pension based on chronic asthmatic bronchitis, which he attributed to working with cement dust for 22 years. Tompkins’s application included agreement to be bound by all the Fund’s rules and regulations, although he did not inquire about those rules or make any effort to find out what they were. Upon receiving his first monthly payment of $2,115.43, he was required to sign a Retirement Declaration that provided notice of disqualifying employment for plan participants receiving retirement pensions but did not include the rules and regulations specific to disability pensioners. In 2007, the Fund suspended his disability pension, claiming that his full-time employment in 2005 and 2006 indicated that he no longer met the definition of “total and permanent disability.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the Fund acknowledged ambiguity, it based its decision on a reasonable interpretation. View "Tompkins v. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law