Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Luevano works as a greeter at Wal-Mart. She complained to her supervisor that a male co-worker was repeatedly harassing her. The supervisor refused to act. The harassment continued. Luevano unsuccessfully complained to the district manager of human resources. Her working hours were cut. She filed a gender discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued a right to sue letter. Two days before the 90-day filing deadline expired, Luevano filed a pro se complaint, with requests to proceed in forma pauperis and for recruited counsel. Using the court's four-page form, she checked boxes for sex discrimination, failure to stop harassment, and retaliation based on a protected activity, supplemented by two handwritten pages alleging that her co-worker harassed her because she was a woman; her male supervisor refused to correct her co-worker’s behavior; and her supervisor retaliated by reducing her hours and intimidation. The district court dismissed without prejudice, stating that Luevano had failed to allege properly that the harassment or retaliation had occurred because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Luevano’s claims in amended complaints relate back to the initial timely filings and adequately alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. View "Luevano v. Walmart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Sroga filed a 54-page complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against employees of Chicago Public Schools and the Board of Education, alleging that they got him fired from his job as an instructor. The district court dismissed for violation of FRCP 8(a)(2), stating that “the morass of irrelevant and tangential allegations” made it “impossible” to evaluate the complaint, but allowed submission of an amended complaint. Sroga timely filed an amended complaint asserting various constitutional and tort-law claims. After five months with no indication of whether Sroga would be permitted to proceed, the district court dismissed most of the claims, leaving claims for retaliatory discharge against an individual and for indemnification against the Board. The court scheduled a status hearing two months later and warned that if Sroga failed to appear, “the Court may dismiss the case for want of prosecution.” The U.S. Marshal’s Office mailed Sroga a letter requesting information about how to serve summonses. Sroga did not respond, and the summonses were returned unexecuted. When Sroga did not appear for his status hearing, the court dismissed. Sroga unsuccessfully moved to vacate, asserting that he was working out of town and did not receive any notification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting Sroga’s history of compliance and that one missed date is not generally a basis for dismissal. View "Sroga v. Huberman" on Justia Law

Peele worked for the Portage Police Department as a detective. In 2007 he supported Charnetzky’s Democratic primary campaign to become mayor. Charnetzky lost. Peele spoke to a local reporter and criticized Sheriff Lain for endorsing the opponent, apparently stating that Sheriff Lain “won’t get any support here.” The day after the comments were published, Peele was reassigned to the more deskbound position of “Station Duty Officer.” Peele sued, claiming that he was demoted and constructively discharged without due process; retaliation for his support of Charnetzky; and defamation. The defendants counterclaimed malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to retaliation, noting that the district court did not address conspiracy, immunity, or the city’s liability. View "Peele v. Burch" on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Union members, working at Navistar’s Indianapolis engine-manufacturing plant, were represented by a union and were subject to a collective-bargaining agreement. They claim that on unidentified dates they were laid off, ostensibly for lack of work, but that Navistar actually subcontracted their work to nonunion plants in violation of the CBA and that Navistar failed to recall them as work became available. They claim to have filed hundreds of grievances that were diverted or stalled. In 2009, Navistar closed the Indianapolis plant. The union members sued. When union members sue their employer for breach of contract under the Labor Management Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. 185, they must also claim breach of their union’s duty of fair representation. The district court dismissed, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead the prerequisite union breach of fair representation. A separate interference-with-benefits claim under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, was resolved by summary judgment in favor of Navistar. The 29 remaining plaintiffs appealed only the LMRA claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that all of the allegations concerning the duty of fair representation were conclusory, so that the complaint lacked the required factual content. View "Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc." on Justia Law

Hitchcock worked for Angel Corps, which performs non-medical care services. Upon learning that Hitchcock was pregnant, her supervisor questioned Hitchcock about whether she would return to work after giving birth, significantly increased Hitchcock’s workload, and reviewed Hitchcock’s work more often. On April 5 Hitchcock went to the home of a new client who was 100 years old and living with her son. Hitchcock claims that felt like she had stepped “into a horror movie” and feared for her safety. Hitchcock told her supervisor that the client “was possibly dying, or already dead.” An ambulance was sent. Angel Corps suspended Hitchcock’s client visits pending investigation, which revealed that the client had been dead for two or three days by the time of Hitchcock’s visit. On May 3, Hitchcock was fired, with a statement that, had Hitchcock done her assessment as originally scheduled on March 31, Hitchcock would have compromised the safety of the client by not conducting a proper assessment. Hitchcock sued, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964/Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). The district court entered summary judgment for Angel Corps. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Hitchcock submitted evidence that her supervisor expressed animus toward pregnant women and treated Hitchcock differently after learning she was pregnant; explanations for Hitchcock’s termination were “shifting, inconsistent, facially implausible, or all of the above.” View "Hitchcock v. Angel Corps Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson filed an employment discrimination claim against Chicago public schools. The district court granted her motion to proceed in forma pauperis and set a date for a status hearing, warning Johnson that failure to appear could result in immediate dismissal. Johnson did not appear; the judge dismissed her suit. Johnson immediately moved to reinstate, claiming that she had not been notified of the hearing. The judge denied the motion, noting that Johnson had agreed to receive electronic notice of orders and decisions. The court had provided electronic notice of the dismissal, an order Johnson admittedly received. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the trial judge had not explained why a single missed conference produced immediate dismissal; “the punishment must fit the crime.” View "Johnson v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Gomberg briefly represented Goyal in 2004 settlement negotiations with a former employer over his claims of retaliation for whistle-blowing and gave Goyal’s employer notice of an attorney lien on any settlement or judgment. The negotiations did not produce an agreement; Goyal later retained new counsel to pursue litigation. In 2009, without the aid of any counsel, Goyal settled with his former employer. After Goyal settled, Gomberg reappeared and demanded a share. The employer paid a portion of the settlement to Gomberg. The district court granted Goyal’s motion to quash the lien, effectively ordering Gomberg to pay Goyal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Gomberg is not entitled to any part of the settlement funds Goyal secured and that “Gomberg’s professional conduct is questionable.” His position that he “secured” funds for Goyal when the opposing party made an unacceptable and unaccepted settlement offer is unreasonable to the point of being frivolous and possibly warranting sanctions. Gomberg’s assertion of a lien for $70,000 was far greater than 10 percent of even the employer’s unaccepted (and not yet made) offer of $375,000 and was without basis. View "Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst." on Justia Law

Hakim was an Accenture employee for nearly 10 years before being let go as part of a workforce reduction. During part of his tenure with the company, he participated in the company’s pension plan. In 1996, Accenture amended the plan to exclude a number of employees in various departments. In 1999, Hakim was promoted to a position in which he was no longer eligible to participate in the plan under the terms of the 1996 amendment. Upon his 2003 termination, at age 39, Hakim signed a release in exchange for separation benefits that waived all claims that arose prior to signing the release. In 2008, while employed elsewhere, Hakim sought additional pension benefits from Accenture, arguing that the notice of the 1996 amendment to the plan (which was emailed to employees) was insufficient and violated ERISA’s notice requirements, 29 U.S.C. 1054(h). His claim was denied by Accenture. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Accenture, holding that Hakim knew or should have known about his claim when he signed the release, and thus waived his claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hakim v. Accenture U.S. Pension Plan" on Justia Law

From 1996 to 2003, Harbaugh worked periodically for Chicago Public Schools as a substitute music teacher. In 2003, she was hired as a “full-time basis substitute,” and tin 2004 she was appointed to a fulltime probationary tenure-track teaching position. In 2008, the principal at Harbaugh’s school recommended against renewing her contract. The Chicago Board of Education accepted that recommendation and terminated her appointment effective at the end of the semester. Harbaugh sued, alleging violation of her due-process rights by terminating her employment without a hearing. The district court entered summary judgment for the Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Illinois law Harbaugh had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment only if she had tenure; a teacher becomes tenured at the beginning of her fifth year of full-time employment on the tenure track. Her year as a full-time-basis substitute teacher does not count toward the four-year requirement. View "Harbaugh v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law