Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bates, a black firefighter, joined the Chicago Fire Department in 1977 and rose through the ranks. In 2000, Fire Commissioner Joyce appointed Bates to one of seven District Chief positions. A District Chief is a member of the personnel management team and holds an at-will position. Bates’s work was well-regarded. Joyce resigned as Fire Commissioner in 2004, and Trotter, also black, became the new Fire Commissioner and chose his own management team; he issued a personnel order that contained eith black and 10 non-black promotions, three black and five non-black demotions, and four lateral reassignments for at-will positions. Bates was demoted to a Deputy District Chief position in Operation Relief, which is a floating assignment. The district court dismissed Bates’s 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 claims of racial discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. Trotter had sufficient experience with Bates and the Chicago Fire Department to support his assertion that Bates’s demeanor and level of enthusiasm were not compatible with his management style. View "Bates v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hester, a white male, began working for the Department’s laboratory in 1994. In 2007 he was reprimanded for failing to timely report test results. Hester later applied for promotion. Liu interviewed him, but chose another white male. When the supervisory position opened again, Hester again applied and was interviewed. Liu chose a white female in her mid-twenties, Gentry, who had been working in the lab for four years, citing Gentry’s performance record and concern that Hester did not have a good working relationship with others. In 2009, Hester received a form listing his “performance deficiencies.” A second performance appraisal report found that Hester still did not meet expectations for “job knowledge” and “communication.” The Department terminated his employment. Hester, then in his 50s, could be fired only for just cause. The State Employees Appeals Commission rejected his challenge. Hester sued, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that Indiana was immune from liability for private damages under the ADEA, and that Hester did not adequately show that the Department discharged Hester because of a protected characteristic. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hester v. IN Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Johnson, an African-American woman, was employed at Koppers’ plant from 1995 until her termination in 2008. She had been disciplined for sleeping at her desk in the laboratory, for smoking in the lunch room, for not punching out on the time clock, for fighting with a security guard, and for an altercation with a white male co-worker, O’Connell. Without interviewing Johnson, the plant manager determined that both O’Connell and Johnson were at fault and decided that Johnson should be punished more severely because of her disciplinary history and O’Connell’s allegations of racial harassment. The plant manager warned Johnson that future incidents would lead to termination. O’Connell received a less severe warning letter. The Union filed a grievance on Johnson’s behalf and Johnson’s warning was reduced to a memo that summarized her work obligations and employment status. Johnson was fired after another altercation with O’Connell. A witness indicated that Johnson shoved O’Connell, who filed a police report. Johnson filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of her race and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Koppers. View "Johnson v. Koppers, Inc." on Justia Law

Part of Crosby’s finger was amputated while using a “kicking method” of removing metal from bundles. His employer, Cooper, discouraged that method as dangerous. Crosby claimed medical and temporary total disability benefits under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. When he returned, Crosby stated that he would continue using the “kicking method.” Cooper suspended him for three days and stated that any future safety policy violation would result in immediate termination. The president of Crosby’s union, Zimmerman, filed a grievance on Crosby’s behalf. After returning from suspension, Crosby was given additional training during which, he alleges, Cooper introduced new safety rules and procedures. Within hours of Crosby’s return to work, Cooper’s safety specialist accused him of violating a new safety rule by tossing a pallet. Crosby denied doing so. Zimmerman notified Crosby that Cooper had decided to fire him and suggested that Crosby ask Cooper to call the decision a “permanent layoff with no recall rights,” so that Crosby would be eligible for unemployment benefits and a neutral job reference. Cooper accepted on the condition that Crosby dismiss the grievance. Crosby later claimed that the settlement was a sham and that he was fired for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Cooper removed his retaliatory discharge suit to federal court, claiming that the suit was a disguised action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, which preempts state‐law claims that require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Cooper asserted that the suit should be dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies under the CBA. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded to state court, rejecting the claim of complete preemption. View "Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc." on Justia Law

From 2006 until he was fired in 2011, Chrzanowski was an assistant state’s attorney. In 2011, a special prosecutor began investigating Chrzanowski’s boss, Bianchi. Bianchi allegedly had improperly influenced cases involving his relatives and political allies. Under subpoena, Chrzanowski testified before a grand jury, and later, again under subpoena, he testified at Bianchi’s trial. A few months later, Chrzanowski was interrogated by Bianchi and fired. Chrzanowski believed that the firing was retaliation for his testimony and filed suit, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and state statutes. The district court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, finding that First Amendment protections did not apply because the testimony was “pursuant to [his] official duties” and, in the alternative, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because any First Amendment protections were not “clearly established” at the time. The Seventh Circuit reversed. When Chrzanowski spoke out about his supervisors’ potential or actual wrongdoing, he was speaking outside the duties of employment. Providing eyewitness testimony regarding potential wrongdoing was never part of what Chrzanowski was employed to do; his rights were clearly established at all relevant times. Unlike restrictions on speech made pursuant to official duties, punishment for subpoenaed testimony chills civic discourse “in significant and pernicious ways.” View "Chrzanowski v. Bianchi" on Justia Law

SVT hired Morgan, an African-American, to work as a security guard at one of its Ultra grocery stores. Morgan had previously worked security for a grocery store that previously occupied the location and at Home Depot. Morgan was working about 40 hours a week at Home Depot and 20 to 30 hours a week at Ultra when he was involved in an incident involving a white manager at Ultra, who had taken a newspaper without paying. Morgan was ultimately fired. He sued, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment to the company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the circumstances surrounding Morgan’s firing, did not, in themselves, raise a plausible inference of race discrimination. Although Morgan argued that the timing of his firing was “suspicious,” given his documented failure to perform theft stops, prior warnings about the lack of theft stops, and SVT’s stringent enforcement of its anti-shoplifting olicies, the court properly concluded that suspicious timing alone was insufficient to create a genuine dispute over whether Morgan was fired for failing to meet legitimate job expectations or for insidious racial reasons. View "Marcus Morgan v. SVT, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Four upper-level managers at Tradesmen, a construction staffing company, formed a competing company in 2009. Tradesmen filed suit alleging breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information, breach of duty of loyalty, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with business expectancy, conversion, and civil conspiracy, and seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to covenants not to compete and injunctive relief. Proceedings against one defendant were stayed, due to bankruptcy. The district court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants, except with respect to the declaratory judgment count, but found that the covenants had already expired. The district court denied attorney’s fees. The Seventh Circuit held that because of the stay, the summary judgment ruling was not a final decision, so that it lacked jurisdiction on appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291, except with respect to the request for injunctive relief (28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1)). The court affirmed on that issue, reasoning that Tradesmen failed to show that it suffered any harm, let alone irreparable harm, from the remaining defendants’ actions. View "Tradesmen Int'l, Inc. v. Black" on Justia Law

Reynolds acquired Pactiv in 2010 under an agreement that calls for severance pay to any non‐union employee terminated without cause, within a year, as a result of the acquisition. Pactiv established a severance‐pay plan with implementing terms, including a requirement that the departing worker execute a separation agreement in a form acceptable to the company, releasing all other claims against Pactiv. Within a year, Pactiv directed Rupert to relocate. He declined. Pactiv acknowledged entitlement to severance pay and sent him an agreement, which required that Rupert promise, for the next year, not to work for competitors in research and development, solicit sales of competing goods and services, or try to hire Pactiv employees. He had not previously been subject to a restrictive covenant and declined to sign. Pactiv withheld severance benefits. The district court held that Rupert was entitled to benefits because the formal plan, governed by ERISA, lacks any language conditioning benefits on signing a restrictive covenant; material terms must be in writing, 29 U.S.C.1102(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Rupert did not ask for benefits under Pactiv’s plan, but asked for benefits under the acquisition agreement, repeatedly asserting that the plan is irrelevant to his claim. The court remanded for consideration under that agreement. View "Pactiv Corp. v. Rupert" on Justia Law

The Lippert tile installation business employs union workers. Some customers require or prefer union workers for tile installation projects, but others prefer nonunion labor. In 2004 the Lipperts created a new tile installation company that employed non-union workers solely to serve those customers. The union filed a successful grievance with the joint arbitration committee (JAC), seeking union benefits for non-union tile installers working for the new company. The Lipperts petitioned to vacate the award, arguing that the new company should not be bound by the award because it was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. The district court granted the union’s motion to enforce the award, finding that the nominally new company could be treated as the same with the old company for purposes of the agreement under the “single employer” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. By failing to present it to the JAC, the Lipperts waived an argument that the arbitration award is unenforceable because the National Labor Relations Board has never found that the non-union laborers are in the same bargaining unit as the union laborers. The companies, which are centrally operated by the same entity, are one and the same for purposes of arbitrability under the contract. View "Lippert Tile Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen" on Justia Law

Hill, an African American, began working for the General Services Administration in 2008 through the Federal Career Intern Program. Realizing that his Master’s degree entitled him to a higher pay rate, he filed a complaint with the EEOC. The parties settled. Hill maintains that he acted professionally during his one-year probationary period. His coworkers complained to supervisors about Hill’s temper on three occasions. A supervisor told Hill that his “stomping around” and slamming doors could be seen as threatening because he was a “pretty big guy,” which Hill took as a coded racial reference. After his probation, Hill was fired, based on those three incidents. Hill sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, for race discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to GSA, stating that Hill was not meeting legitimate expectations because he had engaged in a pattern of behavior that led three different coworkers to report him to their supervisors, and that a white female intern was not a suitable comparator because only one coworker had ever complained about her behavior, nor had Hill established pretext. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Anthony Hill v. Martha Johnson" on Justia Law