Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Reynolds acquired Pactiv in 2010 under an agreement that calls for severance pay to any non‐union employee terminated without cause, within a year, as a result of the acquisition. Pactiv established a severance‐pay plan with implementing terms, including a requirement that the departing worker execute a separation agreement in a form acceptable to the company, releasing all other claims against Pactiv. Within a year, Pactiv directed Rupert to relocate. He declined. Pactiv acknowledged entitlement to severance pay and sent him an agreement, which required that Rupert promise, for the next year, not to work for competitors in research and development, solicit sales of competing goods and services, or try to hire Pactiv employees. He had not previously been subject to a restrictive covenant and declined to sign. Pactiv withheld severance benefits. The district court held that Rupert was entitled to benefits because the formal plan, governed by ERISA, lacks any language conditioning benefits on signing a restrictive covenant; material terms must be in writing, 29 U.S.C.1102(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Rupert did not ask for benefits under Pactiv’s plan, but asked for benefits under the acquisition agreement, repeatedly asserting that the plan is irrelevant to his claim. The court remanded for consideration under that agreement. View "Pactiv Corp. v. Rupert" on Justia Law

The Lippert tile installation business employs union workers. Some customers require or prefer union workers for tile installation projects, but others prefer nonunion labor. In 2004 the Lipperts created a new tile installation company that employed non-union workers solely to serve those customers. The union filed a successful grievance with the joint arbitration committee (JAC), seeking union benefits for non-union tile installers working for the new company. The Lipperts petitioned to vacate the award, arguing that the new company should not be bound by the award because it was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. The district court granted the union’s motion to enforce the award, finding that the nominally new company could be treated as the same with the old company for purposes of the agreement under the “single employer” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. By failing to present it to the JAC, the Lipperts waived an argument that the arbitration award is unenforceable because the National Labor Relations Board has never found that the non-union laborers are in the same bargaining unit as the union laborers. The companies, which are centrally operated by the same entity, are one and the same for purposes of arbitrability under the contract. View "Lippert Tile Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen" on Justia Law

Hill, an African American, began working for the General Services Administration in 2008 through the Federal Career Intern Program. Realizing that his Master’s degree entitled him to a higher pay rate, he filed a complaint with the EEOC. The parties settled. Hill maintains that he acted professionally during his one-year probationary period. His coworkers complained to supervisors about Hill’s temper on three occasions. A supervisor told Hill that his “stomping around” and slamming doors could be seen as threatening because he was a “pretty big guy,” which Hill took as a coded racial reference. After his probation, Hill was fired, based on those three incidents. Hill sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, for race discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to GSA, stating that Hill was not meeting legitimate expectations because he had engaged in a pattern of behavior that led three different coworkers to report him to their supervisors, and that a white female intern was not a suitable comparator because only one coworker had ever complained about her behavior, nor had Hill established pretext. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Anthony Hill v. Martha Johnson" on Justia Law

DeGuelle, an accountant, worked from 1997 to 2009 in the tax department of S.C. Johnson & Son. He alleges that during his employment he discovered that the company had committed tax fraud. The company fired him. He took confidential corporate tax documents with him when he left and accused the company, in a newspaper, of tax fraud. The company sued him in Wisconsin state court for breach of contract, conversion, and defamation. He counterclaimed for wrongful termination and breach of contract, claiming retaliation for his opposing the alleged tax fraud. The company moved for summary judgment, attaching an affidavit from a tax lawyer at Kirkland & Ellis denying tax fraud. DeGuelle, litigating pro se, filed no counter-affidavits. The state court granted summary judgment; a court of appeals affirmed. DeGuelle filed a federal suit, charging both federal and state violations, all growing out of the alleged tax fraud. Following a remand, the district judge, after the state court ruled, granted summary judgment in favor of the company, reasoning that the finding by the Wisconsin court that there had been no tax fraud bound the court by the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "DeGuelle v. Camilli" on Justia Law

Adeyeye, a native of Nigeria, moved to the U.S. in 2008. He requested several weeks of unpaid leave so he could travel to Nigeria to lead his father’s burial rites. He explained that his participation in the funeral ceremonies was “compulsory” and that if he failed to lead the burial rites, he and his family members would suffer at least spiritual death. The employer denied the request, but he traveled to Nigeria for the ceremonies anyway and was fired when he returned to work. Adeyeye filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failure to accommodate his religion. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that Adeyeye’s two written requests did not present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that he had provided notice of the religious character of his request. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whether or not Adeyeye’s letters might have justified holding as a matter of law that they provided sufficient notice of the religious nature of his request, they certainly were sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the employer had notice of the religious nature of the request. View "Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC" on Justia Law

After working at the company for four months, Benes charged his employer with sex discrimination. The EEOC arranged for mediation in which, after an initial joint session, the parties separated and a go-between relayed offers. Upon receiving a settlement proposal that he thought too low, Benes stormed into the room used by his employer’s representatives and said loudly: “You can take your proposal and shove it up your ass and fire me and I’ll see you in court.” The firm fired him. He filed suit under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), abandoning his claim of sex discrimination. A magistrate judge granted the employer summary judgment, finding that Benes had been fired for misconduct during the mediation, not for making or supporting a charge of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that section 2000e–3(a) does not establish a privilege to misbehave in mediation, but only bans retaliation “because [a person] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” View "Benes v. A.B. Data, Ltd." on Justia Law

Lambert, an African-American was hired as a laborer at a Peri distribution yard in 2003. Lambert claims that co-workers and supervisors often made sexually and racially offensive comments. He complained regularly, but supervisors took no action. Nonetheless, Lambert was promoted to a lead position. One day, Lambert’s supervisors observed him behaving in an unusually aggressive manner and ordered him to take a drug and alcohol test. The test revealed that he was intoxicated. He was immediately fired under Peri’s “no tolerance” policy toward consuming alcohol on the job, an important policy for safety in a yard where workers operate heavy machinery and maneuver large concrete objects. Lambert attributed Peri’s decision to terminate his employment to racial discrimination and retaliation for his complaints. The district court rejected his claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded. There was insufficient evidence that Lambert’s race motivated Peri’s decision to test for intoxication or to fire him, but the court acted prematurely in dismissing claims of sexual and racial harassment. A jury could find that he was subjected to a hostile work environment on account of race or sex, and that he took all necessary steps to call his treatment to the company’s attention. View "Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys. Inc." on Justia Law

Clark, the owner and president of an East St. Louis Illinois company, was charged with making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Clark’s company had entered into a hauling services subcontract with Gateway, general contractor on a federally funded highway project in St. Louis, Missouri. Employers must pay laborers working on certain federally-funded projects the “prevailing wage,” calculated by the Secretary of Labor based on wages earned by corresponding classes of workers employed on projects of similar character in a given area, and maintain payroll records demonstrating prevailing wage compliance, 40 U.S.C. 3142(b) The indictment charged that Clark submitted false payroll records and a false affidavit to Gateway, representing that his employees were paid $35 per hour, when they actually received $13-$14 per hour. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that when a false document is filed under a statute that makes the filing a condition precedent to federal jurisdiction, venue is proper only in the district where the document was filed for final agency action. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the effects of the alleged wrongdoing may be felt more strongly in Missouri than in Illinois, the Southern District of Illinois is a proper venue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Buban participates in union politics as part of the dissident “Teamsters for a Democratic Union,” and served as secretary-treasurer of his local from 2004 to 2006. He lost his bid for reelection in 2006, after an acrimonious campaign against rival “Teamsters 4 Teamsters” candidates. Before leaving office, Buban referred himself for work as a shuttle driver, transporting workers to and from a construction site. The company laid Buban off (along with all other drivers who lacked a certain license) in 2007. During the grievance process, Buban clashed with union leadership, his former political rivals. Despite repeatedly stating that he wished to return to work, he remained unemployed. A political ally of Buban’s informed Buban that officials told her that Buban “hasn’t put his name on the out-of-work list.” Buban was unaware of such a list, but was promptly added after his request. Officials referred other members for positions. Buban fled charges, 29 U.S.C. 158(b), and an ALJ found that the union: violated the NLRA by operating an exclusive hiring-hall without consistently applying objective criteria; by discriminatorily failing and refusing to refer Buban for employment; and by failing and refusing to provide him with pertinent information. The Board and Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Teamsters "Gen." Local Union 200" on Justia Law

Ten years ago Certco had one food-distribution warehouse; it now has four. As the new warehouses grew, jobs at the original Madison site dwindled. Certco staffed the three new locations with non-union labor, paid them more per hour than it paid union members and offered a defined-contribution pension plan that cost less than the expensive defined-benefit plan that the union sponsors. In 2006 the NLRB concluded that work at one of the new facilities did not accrete to the union under 29 U.S.C. 158 (a)(5). The union later asked an arbitrator to order Certco to return bargaining-unit work to union members. The arbitrator concluded that much of the labor at the two newest warehouses is bargaining-unit work under the collective-bargaining agreement, which covers all of Certco’s warehouse labor regardless of work site and forbids the transfer of bargaining-unit work to non-union workers. The district court enforced the award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the arbitrator did not require Certco to recognize the union as representative of workers at two new facilities, but only ordered that work formerly done at the old warehouse be returned there or be performed by bargaining-unit members. View "Certco, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters" on Justia Law