Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chaib, born in France in 1957, married an American, immigrated, and became a citizen in 1991. In 2008, Chaib began work at a maximum security prison. During her probationary period, Chaib alleged, training officer Van Dine made sexually offensive remarks. Van Dine admitted to making remarks to another co-worker while Chaib was present, but denied making comments to her. Chaib completed her probation and was granted permanent status. Van Dine claims Chaib was regularly sent back to him for retraining because she had trouble with supervisors. After Van Dine yelled at Chaib to do her job and pointed his finger in her face, Chaib filed an internal personnel complaint. Human resources found no evidence of harassment, but noted evidence that both had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. Both received reprimands. Van Dine ceased all harassing behavior. During two-and-a-half years of employment, Chaib had several encounters with other coworkers that she identified as discriminatory. Her evaluations were not satisfactory. Chaib complained to the EEOC, which resulted in a conclusion that her “appraisal was properly administered” and that its result was proper. Chaib was subsequently denied a transfer and, after an incident involving an inmate, requested time off based on stress, anxiety, and depression. While on FMLA leave, Chaib resigned, filed a second EEOC complaint, and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, reasserting previous complaints and alleging retaliation. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Chaib v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Andrews, a white woman, started working at a Cracker Barrel restaurant in 1999. In 2002 she filed a discrimination claim, which settled. Stewart, a black man, then an associate manager, told Andrews that if he became manager, he would fire her. After Stewart became general manager in 2006, he said he was going to make the restaurant the first all-black Cracker Barrel. He also made daily comments about Andrews’s age, calling her “old woman” and “grandma.” Andrews complained to an associate manager and attempted to complain to the district manager, but the person responsible for scheduling an appointment never did so. In 2007 Andrews complained to an Employee Relations Specialist, who determined that no action needed to be taken. Eventually Andrews asked Stewart to initiate her transfer to another restaurant. She claims he told her that the transfer went through, but he denies doing so. She never made contact with the other restaurant and, after three weeks during which she did not work, the company’s system listed her as having quit. In the meantime, Stewart was fired for violating an asset-protection policy. The district court rejected claims that Stewart fired Andrews because of her sex, age, and race and that he retaliated for her prior Title VII suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Andrews did not suffer an adverse employment action, but quit in anticipation of a transfer that never occurred. View "Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillips worked at CTA as a trucker for 22 years, until, in 2010, he visited CTA’s onsite health services department to report that his fingers went numb at work and to initiate a workers’ compensation claim. CTA had a written substance abuse policy that required drug testing in certain situations, including initiation of workers’ compensation claim. Refusal to submit to testing was cause for immediate suspension pending termination. An injured employee could receive medical treatment in the health services department and return to work without being required to submit to a drug test if the employee did not seek to initiate a workers’ compensation claim and the situation did not fall into one of the other categories for which drug testing was required. Phillips was advised that if he didn’t take the drug test, his employment would be terminated. He refused to take the drug test and was terminated for refusing to submit to drug testing upon his initiation of a workers’ compensation claim. Phillips did file a workers’ compensation claim and eventually received benefits. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting his claim that his termination was retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Phillips v. Cont'l Tire Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

Until 1998, Vanaria was employed by the Cook County Probation Department. He was terminated following investigation of allegations that he had sought sexual favors in exchange for looser conditions of probation. In 2002 the county rehired Vanaria, who was a political operative. He began working at a county hospital in a position excluded from decrees prohibiting hiring decisions based on politics. The hospital did not conduct background investigations of patronage hires. A pharmaceutical representative alleged that Vanaria had attempted to condition her participation in a hospital program on her giving him a massage. An investigation resulted in oral counseling for Vanaria, but no discipline. In 2007, Vanaria offered Krystal, an unemployed massage therapist, a position as a physical therapist. When she stated that she was not qualified as a physical therapist, he explained that he could make things happen because people owed him favors. He provided her with legitimate application forms and insurance paperwork. When Krystal returned to his office with her Social Security card, Vanaria asked Krystal to close the door and told her that if she truly wanted the job, she had to kiss and massage him. Krystal agreed to have Vanaria visit her at her home massage studio, where they had sexual contact. Krystal eventually called the hospital’s HR department and learned that no position had ever existed, Vanaria eventually pled guilty to official misconduct and bribery. The district court rejected Krystal’s Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), equal protection, and due process claims and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Wilson v. Cook County" on Justia Law

A large group of African-American police officers and firefighters sued the City of Indianapolis, alleging that the examination process it uses to rank candidates for promotion in the police and fire departments has a disparate impact on black candidates and is intentionally discriminatory. They filed lawsuits targeting promotion decisions made in successive promotion cycles starting inv2002, but most of the challenged decisions were based on scores generated by testing administered by the police department in 2008 and the fire department in 2007. The district court dismissed many of the claims as either time-barred or substantively flawed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court mistakenly assumed that allegations of intentional discrimination necessarily defeat a disparate-impact claim, here the disparate-impact claims fail because they are stated as legal conclusions, without any factual content to support an inference that the examination procedures caused a disparate impact on black applicants for promotion. The disparate-treatment claims lacked evidentiary support and were properly resolved on summary judgment. Although the second complaint concerns a different set of promotion decisions, it attacked the same eligibility list that was at issue in the first case and was, therefore, barred. View "Adams v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Zayas worked at the Hospital as an ultrasound technician from 1999 until her discharge, at age 55, in 2011. Griesman, Zayas’ supervisor, was responsible for hiring and terminating Zayas and, before firng her, had warned Zayas about sending disrespectful emails. Zayas is Puerto Rican. She brought a national origin discrimination claim and a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. Her case was based on the fact that she was the oldest technician in the department, and was replaced by a younger employee and on evidence of several incidents during which Zayas believed that Griesman or her co-workers were disrespectful. The district court granted the Hospital summary judgment on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Zayas cited a number of hostile incidents, none were related to her national origin, nor were they objectively severe enough to survive summary judgment. Although Zayas’ coworkers did not like her, it was likely the result of “workplace pettiness,” not her Puerto Rican origin. View "Zayas v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law

In 1971 Milwaukee County provided its employees with health insurance under an ordinance that stated that the “county shall participate in the payment of monthly premiums” and extended coverage to retirees. In 1993, the ordinance was amended to provide that “[t]he County shall pay the full monthly cost of providing such [health insurance] coverage to retired members” as “part of an employee’s vested benefit contract.” Upon her 1991 retirement, Hussey had paid no co‐payments or deductibles for her health care. Her benefit plan booklet explained that with 15 years of service: “the retiree may participate in the health plan in which he/she is currently enrolled on the same basis as … the active employee group. The County will make the full premium contribution.” Until 2012, the plan coordinated benefits so that expenditures not covered by Medicare were paid in full by the County. In 2012 the County increased deductibles, co‐payments, and co‐insurance charges and modified coordination of benefits so that retirees over age 65 would pay the same deductibles, co‐payments, and co‐insurance charges as active employees. Hussey filed a purported class action, alleging that the failure to provide cost‐free health insurance to retirees constituted an unconstitutional taking of property. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the County only promised retirees the ability to participate in the same health insurance plan as active employees on a “premium‐free” basis.View "Hussey v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Beverly’s mother, Sarah, was diagnosed with end‐stage heart failure. Beverly lived with Sarah and acted as her primary caregiver; she administered insulin and other medication, drained fluids from her mother’s heart, and bathed and dressed her. Sarah told a hospice social worker that she had always wanted to visit Las Vegas. The social worker secured funding from a nonprofit organization. The six-day trip was scheduled for January 2008. Beverly requested unpaid leave from her Chicago Park District job to accompany her mother. The District denied the request. Beverly claims that she was not informed of the denial before her trip. She and her mother traveled to Las Vegas where they participated in tourist activities, while Beverly served as her mother’s caretaker. At one point Beverly drove her mother to a hospital when a fire unexpectedly prevented them from reaching their hotel room, where Sarah’s medicine was stored. Several months later, the District terminated Beverly for unauthorized absences during her trip. Ballard filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act, which refers to leave “to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition,” 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(C). The district court ruled in favor of Beverly, stating that “where the care takes place has no bearing on” FMLA protections. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Ballard v. Chicago Park Dist." on Justia Law

The Railroad owns the Corwith Rail Yard in Chicago and, until 2010, used an independent contractor, RTS, to operate Corwith. Teamsters Local Union 705 represented RTS employees, who were covered by the union’s health-and-pension plan. The Railroad contributed to the plan, as required by its contract with RTS. In 2010 the Railroad obtained wage-and-benefits concessions from Local 705. But when the Railroad ended its relationship with RTS and moved the Corwith work in-house, it entered into a bargaining agreement with a different union, TCIU. RTS terminated the employment of its Corwith employees. The employees could reapply with the Railroad, but its compensation package with TCIU was not as generous. Local 705 and employees filed a proposed class action, alleging violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001 and conspiracy to violate ERISA. The district court dismissed. On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged unlawful interference with the attainment of retirement benefits in violation of ERISA and a related conspiracy claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs alleged only an unlawful “discharge,” which presupposes an employment relationship. Only RTS was in an employment relationship with the membersof Local 705. The complaint alleged that RTS discharged the employees because it lost its contract, not for the purpose of interfering with their attainment of pension benefits. ERISA does not provide a cause of action for conspiracy. View "Teamsters Local Union No. 705l v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC" on Justia Law

The Aurora School District fired Green from his position as a teacher. His union refused his requests to pursue a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement and to represent him in a suit under the Illinois Teacher Tenure Act. Green sued, won, and was reinstated, then sued, claiming that his union abandoned him because of his race, violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c). Green, who is black, claims that the union has represented comparable white employees in grievance proceedings and litigation under the Tenure Act and that the union retaliated against him because he had opposed earlier discrimination. The district judge called Green’s evidence “conclusory;” concluded that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to employees of state or local government, so the union did not have a duty of fair representation; and stated that Illinois law does not require teachers’ unions to represent teachers by filing grievances under a collective bargaining agreement or suits under the Tenure Act. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that neither 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c) nor 2000e–3(a) makes anything turn on the existence of a statutory or contractual duty violated by the act said to be discriminatory. View "Green v. AFT/IFT Local 604" on Justia Law