Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fuqua, a computational linguist, was hired by SVOX in 2009 to help market linguistic products. A few months later, SVOX approached Fuqua with a new employment contract that contained an inventions assignment clause that required Fuqua to disclose and assign to SVOX intellectual property that he made, conceived, or developed in the past and required assignment of his rights to patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and royalties to SVOX. Fuqua believed that the disclosure required by the new agreement would violate state and federal laws and refused to sign the contract. SVOX terminated Fuqua’s employment. Fuqua filed a complaint with the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense (OIG), alleging violation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which prohibits reprisals for disclosures of wrongdoing relating to covered funds under the act. The OIG found that SVOX did not receive Recovery Act funds and declined to investigate further. The district court dismissed, finding that SVOX did not receive covered funds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fuqua v. SVOX USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Huon, a lawyer representing himself, sued his former employer Johnson & Bell, and its attorneys, for intentional discrimination based on race (Asian) and national origin (Cambodian) in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. After remand, the district court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Huon’s suit was barred by claim preclusion because it arose out of the same “series of connected transactions” as claims that he previously litigated in state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims mirrored those raised in state court.View "Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd." on Justia Law

Campbell worked at the Forest Preserve District’s Cermak Family Aquatic Center. In 2010, a security camera recorded him having sex with a coworker in the center’s office. Weeks later, the FPD fired him. Nearly two and a half years later, Campbell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1981, alleging that he was denied progressive discipline in violation of his right to due process; that he was fired because of his race in violation of his right to equal protection of the law; and that his termination violated that statute’s prohibition on racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts. Campbell later conceded that his section 1983 claims were time‐barred. The district court dismissed, finding that section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of section 1981 committed by state actors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 section 1981 provides a remedy against state actors independent of section 1983 and that if we were to allow his claim to proceed directly under section 1981, it would be timely because it would be governed by 28 U.S.C. 1658’s four‐year statute of limitations, rather than the two‐year statute of limitations governing section 1983 claims in Illinois. View "Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

The Union represents a bargaining unit at PPG’s plant. PPG informed the Union in April 2009 that it wanted to modify the collective bargaining agreement to reduce labor costs. That CBA states that a party seeking to alter the agreement must provide 30 days’ notice. The parties are required to meet in conference at least 10 days before the agreement expires. Proposed changes must be presented not later than the first day of the conference, by the party seeking modification. The parties attended an informal meeting on May 14. PPG explained that its labor costs exceeded competitors’ by $10 an hour; the parties discussed possibilities for reducing those costs. The Union requested that PPG provide details of one proposal and calculate labor-cost reductions that could be achieved without concessions from current employees. On May 28, PPG sent an e-mail with those details. The official negotiating conference began on June 1. PPG reiterated its proposal. During the next two days PPG put forward other proposals. The Union responded that it was not required to bargain about those proposals and filed a grievance. An arbitrator found some proposals timely and others untimely. PPG put forward its final offer, removing several items that had been proposed after June 1. PPG determined that the parties were at an impasse and unilaterally implemented the final offer. The Union filed suit under 29 U.S.C. 185(a). The district court granted PPG summary judgment, concluding that the arbitrator’s award did not preclude PPG from implementing the proposals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Neither the text of the decision nor the arbitration record supported the Union’s desired interpretation of the award. View "United Steel, Paper & Forest, Rubber, Mfg, Energy Int'l Union v. PPG Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007 Hnin, from the country of Myanmar, began working at TOA’s metal stamping plant. All TOA associates, including Hnin, receive a handbook with a statement that TOA normally employs progressive discipline and attempts to provide notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to improve, but that some infractions warrant probation or dismissal without prior warning, including violations of TOA’s sexual harassment policy. In 2010, Brock began working at TOA, about 22 feet from Hnin’s work station. A month later Brock reported that Hnin had been harassing her for some time, that she had asked Hnin to stop several times, and that the harassment involved a co-worker, Miller. Hnin made body gestures and kissing noises, suggesting that Miller and Brock were together. Brock also stated that Hnin instructed co-workers to slow down so they could work more overtime and acted in an intimidating manner. She identified several witnesses. During an explanation of the investigation, Hnin became aggravated and spoke in an elevated tone. He denied any wrongdoing and asked that the witnesses be brought in so he could confront them. He was told that this request was not in line with TOA’s procedures. TOA terminated his employment. Hnin filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and state law. The district court granted TOA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting national origin discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims. View "Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC" on Justia Law

Holder was an Illinois correctional officer since 2006. His wife began to suffer from mental health problems relating to opiate dependency. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles eligible employees to 12 work weeks of leave during a 12-month period to care for a spouse with a serious medical condition, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). In October 2007, Holder submitted an FMLA certification form. His wife’s psychiatrist indicated that it would “be necessary for the employee to take off work only intermittently or to work less than a full schedule as a result of the condition,” and that the need for leave would continue for an “unknown” duration. The request was approved. The state never asked for additional medical documentation and paid its share of his health insurance premium until April 18, 2008. About 130 days of absence were recorded on a day-by-day basis. On April 18, 2008, Holder was advised that his FMLA leave had expired and that additional leave would be under the Illinois Family Responsibility Leave program, which allows up to a year of unpaid leave; the state only covers insurance premiums for six months. In April-June 2008, Holder took 29 absences, citing the state program. The Warden disapproved requests for June 8-9 and on the denied form, Holder wrote “last one!!!” Eight months later Central Management Services informed Holder that the state had mistakenly paid for his health insurance premiums beyond his entitlement and began deducting 25% of his earnings until he had refunded $8,291.83. Holder sued, claiming interference with FLMA rights. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the state, but the judge entered judgment awarding Holder $1,222.10 for January 2008, but entered a judgment for the state for the rest of the months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holder v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Lomanto worked as a U.S. Postal Service custodian in a “bid job,” with a fixed schedule, awarded on a seniority basis under a collective bargaining agreement. In 2005, Lomanto started working as a temporary maintenance supervisor on an as-needed basis. The CBA limits such assignments to four months; between assignments temporary supervisors must return to their regular jobs for a two-week pay period. Bid jobs are reserved for four months and then declared vacant, so that another union member can obtain a steady schedule. Union steward LaFoe warned Lomanto that she had violated the four-month rule; although she had worked as a custodian for two consecutive weeks, the weeks did not align with a pay period. LaFoe did not file a grievance. Lomanto, again assigned as a temporary supervisor, reported that Szczesny, another union steward, had falsified his timesheet. Szczesny received a warning. Subsequently, LaFoe grieved Lomanto, concerning sick leave. LaFoe told Lomanto: “this is what happens when you issue action on a fellow steward.” It was denied for lack of evidence. LaFoe filed another grievance: Before the end of a four-month assignment, Lomanto had received travel time at the supervisory pay rate for attending training. Her return fell on the first day of a new pay period. For the rest of that period, she returned to custodial work. The next day, she was again assigned as a temporary supervisor. Management concluded that Lomanto had violated the four-month rule. She lost her bid job. Lomanto sued the union for breaching its duty of fair representation (Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185). The district court dismissed. While there was a fact question about the union’s motive for the grievance, Lomanto could not obtain her requested relief. Only the Postal Service could reinstate her, but it was not party to the suit. Neither punitive nor emotional-distress damages are available. View "Zepperi-Lomanto v. Am. Postal Workers Union" on Justia Law

Macon runs group homes for disabled individuals and has a policy requiring any employee who “witnesses, is told of, or has reason to believe an incident of abuse or neglect … has occurred” to report the incident. A 2009 Illinois law requires a report to a state agency. Baker, hired in 1991, twice saw a coworker, Carter, use his finger to flick a resident’s neck. She told supervisors. A decade later state officials investigated allegations that Carter had abused the same resident. Cross, a 39-year-old caregiver, told investigators that she had seen the resident agitated and gesturing at his genitals after Carter had worked the overnight shift. Cross asked the resident “who did that to him,” but could not understand his answer. A week later, she overheard Carter state, “Yes, I pulled it,” and a month later, she saw the resident point to his genitals and toward Carter. Though Cross and Baker discussed Cross’s observations, Cross did not report. Baker and a third caregiver described seeing Carter flick the resident in the neck. The third caregiver told investigators that she had heard Carter “joking” about squeezing the resident’s testicles. The report concluded that the resident had been abused and recommended that Macon address the failure of the employees to comply state law. A disciplinary report for Cross observed that she had “direct evidence” of and “suspected” abuse. The report for Baker and the third worker found that each had been “an eyewitness” and failed to report. Macon fired Baker, age 56, and a 61-year-old caregiver, but suspended Cross for three days. Baker sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed; a jury reasonably could find that Macon discriminated based on age by treating a younger employee more leniently.View "Baker v. Macon Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Banks sued her former employer, the Board of Education, and her former supervisor, Gonzales, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and related violations of federal and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims; 29 after the district court entered judgment, Banks filed “a motion to alter the entry of summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),” which the district court denied six days later. Banks then filed a notice of appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Because Banks missed that deadline, her motion was not effective as a Rule 59(e) motion that could have tolled the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment. Treating her post‐judgment motion as a Rule 60(b) motion that did not toll the time to appeal the summary judgment, her notice of appeal was timely only as to the district court’s denial of her post‐judgment motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying that motion. View " Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s Act 10 significantly changed Wisconsin public‐sector labor law: it prohibited government employers from collectively bargaining with their general employees (not public safety employees) over anything except base wages and precluded general‐employee unions from using automatic payroll deductions and fair‐share agreements. Act 10 mandated that general‐employee unions submit to a recertification election every year (instead of remaining certified indefinitely) and certification requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of the bargaining unit, not just those voting. Public‐employee unions and an individual union member sued, claiming that these changes infringe their First Amendment petition and association rights and deny union members the equal protection of the laws. The district court rejected the challenges. The Seventh Circuit, having previously held that Act 10’s prohibition on payroll deductions did not violate the First Amendment and that Act 10’s distinction between public safety and general employees was viewpoint‐neutral, affirmed. The court concluded that the law does not implicate the First Amendment and applied rational basis review. Its limitations on the scope of statutory collective bargaining are rationally related to a legitimate government interest: promoting flexibility in state and local government budgets by providing public employers more leverage in negotiations. View "Laborers Local 236, AFLO-CIO v. Walker" on Justia Law