Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010 Price was a full-time tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher who was working in a program to improve the class-room teaching skills of other teachers. In all of her evaluations, she was rated excellent or superior. In 2010, the Board of Education authorized the discharge of 1,289 teachers, some of whom were tenured. At the same time as the layoffs, Price alleges CPS was continuing to hire teachers to fill vacant positions, including new hires with no prior experience. Price alleges that she was not considered for any vacant positions, nor was she given any notice of existing vacant positions before her layoff and that the Board did not implement procedures to allow laid-off tenured teachers to show they were qualified to fill vacant positions. Price filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit one year later on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated teachers. The district court dismissed because Price did not identify any protected property interest that could give rise to a due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that tenure did not create the claimed property rights. View "Price v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Spaine was a seasonal employee from 2008 until 2011, helping low-income and disabled persons register for housing assistance. Spaine alleges that she was harassed and unfairly disciplined because of her race and that she was told, when her 2011 employment ended, that instead of being reinstated automatically as in the past, she would have to reapply the next year. Spaine interpreted this as termination. She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 alleging that she was harassed and eventually fired because she is African American. Months after filing that complaint, Spaine filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code. Spaine was represented by counsel in the discrimination suit, but was without a lawyer in the bankruptcy case. On a schedule of personal property, Spaine was required to list contingent and unliquidated claims of all types. She listed nothing. In the separate financial statement, Spaine was required to list lawsuits to which she was party within the preceding year. She listed two eviction suits, but did not list her discrimination suit. A transcript of the creditors’ meeting shows that Spaine told the bankruptcy trustee about her discrimination lawsuit at the first opportunity after filing her incomplete schedules. Spaine also subsequently filed an affidavit indicating that she told the bankruptcy judge about the suit. The employer alleged that Spaine was trying to conceal the suit. Spaine successfully moved to reopen her bankruptcy. The discrimination suit was dismissed on estoppel grounds. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that material facts remained in dispute. View "Spaine v. Kane-Richards" on Justia Law

Gienapp worked at Harbor Crestnursing care facility. In January 2011 she told Chattic, its manager, that she needed leave to care for her daughter, who was being treated for thyroid cancer. Chattic granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). While on leave, Gienapp submitted an FMLA form, leaving blank a question about the leave’s expected duration. Harbor Crest did not ask her to fill in the blank, nor did it pose written questions as the 12-week period progressed. A physician’s statement on the form said that the daughter’s recovery was uncertain, and that if she did recover she would require assistance at least through July 2011. Chattic inferred from this that Gienapp would not return by April 1, her leave’s outer limit, and hired a replacement. When Gienapp reported for work on March 29, Chattic told her that she no longer had a job. The district court entered summary judgment, ruling that Gienapp had forfeited her FMLA rights by not stating exactly how much leave she would take. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Gienapp could not give a firm date; Department of Labor regulations call her situation “unforeseeable” leave, governed by 29 C.F.R. 825.303, which does not require employees to tell employers how much leave they need. View "Gienapp v. Harbor Crest" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Michigan City Area Schools hired Nichols as a temporary, substitute janitor. Nichols worked at Joy Elementary School without incident. He then went to Springfield Elementary School as a replacement until a permanent janitor could be found for a recently retired janitor. He claims that employees there spoke to him in a mocking tone, tried to entrap him into taking a purse because he is African-American, and acted in a “bullying” manner. Other employees claimed that they felt threatened by Nichols’s strange behavior, which included taking pictures of one of them. Nichols was told that the custodial position had been filled with a permanent employee and that they would call him if they needed his services, but they never did. Nichols filed a pro se complaint asserting racial harassment and discrimination. The district court granted Michigan City summary judgment, finding that the complained-of conduct did not give rise to Title VII liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Nichols v. MI City Plant Planning Dep't" on Justia Law

In 2007 Huang, a systems and software engineer, had worked for CNA commercial insurance for eight years. In March, Huang was transferred to a new, four-member team. CNA required every member of Huang’s team to be on “pager duty” every fourth weekend, carrying a pager at home and being available to respond 24 hours a day throughout the assigned weekend. Huang repeatedly refused pager duty, citing family obligations, even after his supervisor and human resources reminded him that he could be fired for refusing. Huang offered to work from the office on Sundays in exchange for having Mondays off but refused pager duty. Around this time, Huang’s supervisor stated, for reasons unrelated to pager duty, that Huang was “pissing [him] off.” Huang emailed the human resources department to complain. Two years earlier, Huang had complained about another supervisor’s “favoritism.” Four months after Huang’s first refusal of pager duty, Huang’s supervisor and a human resources agent gave him one final opportunity to comply. When he refused, CNA discharged him. Consistent with CNA’s practice, it asked Huang for a list of his belongings so that someone could retrieve them from his desk. When Huang refused and demanded to return to his work station, human resources called security. Police escorted Huang out and arrested him. CNA did not press charges. After pursuing administrative remedies, Huang filed suit, claiming discrimination based on race and national origin (42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2000e-17) and that by firing him and having him arrested, CNA unlawfully retaliated for his earlier complaints. The district court granted CNA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Huang v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board found that HH3 Trucking had committed unfair labor practices and ordered back pay for its workers. HH3 failed to comply. The NLRB petitioned for judicial enforcement. HH3 did not reply to the petitions. The Seventh Circuit we enforced the orders summarily. HH3’s liability is $190,000 plus interest. After finding that HH3’s owners, the Hudsons, could comply but had chosen not to do so, the court held the Hudsons in civil contempt, and ordered them to pay at least $600 a month until the full judgment had been satisfied. Nothing happened. The court directed the Marshals Service to place the Hudsons in custody until they paid. They promised compliance and were released. They paid $600, then stopped. They went back to jail. After they asserted that they are no longer able to comply, the court allowed them to be transferred to home confinement and investigated. Finding that, although Gretchen Hudson considers herself retired and William Hudson had (recently) become medically unable to work, they remain able to pay something by drawing on savings and sources of current income that include benefits from a retirement plan. They argued that money received from a pension plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as their plan is, is free of all legal claims by third parties, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and, noting that the “scofflaws” have begun to receive Social Security benefits, which themselves exceed $600 monthly, ordered them to pay at least that amount. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. HH3 Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

According to the 2010 Census, Hazel Crest was 85.2% black and 10.2% white, but had no black supervisory police officers until 2005. Garofalo and Peers, both white, were sergeants on the police force and were among four front-runners considered for a deputy police chief position, which ultimately went to a black officer who was not one of those four candidates. They claimed that the village discriminated against them by promoting a black officer they contend is unqualified and sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and under Illinois state law. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Garofalo and Peers failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that they were the object of unlawful discrimination. Defendants offered evidence that Garofalo suffered from a lack of leadership and deficiencies in decision-making abilities. Peers had a reputation for a “volatile and unstable personality,” and did not have the respect of the men he supervised. Garofalo and Peers did not present evidence to counter that explanation and permit a finding of pretext. View "Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

The Chippewa County Highway Department employed Kvapil as a seasonal employee, 2006-2008. When he was hired, Kvapil completed a New Employee Orientation for Limited Term Employees Form that advised him of work rules. Kvapil acknowledged receiving the Employment Handbook by signing a receipt that stated that all county employees are employees at will; the Handbook also contained a provision entitled “At Will Employment.” Kvapil owns property in the Town of Wheaton, Chippewa County. From 2000 until 2008, Clary, the County Planning and Zoning Administrator, contacted Kvapil about Kvapil storing unlicensed and inoperable vehicles on that property. During the zoning dispute, Kvapil made threats of violence to Clary. After Kvapil failed to comply, a warrant issued and officers searched the Wheaton property. The county issued a citation. Kvapil visited the Planning and Zoning Department’s Office demanding documents and became hostile, tore up the warrant, threw it at Clary, and said “you’re going down.” After a series of emails discussing the county’s “zero tolerance policy towards any violence or threat,” Kvapil was suspended for one day. A letter notified Kvapil that further infractions would subject him to more severe discipline, including discharge. Subsequently, there was a report that Kvapil had run a private citizen off the road. After his termination, Kvapil filed suit, alleging a property interest in his seasonal work, absent commission of an infraction specified in the handbook. The district court rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kvapil v. Chippewa Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1996, Whitfield applied for an electrician position at Navistar’s plant. Navistar hired 16 electricians while Whitfield’s application was pending. The written job description required that an applicant have either eight years of experience or a journeyman card. Whitfield allegedly had nine years of experience, with four years in the U.S. Navy. A foreman interviewed Whitfield and stated he would hire him if the Union verified the required experience. The Union was allegedly unable to verify his experience through numerous employers, but did not consider Whitfield’s experience in the Navy. Whitfield continued to work elsewhere as an electrician and to provide additional references. In 1998, Whitfield obtained an IBEW card, so there was no doubt that he met the requirements. The Union cleared him for hire, and returned Whitfield’s file to the foreman, who opened his folder and saw that the word “black” written on the cover sheet. While the resubmitted application was pending, Navistar hired five white electricians. Whitfield was never formally rejected but in 1999 the foreman told him that Navistar would not allow him to hire Whitfield. At trial Navistar asserted errors in his resume and lack of PLC experience, an allegedly unstated qualification. In 2001 Whitfield and 26 others sued Navistar under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). The district court certified the other plaintiffs’ hostile work environment class and ordered that Whitfield’s hiring discrimination claim remain part of the case for discovery, but separated his claim for trial. The hostile work environment action settled during trial. During joint discovery there was extensive evidence showing extreme racial hostility at the plant. At Whitfield’s 2012 trial, the court rejected his submission regarding evidence from the class trial and concluded that his evidence was insufficient to prove discrimination. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting an updated EEOC chart as clear and persuasive evidence that Whitfield was more qualified than many of the white electricians Navistar hired. View "Whitfield v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp." on Justia Law

Averhart, formerly a guard at the Cook County Jail, was suspended without pay in 2001 and fired in 2003. She had filed an EEOC charge of discrimination in 2000 and was investigated for smuggling drugs and contraband to prisoners. She had been arrested for shoplifting. She claimed retaliation for her corroboration of a coworker’s claims of sexual harassment and filed her first of four federal lawsuits in 2001. She has lost them all, along with two state suits. The district court dismissed the fourth suit as barred by the earlier decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the suit frivolous. The court noted that she was never an employee of the Merit Board, which approved her firing; that a claim against the Sheriff’s Department was filed almost a decade beyond the statute of limitations; and that new theories of race and sex discrimination do not avoid preclusion, which requires all legal theories that concern the same events to be brought in a single suit. The court gave Averhart 14 days to show cause why it should not impose sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38, possibly including a financial penalty and an order revoking her privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. View "Averhart v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law