Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hayssen and its employees were parties to a Plant Closing Agreement that promised medical benefits upon retirement. In 1996, Bemis acquired Hayssen and assumed its obligations. Bemis reduced benefits under the Agreement: increasing co-pays and deductibles and eliminating its prescription drug program. Former employees sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132, and the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a). The court certified a class, but granted summary judgment to Bemis, reasoning that the Agreement did not establish a lifetime interest in a certain level of benefits. About a month later, Bemis eliminated all medical benefits under the Agreement. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the parties intended to provide lifetime medical coverage. On remand, the court granted a preliminary injunction forcing Bemis to restore the benefits eliminated in 2009 and provide a basic Medicare Part D drug benefit. The court awarded fees and costs, finding that the company’s position was not substantially justified. The judge struck billing entries that were vague or for time not reasonably expended on the case, concluded that the lawyers’ billing rates were reasonable, and calculated the lodestar amount to reach an award of $403,053.75, for four years of advocacy, including an appeal and trial preparation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Temme v. Bemis Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Langenbach began stocking shelves for Wal-Mart in 1998. The next year, she was promoted. In 2001, she was again promoted. Langenbach was admitted to Wal-Mart’s Management-In-Training program in 2008. In her first evaluation as an Assistant Manager, she was rated as a “Solid Performer” with noted deficiencies. Later that year, Langenbach was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan. The PIP was never completed. Her managers did not hold the anticipated follow-up meetings. She later received a comment that she was not following management routines and frequently failed to complete her duties on time. At her 2010 review, Langenbach received a competency score of 2.63 out of 5 and a rating of “Development Needed,” noting specific issues. That month, Langenbach needed surgery and was granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Her next evaluation assessed overall competency at 2.26 out of 5 and rated her as “Development Needed.” Langenbach was again placed on a Performance Improvement Plan. At three follow-up sessions, she was rated as “Below Expectations.” She was terminated five months after returning from leave. The district court rejected claims that Wal-Mart retaliated against her for exercising her FMLA rights and discriminated against her by delaying her promotion, paying her less than her male counterparts, and refusing to promote her further. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, General Warehouse, an employer obligated to contribute to the Central States Pension Fund on behalf of certain employees ceased to have an obligation to the Fund, which led to a complete withdrawal, incurring withdrawal liability of $1,262,568. Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1301(b)(1), if a withdrawing employer is unable to pay in full, a pension plan can recover the deficiency jointly and severally from any other business under common control with the withdrawing The Fund sued to collect from General Warehouse, GEOBEO and other businesses under common control. The parties entered into a consent judgment, acknowledging that the named defendants were jointly and severally liable. The Fund then initiated an action to add the defendants to the group of business entities from which it can collect. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding “overwhelming evidence” that the entities were under common control. View "Cent. States, Southeast SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. CLP Venture LLC" on Justia Law

A strike against the hotel began in 2003, but apparently escalated in 2008, when the union pursued a more aggressive strategy. It began engaging in secondary activity by targeting organizations that had made arrangements to reserve large blocks of rooms or space at the hotel, in the hopes that they would cancel their plans and pressure the hotel to end the strike. The union would send delegations, consisting of striking hotel workers and union staff in groups of two-10 people, to the stores and offices of potential hotel patrons. The hotel claims that these delegations violated 29 U.S.C. 187(a) and 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) by coercing the customers into cancelling their agreements to book rooms. Although the strike ended in 2013, the hotel sought damages for past activity. At the close of discovery, the district court granted the union summary judgment, finding that the union’s conduct was not coercive, and that barring it as a matter of federal labor law would raise important free speech concerns. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded for a trial regarding whether certain of the union’s actions were coercive, whether any such coercive conduct damaged the hotel, and if so, to what extent. View "520 S. MI Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1" on Justia Law

In 2006, Matthews, an African-American woman, applied for two open positions in Waukesha County: Economic Support Specialist and Economic Support Supervisor. She was not hired, and filed suit, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983.Matthews dismissed her claim related to the Supervisor position. With respect to the Specialist position, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the county articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its hiring decision. View "Matthews v. Waukesha Cnty." on Justia Law

Bell was employed as a substance abuse counselor at an Indiana maximum security prison. An investigator, looking for security breaches, discovered that night-shift employees were having sex on Bell’s desk and told her that he was not concerned about night-shift staff having sex but suggested she wash her desk every morning. The superintendent said that, as long as inmates were not involved, he was not concerned. Immediately thereafter, the superintendent discovered that Bell was having an affair with the Major in charge of custody (allegedly involving sex on his desk) and both were terminated. The prison settled the Major’s appeal to the State Employees’ Appeals Commission and called him to testify against Bell at her appeal. Major was able to keep his benefits, including his pension, to quickly get unemployment benefits, and to subsequently begin working at the prison as a contractor. Bell was not afforded similar benefits and opportunities and filed suit, alleging Title VII claims of sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, concluding that Bell was not similarly situated to the Major, that she failed to prove retaliation, and that the sexual tenor of the prison’s work environment was not severe or pervasive enough to qualify as hostile. The Seventh Circuit reversed with regard to the discrimination and hostile environment claims, but affirmed with regard to her retaliation claims. View "Orton-Bell v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

Jewel Foods employed Reeves as a bagger from 1997 until his dismissal in 2005. Reeves has Down syndrome and received vocational tutoring from Jewel; a social service agency sent a job coach to work with Reeves. Jewel’s Service Manager provided individual training. Jewel instituted supervision policies that applied only to Reeves. Reeves, unlike the other baggers, was exempted from collecting shopping carts from the parking lot after he was found directing customers how to park their cars. Reeves sometimes had trouble complying with workplace rules. He cursed at a manager when the table at which he usually ate lunch was used for a tasting; he once cursed within earshot of a customer about another customer. In 2005, Reeves took an American flag pin from a store shelf without paying for it, apparently not realizing the pins were for sale. Despite its usual policy, Jewel decided not to fire him. Reeves’s parents asked if Jewel could bring back a job coach. Reeves’s supervisor deemed the extra instruction unnecessary. Reeves was later terminated for cursing at another employee within earshot of a customer and other employees. The EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe both that Jewel discriminated against Reeves because of his disability and that Jewel engaged in a pattern and practice of denying reasonable accommodations to disabled employees. The district court dismissed his Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, failure‐to‐accommodate claim, citing numerous accommodations Jewel had made and the fact that Jewel did not explicitly reject the Reeves’s job coach suggestion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Tank, who was born in India, worked for T-Mobile as a vice president. After two investigations relating to his treatment of colleagues, he was fired. Tank filed suit alleging discrimination, retaliation, and disparate pay. The district court entered summary judgment for T-Mobile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on the circumstantial evidence Tank provided, no reasonable jury could conclude that T-Mobile fired Tank because of his national origin or race or that the human resources director harbored discriminatory animus or was deliberately indifferent to Tank’s claim. The employees to whom Tank compared himself were not valid comparators.View "Tank v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

After exhausting the EEOC process, Carlson brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, against her employer, CSX, a railway company, and brought a related contract claim based on a settlement she had reached with CSX of an earlier discrimination lawsuit. CSX argued that the claims were implausible and that some were precluded by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) because they were based on company decisions justified by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed most of Carlson’s claims for failure to state a claim, and held that the RLA precluded the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the allegations in her complaint ‘easily sufficient” to state claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. The RLA, which requires that claims arising under collective bargaining agreements in the railway and airline industries be decided in arbitration, does not preclude Carlson’s claims, which arise under Title VII and a private contract between Carlson and CSX. View "Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Hutt worked for Solvay Pharmaceuticals as a sales representative, 2001-2007. Her supervisor, who had recruited her to Solvay from a different company, gave her satisfactory ratings in most categories, but repeatedly informed Hutt that she needed to improve her punctuality and consistency in submitting internal reports. When her supervisor retired, Lozen was appointed the new Indianapolis sales district manager by Westfall, himself a newly‐appointed regional manager. Hutt worked under Lozen and Westfall 2008-2011 and had several conflicts with them, which resulted in several disciplinary actions. She was ineligible for bonus pay while on warning status for seven quarters. In 2009, Hutt filed a complaint with the EEOC, followed by a lawsuit, alleging age discrimination and retaliation and violation of the Indiana Wage Payment Statute. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hutt established no causal connection between the filing of the EEOC charge and adverse employment actions. A claim that Hutt and another were singled out for worse treatment based on their age was only asserted with “reliance on speculation.” View "Hutt v. Solvay Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law