Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, after coworkers made offensive comments, orally and in graffiti, about Muhammad’s race and perceived sexual orientation, Muhammad complained to management. Caterpillar responded. Walls were repainted and employees were warned that anyone caught defacing the walls would be fired. Six weeks later, Muhammad left his work station during non-break time to use the restroom, and checked the bid board before returning to work. Supervisor Edwards confronted him about use of work time to check the board. Edwards contends that Muhammad responded with disrespectful comments and walked away. Muhammad claimd that he did not act disrespectfully, but did not want to discuss it without a union representative present. Edwards suspended Muhammad and walked him out of the plant, allegedly for insubordination. After an internal investigation, the suspension was deemed appropriate. Muhammad filed a grievance through his union and was allowed to return to work. He was suspended again and later terminated based on his conduct upon his return. Following settlement of his grievance of the termination, he returned to work. He was later laid off in a reduction in force. He was subsequently rehired and remains employed at Caterpillar. Based on the 2006 incidents, Muhammad filed charges of harassment and retaliation with the EEOC. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, he sued, claiming hostile work environment and retaliation. The district court entered summary judgment for Caterpillar. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the company reasonably responded to complaints of harassment and no evidence suggested that Caterpillar suspended Muhammad because he complained.View "Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

Washington Group, an engineering, construction and management services company, offered Abraham a position as a “lead scheduler” for a project in Wisconsin. After negotiations, Washington Group sent Abraham a letter offering him the title of “project control manager,” a higher position higher in the chain of command. Abraham, who worked for the company for about a year, pursuant to his written contract before leaving the company and filing suit, claimed that Washington Group and its parent, URS, also promised him that he would perform the duties of a project control manager and then breached that promise. The defendants claim that Abraham understood that it would give him the title of project control manager for purposes of increasing his salary but he would perform the functions of a lead scheduler on a day-to-day basis. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Abraham received all of the promises set forth in his unambiguous written contract.View "Abraham v. Washington Grp. Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

The Indiana Right to Work Act became law in 2012 and provides that: A person may not require an individual to: Become or remain a member of a labor organization; Pay dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization; or Pay to a charity or third party an amount that is equivalent to or a prorate part of dues, fees, assessments or other charges required of members of a labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, IND. CODE 22‐6‐6‐8. Section 3 clarifies which substantive provisions of the Act are to be construed to apply to the building and construction industry; Section 13 provides that Sections 8‐12 of the Act apply prospectively. The Union filed suit, claiming that the Act violated the U.S. Constitution and the Indiana Constitution and that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151, preempts sections 8(2)–(3) and 3(2)–(3) of the new legislation. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the legislation is not preempted by the scheme of federal labor law and does not violate any constitutional rights.View "Sweeney v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Olendzki is a psychologist at an Illinois state prison. After he was elected to his union’s Executive Board, Olendzki began to advocate for fellow union members and to voice concerns to management. Olendzki believes that this advocacy led to hostile relationships with his superiors and caused them to retaliate against him by removing him from a hostage crisis team; ordering him to meet with mentally ill inmates without guard supervision in the same room; relocating his office; increasing his workload; filing a harassment claim against him; not providing a written justification to Olendzki’s request for advance leave time, which resulted in the denial of the request; and revising institutional directives that affected Olendzki’s job duties without Olendzki’s input. Olendzki was never fired, disciplined, or denied an employment opportunity. He sued six of his superiors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that they retaliated against him for his union advocacy, a violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Olendzki was acting as a union official, not as a public employee, when he made the statements at issue, so that they were not protected under the First Amendment.View "Olendzki v. Rossi" on Justia Law

Brown began his employment with BNSF railroad in 1996 and progressed through jobs as a foreman, track inspector, and machine operator. In 2007 a family physician diagnosed Brown with carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists and cubital tunnel syndrome in his elbow. In October 2007 Brown allegedly injured his right shoulder after lifting heavy bars at work. His family physician could not detect any injury despite conducting tests, but sent Brown to physical therapy. By December 3, Brown reported that his shoulder was pain free, and his doctor cleared him to return to work with no restrictions. The next day, Brown had surgery on his wrist to relieve his carpal tunnel syndrome. Surgery on the other wrist followed in January 2008. He returned to work on March 24 without restrictions. He had surgery on his elbow in October 2009 and was cleared to return to work in January 2010. Brown’s surgeon informed him that all three procedures were successful and resolved his symptoms. Brown remained employed at BNSF without medical restriction until September 2011. In 2009, Brown sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that the railway negligently caused cumulative trauma to his wrists, elbow, and shoulder because his duties required him to use vibrating tools that caused or aggravated his wrist conditions and that he was required to work excessive hours without proper equipment while BNSF was short‐staffed. The district court excluded his expert’s reports and testimony as unreliable and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting several flaws in the expert’s reports.View "Brown v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co." on Justia Law

After his employment with the town was terminated, the plaintiff sought benefits under the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act. The town opposed his claim, arguing that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he had constructively resigned “without good cause” by failing to obtain a commercial driver’s license within one year of starting work, a condition of his employment. The department agreed with the town. The plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed. He then sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was fired in violation of his rights to due process of law and freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the claim as barred by collateral estoppel. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the Illinois statute, 820 ILCS 405/1900(B), denies collateral estoppel effect to rulings in unemployment insurance proceedings. View "Council v. Village of Dolton" on Justia Law

Hansen’s employer has an attendance policy, under which employees accumulate points for unexcused absences. When an employee incurs 10 points within a year, his employment is subject to termination. Leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601–2654 is not counted. As of May 2, 2011, Hansen had nine points. He was absent from work from May 3-6 and May 9. On May 3, he requested FMLA leave for depression. On May 11, he provided medical certification, documenting episodic flare-ups periodically preventing him from performing his job. Hansen’s absences earlier that month were approved as FMLA leave. Hansen requested FMLA leave for eight days in June and incurred no attendance points for these absences. Based on the doctor’s faxed response to an inquiry, three subsequent requests were denied. Hansen accumulated 13 points in one year and his employment was terminated because he “exceeded [his] frequency” under which he could “miss 4 times every 6 months.” Later, the doctor sent a letter, modifying his original certification. The letter did not mention the July absences. The company did not retract the termination. Hansen sued under the FMLA alleging interference and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that without expert testimony Hansen could not show that his serious health condition rendered him unable to work during the absences for which he was terminated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The law does not require a plaintiff to present expert testimony as to his incapacity, and Hansen’s evidence has raised a genuine issue of material fact for trial. View "Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp LLC" on Justia Law

Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Graber worked at the Milwaukee County jail and was vice president of the union. A child was killed when a concrete slab fell from a county park structure. Captain Meverden was the incident commander on the scene; he immediately assigned deputy sheriffs at the jail the task of securing the perimeter. The deputies were informed to stay for mandatory overtime even if their usual shifts were over. Meverden ordered Sergeant Mascari to ask for volunteers to comply with the collective bargaining agreement. Graber arrived for his shift as Intake Booking Sergeant; he was not sent to the park and did not have any staffing responsibilities. A fellow deputy who had been assigned to secure the park approached Graber and complained about the mandatory overtime. Graber took the position that the mandatory overtime violated the collective bargaining agreement. Meverden stated that the mandatory overtime was necessary because volunteers could not be mobilized quickly enough. Following a series of subsequent events, Graber received a seven-day suspension, purportedly unrelated to the staffing issue. The suspension was overturned by an arbitrator. Graber sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights to free speech and association and the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Graber failed to establish a causal connection between his constitutionally protected speech and an adverse employment action.View "Graber v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Union filed suit against a nuclear energy facility to compel arbitration after a union employee was discharged without just cause. The court reversed the district court's denial of the Union's motion to compel arbitration where the Union's grievance, on its face, clearly falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. View "Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NextEra Energy Point Beach LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging claims of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that her employer and several managers retaliated against her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 28 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court rejected the idea that the passage of a particular amount of time between protected activity and retaliation can bar the claim as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiff has offered evidence of other retaliatory behavior between her 2003 sexual harassment complaint and the 2006 reorganizations and demotion that bridged the gap between the two events, leaving the issues of causation for a jury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for trial. View "Malin v. Hospira, Inc., et al." on Justia Law