Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hirlston worked for several years as a Costco store's Optical Manager. Hirlston has life-long disabilities that make it hard for her to bend, walk, and stand. In 2015, Costco planned to remodel the optical department in a way that would make it more difficult for Hirlston to continue working in that job. The parties discussed accommodations, including work restrictions designated by Hirlston’s doctor. Costco determined that no accommodations would allow Hirlston to continue as Optical Manager and that she had not been carrying out the essential functions of her job before the remodeling. She had been acting contrary to her doctor’s restrictions and delegating tasks that Costco believed were essential for her to carry out. Costco placed Hirlston on involuntary leave and later assigned her to a different job paying less money.Hirlston sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging disability discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 12111(8), 12112, 12203(a). A jury concluded that she was not qualified to do the Optical Manager job. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The use of a special verdict form was not erroneous. Hirlston forfeited her challenge to jury instructions by failing to make a timely objection. The key instruction included an error but the error did not harm Hirlston’s case so as to require a new trial. The judge did not abuse her discretion by allowing the parties to introduce photographs of the workplace that had not been disclosed in discovery. View "Hirlston v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

Until recently, under every McDonald’s franchise agreement, the franchise operator promised not to hire any person employed by a different franchise, or by McDonald’s itself, until six months after the last date that person had worked for McDonald’s or another franchise. A related clause barred one franchisee from soliciting another’s employee (anti-poach clauses). In a suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, the plaintiffs worked for McDonald’s franchises while these clauses were in force and were unable to take higher-paying offers at other franchises. They contend that the anti-poach clause violated the antitrust laws.The district court dismissed, rejecting plaintiffs’ “per se” theory, stating that the anti-poach clause is not a “naked” restraint on trade but is ancillary to each franchise agreement—and, as every new restaurant expands output, the restraint was justified. The court deemed the complaint deficient under the Rule of Reason because it does not allege that McDonald’s and its franchises collectively have power in the market for restaurant workers’ labor.The Seventh Circuit. The complaint alleges a horizontal restraint; market power is not essential to antitrust claims involving naked agreements among competitors. The court noted that there are many potentially complex questions, which cannot be answered by looking at the language of the complaint but require careful economic analysis. View "Turner v. McDonald's USA LLC" on Justia Law

Hambrick, a black woman born in 1970, has worked at the Social Security Administration (SSA) for nearly 35 years. In 2016, her supervisor reassigned her. Hambrick remained a manager at the same pay scale and grade. Since her transfer, Hambrick alleges she has endured constant negative treatment from her supervisors and peers, amounting to harassment based on her age and race. Hambrick unsuccessfully applied for other roles. For one position, her supervisor hired a younger, white man, explaining that her collaborative skills needed work and her direct supervisor recommended her “with reservations.” Hambrick also complained of her heavy workload, and the quick rise of younger, non-black SSA employees and that her supervisors did not celebrate her lowering the backlog of cases. Hambrick filed Equal Employment Opportunity complaints that were resolved in the SSA’s favor.The district court determined that Hambrick had administratively exhausted the SSA’s failure to promote Hambrick; Hambrick’s lowered performance evaluation; and Hambrick’s non-selection to positions in 2021 as retaliation for her EEO complaints, then concluded that she failed to show unlawful discrimination. The court concluded that the “totality of undisputed facts … consisted of unremarkable workplace disagreements.” Hambrick’s “dissatisfaction with her supervisors, heavy workload, and lack of recognition,” did not create a hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the incidents that Hambrick challenged were severe or pervasive, nor does she show how they relate to the protected characteristics of her race or age. View "Hambrick v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Singmuongthong describes himself as a tan-colored, Asian man of Laotian national origin. He worked as a correctional officer at Sheridan from 1998-2013, when he became a lieutenant at Sheridan. In 2016, he was promoted and became assistant warden of operations at a new facility, Kewanee. Singmuongthong received a five percent increase in his salary. Kewanee’s warden, Williams, was investigated in 2018 for inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature with subordinate staff and was terminated. That investigation also concluded that Singmuongthong had difficulty making good administrative decisions, had failed to report inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature, and spent too much time at bars with subordinate staff. Singmuongthong informed the regional deputy chief, Funk, that he was interested in the warden position. He was not chosen for the position because of his relationship with Williams and concerns about his judgment. Following a subsequent investigation of a separate allegation of sexual harassment, Singmuongthong was terminated from employment.Singmuongthong alleged discrimination based on his race, color, and national origin, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Singmuongthong appealed only his pay disparity and failure to promote claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. View "Singmuongthong v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Kinney worked as the hospital's director of imaging services. Her employer approved her 2018 request for intermittent medical leave due to anxiety. Kinney began working remotely in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. When safety protocols were developed, her coworkers returned to work in person. Kinney kept working remotely without asking permission. She asserts that she could not wear a mask in compliance with the hospital’s COVID-19 protocol because face coverings exacerbate her anxiety. When her absences led to complaints, hospital management told Kinney that she had to work on-site several days each week. Management denied her request for accommodations.Kinney resigned and sued the under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (alleging a hostile workplace, discrimination based on her sex in failing to select her for promotions, and constructive discharge), and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 (retaliation). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the hospital. No reasonable juror could find that Kinney could perform certain essential functions of her job without being present in the department that she oversaw; Kinney was not a qualified individual for the job under the ADA and her accommodation request was not reasonable. Her resignation was not a constructive discharge. Kinney did not raise a genuine factual issue as to whether she was similarly or better qualified for the position than the chosen male candidate. View "Kinney v. St. Mary's Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Frazier-Hill was terminated from her employment as a CTA bus driver. She sued, alleging that the CTA failed to provide her a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 (ADA). Specifically, she claimed that the CTA should have allowed her to drive only standard, non-articulated buses due to certain maladies caused by her carpal tunnel syndrome.The district court granted the CTA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could find that Frazier-Hill was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The court noted that Frazier-Hill had surgery that relieved her carpal tunnel symptoms; a medical report from her physician about three months after her operation and five days before one of her accommodation requests indicated no work restrictions other than a temporary inability to drive articulated buses. The doctor declined to check any of the boxes indicating that Frazier-Hill was restricted in, for example, lifting, pushing, walking, bending, carrying, pulling, or stooping. An occupational therapy report also noted no deficits in lifting. View "Frazier-Hill v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Bureau Chief Korza received a complaint regarding Snowden’s handling of a claim. Korza found discrepancies in Snowden’s records. Korza and a division administrator met with Snowden and her union representative and gave Snowden copies of the records. Korza continued his review and found many additional problems. Korza consulted with the Department’s Labor Relations office. Korza lacked the authority to discharge anyone and was advised that discharge was an appropriate penalty for the falsification of records. Korza summarized his findings for the director of the Division and recommended termination. At a later pre-disciplinary meeting, Snowden and her union representative were given a statement of charges. Korza stated that the discipline was undetermined because Snowden had not had an opportunity to respond, but that the charged violations were subject to discipline including discharge. Snowden’s written rebuttal did not contest the factual basis for the charges but noted arguable shortcomings in the investigation. At a final meeting, Korza advised Snowden that she was being placed on suspension pending discharge. Director Hoffman later signed a form terminating Snowden. Snowden pursued a grievance, which resulted in Snowden being allowed to resign without reinstatement rights.Snowden filed suit, asserting due process violations, claiming that Korza had decided to discharge her before the pre-disciplinary meeting and was not the impartial decision-maker. The Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit. Korza was not the decision-maker. Snowden was given notice and the opportunity to respond before that decision was made, plus a post-discharge grievance process. View "Snowden v. Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Kimmons was diagnosed with early cataracts in the center of his vision that might qualify for surgery. An optometrist recommended that Kimmons avoid driving at night. Kimmons lived in Racine and was working at Charter’s Milwaukee call center, a one-hour drive away. Kimmons’ shift ended at 9:00 PM, so he asked Charter to modify his work schedule. Charter allowed him to start at 10:00 AM and end at 7:00 PM but for only 30 days. Kimmons asked to extend his modified schedule while he tried to move closer to the workplace. Charter’s internal policy permitted work-schedule changes, but Charter summarily denied this request, stating that “assistance with your commute” is “not required under the ADA." Kimmons tried other options for commuting without success.Kimmons filed an EEOC charge under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5). The district court granted Charter summary judgment, finding that Kimmons did not need any accommodation to perform an essential job function. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that there is no bright-line rule as to when an employee’s disability interferes with essential job attendance or whether particular accommodations are reasonable but, if a qualified individual’s disability substantially interferes with his ability to get to work and attendance at work is an essential function, an employer may sometimes be required to provide a commute-related accommodation, if reasonable under the circumstances. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Eligibility for disability payments from the Fund turns on how many credits an ironworker has accumulated (a credit is equal to 1,000 hours of work on union jobs in a given year); those with more than five but fewer than 15 credits are entitled to disability benefits if “totally and permanently disabled as the result of an accident sustained while on the job and employed by a Contributing Employer.” Lane, with nine credits as a union ironworker, applied for disability benefits. Lane was approved for Social Security Disability Insurance. The Fund’s Administrator requested information to connect Lane’s disability to an on-the-job injury. Lane explained that he suffered on-the-job injuries to his shoulder and knee and sent medical records, none of which connected his disability to the cited May 2014 accident. Lane admitted that his SSA award was determined by a combination of factors, not just the 2014 accident. A letter from Lane’s physician referred to several work-related injuries without identifying the work-related events or whether those injuries were the sole basis for the SSA’s disability award.After review by the Medical Review Institute of America concluded that the records did not establish that the SSA disability related to the 2014 accident, the Fund’s Trustees affirmed the denial of Lane’s Claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Fund under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1002, characterizing the denial as “not downright unreasonable.” View "Lane v. Structural Iron Workers Local No. 1 Pension Trust Fund" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald worked for Roncalli Catholic High School as a guidance counselor and Co-Director of Guidance for 14 years and earned years of stellar performance reviews. In 2018, the school declined to renew her one-year employment agreement, explaining that her same-sex marriage was contrary to the Catholic faith. Fitzgerald was placed on administrative leave. Her Co-director of Guidance, Starkey, informed Roncalli that she too was in a same-sex marriage. The school did not renew Starkey’s employment agreement. Fitzgerald and Starkey brought separate lawsuits, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.In both cases, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The school fired Fitzgerald because of her same-sex marriage and Title VII prohibits this kind of sex discrimination, but the Supreme Court has held that employment discrimination suits are barred “when the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.” Fitzgerald played a crucial role on the Administrative Council, which was responsible for at least some of Roncalli’s daily ministry, education, and operations and “helped develop the criteria used to evaluate guidance counselors, which included religious components like assisting students in faith formation and attending church services.” Fitzgerald held herself out as a minister. View "Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High School, Inc." on Justia Law