Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman of Sudanese extraction, the plaintiff worked in Jeffboat’s shipyard in Jeffersonville, Indiana as a welder from 2006 until she was laid off in 2011. She had been u a welder first class, doing the most difficult and dangerous jobs, such as overhead welding and welding in confined spaces. In a two-week period in June 2011, the plaintiff, who had on 12 previous occasions sought first aid for work-related injuries, experienced two more such incidents, becoming dizzy and nauseous while welding in confined spaces. Jeffboat demoted her to welder third class, reducing her pay from $21.10 per hour to $15.69 per hour. The plaintiff claimed that the company demoted her in retaliation for her having complained to the EEOC the previous February that the company was discriminating against her because of her sex and national origin. She was subsequently laid off, but the layoff was part of a general reduction in force based on seniority and a few months later she was notified that she was being recalled. She failed to reply within the deadline and never returned to work. Her discrimination claims were rejected. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff's lack of evidence View "Ani-Deng v. Jeffboat" on Justia Law

O’Gorman worked for Chicago from 1996-2007, as a carpenter and later as a General Foreman, placing city orders with Arrow Lumber, owned by Beal. After an investigation following reports from an Arrow employee, O’Gorman was arrested and charged with theft of city property and violations of City Personnel Rules. The city also pursued a civil case under the Illinois Whistleblower Act and the Chicago False Claims Act, which remains pending. The city issued a press release announcing the charges that he had diverted $50,000 in goods for his own use and tried to cover the theft. Beal pled guilty. O’Gorman’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that the investigation improperly focused on O’Gorman and protected Arrow and Beal for political reasons and that Beal covered up Arrow’s fraud; that the Human Resources Director informed a union representative that if O’Gorman did not resign he would be fired and that any hearing would be a sham; and that supervisors told him that if he resigned, he would be reinstated once he was acquitted. O’Gorman resigned, was acquitted of all criminal charges, and unsuccessfully requested reinstatement. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the termination claims untimely and that there is no property interest in rehiring. View "O'Gorman v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Association of Administrative Law Judges, a union, represents the Social Security Administration’s administrative law judges in collective bargaining pursuant to the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. 7101. The Association and ALJs employed by the SSA sued, claiming that, by setting a goal that its ALJs decide 500-700 social security disability cases a year, the Administration has interfered with their decisional independence, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554(d)(2), 3105. The district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 precluded resort to the APA by creating remedies for “prohibited personnel practices” taken against federal employees, including “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions,” 5 U.S.C. 2302(a)(1), (2)(A)(xii), (b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act for interference with decisional independence does not extend to the incidental consequences of a bona fide production quota. View "Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Garcia and Salgado, drivers for Latino Express, solicited signatures from other drivers to certify the Union. Owners and managers began efforts to undermine the Union activity and the two were eventually terminated. They filed claims with the NLRB alleging that Latino Express had violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) and (3) by interfering with their organizing activities. The NLRB Regional Director sought interim injunctive relief pending the Board’s remedial action under section 10(j), alleging that Latino created the impression that the union or other concerted activities were under surveillance; granted improved benefits in response to the organizing campaign; instructed employees not to speak with each other about the company’s accident reimbursement policy; announced that union representation was never going to happen; interrogated employees about union activity and threatened discharge; and solicited employee grievances. The Director requested interim reinstatement for Garcia and Salgado. The district court granted relief as requested. Latino sought an extension of time, claiming that its employees had withdrawn their recognition of the union and that a decertification petition was forthcoming. The court found Latino in civil contempt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the status of the union was irrelevant to compliance. View "Ohr v. Latino Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Greengrass sued her former employer, IMS, alleging that IMS retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the U.S. EEOC against the company by naming her in its annual SEC filings and casting her complaint as “meritless.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of IMS on the ground that Greengrass lacked evidence showing a causal link between her EEOC filing and the alleged retaliatory act. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Greengrass made out a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity when she filed her EEOC charge, that IMS engaged in an adverse employment action when it listed her name in its SEC filings, and that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that IMS listed her name because Greengrass filed the EEOC charge. View "Greengrass v. Int'l Monetary Sys., Ltd." on Justia Law

Ripberger, born in 1951, began working for IDOC as a substance abuse counselor in 1991. She lost her job in 2010, when IDOC contracted out its counseling program to Corizon. Ripberger alleges that Corizon’s decision not to hire her stemmed from previous events in 2009, when Orton-Bell and Ripberger complained that their desks were being used after hours. According to Ripberger, they were told it was “just” staff members, not inmates, using their desks for sex, and that they could simply wash down their desks. It came to light that Orton-Bell was having an affair with the Major in charge of custody. Orton-Bell and the Major were terminated, but the Major quickly received unemployment benefits, kept his benefits, and began working again at the prison on a contract basis. Orton-Bell filed suit. Ripberger supported Orton-Bell’s sex discrimination complaint. Ripberger sued Corizon, claiming sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court granted Corizon summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Ripberger was the unfortunate victim of a reduced workforce. View "Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a long-standing local ordinance, the City of Plymouth, Indiana pays its police officers “longevity pay” after each work anniversary, calculated by multiplying $225 by the number of years that the officer has been on the force. Faced with financial difficulties in 1989, Plymouth enacted a second longevity pay ordinance, which prorates longevity pay for officers who take a leave of absence during any given year, including for military service. During officer DeLee’s twelfth year on the job, he missed nearly eight months of work while serving in the Air Force Reserves. When he returned, Plymouth paid him one-third of his full longevity payment for that year. DeLee sued, arguing that longevity pay is a seniority-based benefit to which the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335, entitles him in full. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plymouth. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Plymouth’s longevity benefit is more appropriately characterized as a reward for lengthy service, rather than as compensation for work performed the preceding year, USERRA guarantees DeLee a full longevity payment for his twelfth year of employment. View "DeLee v. City of Plymouth" on Justia Law

Parker asserted that “Scheck Industries” had fired him after just a few months on the job because of his race and several complaints he made to management about workplace discrimination. The EEOC issued Parker a right-to-sue letter, explaining that the agency had investigated but was unable to confirm his allegations. The agency’s letter did not suggest that “Scheck Industries” never employed Parker or that an entity with that name did not exist. In fact, Parker’s employer apparently used that name in dealing with the EEOC, since the agency’s letter to Parker was copied to “Scheck Industries.” Parker drafted a pro se complaint. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of service but explained that the company’s liability insurer failed to file an answer after misidentifying the complaint; that Scheck Mechanical never employed Parker; and that Parker’s claims under Title VII were untimely. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting Scheck Mechanical’s position, that Parker sued only Scheck Mechanical; the complaint included multiple references to Scheck Industrial. It may not matter which company employed Parker if, as Parker asserts, the line between the companies is blurred. View "Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp." on Justia Law

A Catholic school in Fort Wayne, Indiana, discharged a language-arts teacher because she underwent in vitro fertilization in violation of the moral teaching of the Catholic Church. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order was not final and that the case did not qualify for collateral order review. View "Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend" on Justia Law

Taylor-Novotny sued her former employer, Health Alliance Medical Plans under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. She contended that Health Alliance failed to accommodate her multiple sclerosis as the ADA required, discriminated and retaliated against her based on her disability, interfered with her FMLA rights, and discriminated against her based on her race. She also asserted a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for Health Alliance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Taylor-Novotny did not establish that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and did not meeting Health Alliance’s legitimate expectations for punctuality and accountability. Her failure to meet Health Alliance’s legitimate expectations also foreclosed her race discrimination claim. With respect to her ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, she did not establish that the additional accommodation that she sought was reasonable. The evidence was insufficient to form a convincing mosaic suggesting that Health Alliance retaliated against her because she sought accommodations for her multiple sclerosis. Health Alliance never denied Taylor-Novotny FMLA leave. View "Taylor-Novotny v. Health Alliance Med. Plans, Inc." on Justia Law