Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hess, an attorney, had worked on a number of medical-malpractice cases before his law firm, Kanoski terminated his employment. Many of these cases settled after Hess’s termination, and Hess was not compensated. He sued under his employment agreement and under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, adding claims of tortious interference, wrongful discharge, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. In 2011, the district court dismissed each of Hess’s claims. On remand the district court held that Hess was not entitled to compensation for the post-termination settlements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on its interpretation of Hess’s employment contract provisions that Hess would receive bonus pay in the amount of 15 percent of all fees “generated over the base salary (or $5,000 per month),” that the bonus shall increase to 25 percent “on all fees received annually in excess of $750,000.00,” and that that, “where the Corporation retains clients upon Employees [sic] termination that Employee has no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the Employee is to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for all work done while an Employee of the Corporation.” View "Hess v. Kanoski & Associates" on Justia Law

Window washers employed or formerly employed by CCS filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, which requires an employer to pay hourly workers at least one and a half times their normal hourly wage for hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week, which CCS has not done for the plaintiffs. There is an exception where: the worker’s regular pay exceeds one and a half times the federal minimum wage (conceded by plaintiffs); “more than half his compensation for a representative period represents commissions on goods or services”; and he is employed by “a retail or service establishment.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CCS with regard to its status as a retail or service establishment and, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of CCS on the commission requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that FLSA is intended to encourage employers to spread out full‐time work among different employees. Giving plaintiffs overtime pay would not further that purpose because it was not shown that they are on average working more than 2,000 hours a year. CCS has an admirable safety record without paying its workers for overtime; plaintiffs are well paid. View "Alvarado v. Corp. Cleaning Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Hutchens is a black woman. A large-scale layoff in the Chicago public schools system’s Professional Development Unit, where she worked, required the unit to decide whether to retain her or a white woman, Glowacki, who Hutchens argues was less qualified. She claimed that the unit’s director, Rivera, preferred whites to blacks. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that their justification for the replacement that was not merely a “pretext.” The Seventh Circuit reversed as to racial discrimination (42 U.S.C. 1983) and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. A reasonable jury could credit Hutchens’ evidence while rejecting that of the defendants, and impressed by Hutchens’ credentials, her seniority over Glowacki, her earlier receipt of National Board Certification, her other credentials superior to Glowacki’s, her writing skills, and her toughness in teaching inmates of Cook County Jail year after year, could conclude that she was better qualified for the job than Glowacki. That reasonable jury might nevertheless deem Hutchens a victim not of racism but of error, ineptitude, carelessness, or personal like or dislike, unrelated to race. View "Hutchens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Dr. Simpson, an African-American was recruited to apply for a position at BDCH in 2010. BDCH’s CEO offered Simpson employment with the concurrence of BDCH’s COO. Both were aware of Simpson’s race. BDCH paid the recruiter $12,000. BDCH’s Physician Employment Agreement stated that Simpson “must apply for, obtain and maintain” active medical staff membership and clinical privileges. BDCH was to pay Simpson a $20,000 signing bonus “within five (5) days after first day of employment,” contingent on Simpson’s obtaining medical staff privileges and fulfilling other conditions of the employment agreement. Simpson applied for medical staff privileges at BDCH, stating that he was certified with the American Board of Family Physicians and held an unrestricted license to practice medicine in Indiana and Illinois. He also indicated that he was a defendant in two medical malpractice cases involving wrongful death, but did not disclose that these claims were not covered by malpractice insurance. Simpson noted that he had been placed on academic probation during his first year of residency. The Committee denied his application for staff privileges. Simpson sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of BDCH. Simpson failed to show that the Committee’s concerns were untrue, unreasonable, or pretexts for discrimination. View "Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps." on Justia Law

Love, who is African-American, was dismissed from the Milwaukee city hall renovation site, where he worked as a foreman, after a physical altercation with another worker. Cullen was the general contractor; Cullen’s subcontractor (Matthews) employed Union Contracting, which employed Love. Love brought a Title VII action against Cullen, alleging that his dismissal was racially motivated. Union, which had no contractual relationship with Cullen, paid Love’s salary and provided all other benefits, set Love’s hours, and passed Cullen’s instructions on to Love. Cullen only gave specific directions if it reviewed a finished product and found it unsatisfactory. In the event of “serious incidents” involving threats to workplace safety or productivity, Cullen retained the right to investigate its subcontractors’ employees, discipline them, and permanently remove them from the job site. According to Love, there was another physical altercation between two Caucasian workers at the site that resulted in no significant disciplinary action. The district court concluded that Love failed to demonstrate an “indirect” employment relationship and granted Cullen summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Cullen’s involvement in Love’s dismissal was relevant to their relationship, it was not enough to overcome other factors. Cullen, in the aggregate, exercised very little control over Love. View "Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Carter, an African-American male, holds an MBA and is a CPA. CSU’s College of Business hired him in 1986 as a temporary assistant professor. In 1992, CSU granted Carter tenure and promoted him to associate professor. In 1995-1996, he was department chair until he was removed by the university president. In 2006-2007, Carter was dissatisfied with his teaching assignments. Beginning in January 2007, Carter called in sick every Thursday. Carter blamed CSU’s failure to accommodate his sleep apnea. CSU’s Assistant Vice President recommended that Carter be sanctioned. Carter sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and disability. The district court entered partial summary judgment against Carter; the parties settled the remaining claim. On January 22, after the start of the spring 2008 semester, Carter requested FMLA leave to care for his mother. CSU granted the request. When Carter returned on March 20, CSU assigned him non-teaching duties for the remainder of the semester. His supervisor, Simyar was not willing to recommend Carter as Department Chair. The president had previously rejected candidates for other chair positions because they lacked terminal degrees, but at least three other chairs did not have PhDs at the time. Carter sued, alleging retaliation in violation of the FMLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the person chosen as Chair was no more qualified than Carter. View "Carter v. Chicago State Univ." on Justia Law

Ledbetter, a black male, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981 against his former employer, Good Samaritan Ministries of Carbondale, Illinois, a tax-exempt nonprofit organization that provides services to needy people. The suit charged retaliation for Ledbetter’s having filed a charge of racial discrimination and of retaliation with the EEOC. Ledbetter had been warned, based on complaints by shelter residents and co-workers about alleged intimidation and threats. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding too many " loose ends" for summary judgment. View "Ledbetter v. Good Samaritan Ministries" on Justia Law

Jones, a United Airlines flight attendant, was fired for misconduct. He sued his union, claiming that because of racial animus and his complaints about discrimination, the union had not fairly represented him, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2000e-2(c), 2000e-3(a). As part of a settlement, the union agreed to challenge his discharge before the System Board of Adjustment. Jones agreed to dismiss his lawsuit with prejudice. The settlement does not provide for continuing federal court jurisdiction. Both signed a stipulation of dismissal (FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)). Two weeks later, Jones filed his first pro se submission: a two-sentence request to discharge Jones’s recruited lawyer and to return his suit to the district judge. Next, he asked that his lawsuit be reinstated and that a “default judgment” be entered against the union, although it was pursuing a grievance, as promised. Finally, Jones submitted his “motion to establish court’s jurisdiction.” The magistrate to whom the case had previously been assigned rejected all three for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, reasoning that Jones’s submission was not part of the litigation covered by the parties’ consents, so the magistrate did not have authority to issue a dispositive ruling. Jones was bringing a new lawsuit. The magistrate could dispose of that new action only if assigned by a district judge and the parties furnished new consents. View "Jones v. Asso'n of Flight Attendants-CWA" on Justia Law

Miller, an African-American male, worked as a cook for Hospitality’s Sparx Restaurant. Miller became assistant kitchen manager and was a satisfactory employee. On October 1, 2010, Miler discovered racially offensive pictures at the kitchen cooler. Miller lodged a complaint. Two employees admitted responsibility. The manager agreed that the posting was a termination-worthy offense, but one offender was given a warning and the other was not disciplined. Soon after Miller’s complaint, supervisors began to criticize Miller’s work performance. Sparx fired Miller on October 23, 2010. The EEOC filed suit on Miller’s behalf under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), 3(a). Before trial, Sparx had closed and Hospitality had dissolved. The court concluded that successor corporations could be liable. The jury awarded $15,000 in compensatory damages on the retaliation claim. The EEOC sought additional remedies. The district court denied the front-pay request but awarded Miller $43,300.50 in back pay (and interest) plus $6,495.00 to offset impending taxes on the award; enjoined the companies from discharging employees in retaliation for complaints against racially offensive postings; and required them to adopt policies, investigative processes, and annual training consistent with Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to both successor liability and the equitable remedies. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. N. Star Hospitality, Inc" on Justia Law

For 13 years Sklyarsky worked as a custodian at a Chicago office building, through different employers. In 2010, new supervisors began disciplining Sklyarsky. He complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights that the company was treating him unfairly because of his Ukrainian national origin. Sklyarsky was fired in 2013, and after exhausting administrative remedies, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2000e-2, e-3, e-5(f).1 During discovery Sklyarsky, an experienced pro se litigant, concluded that the building’s management company had been involved in the discrimination and sought leave to join it as a defendant. Judge Kocoras denied that motion, telling Sklyarsky that Means-Knaus had “nothing to do with the employment contract” and that, if he wanted to sue MeansKnaus, he would have to file a separate action. Sklyarsky did that. Judge Gottschall, assigned to the new suit against Means-Knaus, screened Sklyarsky’s pro se complaint and dismissed it sua sponte, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), finding that the doctrine of claim preclusion foreclosed a separate suit. Judge Kocoras refused to reconsider and entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any procedural missteps were harmless. View "Sklyarsky v. Harvard Maint., Inc." on Justia Law