Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shell worked for the City of Anderson Transit System (CATS) as a Mechanic’s Helper on the day shift for 12 years. According to the job description for the position, a Mechanic’s Helper may occasionally drive buses to field locations. A Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) is required to drive the CATS buses. Shell’s hearing and vision impairments prevent him from obtaining a CDL. Shell never drove a bus. When general manager Blackwell was appointed at CATS as part of personnel changes made by the new mayor, he informed Shell that his employment would be terminated unless he obtained a CDL, as the job description required it. After he was fired, Shell sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), for failure to accommodate his disability and alleged that his termination was politically motivated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. A jury should decide whether the city violated the ADA; the factual record did not establish as a matter of law that driving a bus was an essential function of the Mechanic’s Helper position. View "Shell v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the Democratic primary preceding the 2010 election, the candidates for Sheriff were Miller, a St. Joseph County Police Department sergeant, and Grzegorek. Grzegorek won the general election. Miller sought to be appointed either Assistant Chief or Warden of the county jail. Grzegorek appointed as Assistant Chief a man who had been Sheriff from 1985 to 1998 and retained the current Warden. The head of the Detective Bureau, an appointee of the new Sheriff, stated that Miller should take charge of the Property Room. The Department had accumulated about 1000 guns, which needed to be sorted. Miller took the position, which involved no change in compensation or rank, but months later, expressed dissatisfaction. He was offered a position in the Family Violence Unit. He declined, and continued in the Property Room until the sorting was complete, then returned to the Detective Bureau. Miller claims that his assignment to the Property Room was degrading and that he was not asked about his interest in other vacant positions that would have been promotions. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of racial hostility. Miller’s qualifications were less impressive than those of the persons appointed to the positions he wanted. View "Miller v. St. Joseph County" on Justia Law

Locke, a parolee, sued Haessig, a state official, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause, based on how Haessig responded to Locke’s complaint that her subordinate, a parole officer, was sexually harassing Locke. Locke provided evidence that Haessig was told of the harassment, failed to intervene or investigate, and then threatened to retaliate against Locke for complaining. The district court denied Haessig’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Haessig’s claim that she lacked the required intent to discriminate. Accepting Locke’s version of the facts, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Locke. Haessig was told of Locke’s complaints, but never met with him to discuss the allegations or tried to protect him from further harassment. According to Locke, after hearing of his complaint, Haessig expressed anger toward Locke and said he would never get off of his electronic ankle monitor until he was discharged from parole. A reasonable jury could infer intent to discriminate. That was clearly established law in 2008 when the events took place. Haessig had reasonable notice that her alleged actions were unlawful and so is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Locke v. Haessig" on Justia Law

Mintz started at Caterpillar in 2005. In 2007, Mintz was promoted to manufacturing engineer: an intermediary between the design department and the production floor, supervised by Turpen. Mintz moved to a different assembly line and, in 2011, began reporting to Rumler. Mintz’s duties included managing “grief” and engineering change orders; grief refers to discrepancy between what was ordered and what employees are scheduled to build. Mintz’s 2010 evaluation, prepared by Turpen, included an overall rating of “3B-Valued Performance.” The section that involved grief and change orders stated “does not meet.” His first review of 2011 resulted in a lower “3C” rating. Mintz, the only African American engineer working in the area at Caterpillar, believed that his rating was based on race. For the third quarter, Mintz received a “4-Needs Improvement,” indicating potential termination. Rumler assigned others to assist Mintz in resolving deficiencies. He allowed Mintz to work overtime and during a shutdown. Mintz’s 2011 year-end evaluation was “4”with a “does not meet” assessment of grief and change orders. His performance had worsened, causing tear down hours and assembly line down time. Mintz claimed racial discrimination. The year-end evaluation resulted in a $9,500 difference in his bonus payment. Mintz had no evidence of any race-related comments or jokes. He did not identify any Caterpillar employee that he believes was treated better than him. In 2012, Mintz transferred to another department where he remains employed. In his suit, claiming violation of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Caterpillar. Mintz was not meeting legitimate expectations and had no evidence that his complaint of race discrimination caused his evaluation. View "Mintz v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

To fix a 2004 Teamsters election, Bania and the union president diverted ballots by changing members’ addresses in the database. They collected those ballots and cast falsified votes. After an investigation, they employed the same fraud during a second election. Bania was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and theft from a labor organization (18 U.S.C. 371), four counts of mail fraud (13 U.S.C. 1341 and 1346), and six counts of embezzling, stealing, and unlawfully and willfully abstracting and converting property and other assets of a labor organization (29 U.S.C. 501(c)). In 2009, the court sentenced Bania to concurrent 40-month terms, departing from the low-end of the guidelines, 97 months, and ordered Bania to pay $900,936 in restitution, reflecting salaries paid to co-defendants and expenses of the second election. The court later rejected Bania’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in disregarding Bania’s instruction to appeal. In 2012, Bania completed his prison term. In 2013, the district court denied Bania’s motion for early termination of supervised release because of his outstanding financial obligation. Bania did not challenge that rationale, but argued that the restitution calculation improperly totaled the loss he intended to cause, rather than the loss actually caused. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision not to terminate supervised release. Bania filed an unsuccessful “Motion to Terminate Order of Restitution and Order of Forfeiture.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Bania’s motion. The time to appeal his sentence has long passed. View "United States v. Bania" on Justia Law

Stern worked at St. Anthony’s Health Center (SAHC) as Chief Psychologist, with supervisory, administrative, and clinical responsibilities. In 2010, Stern received an annual performance evaluation that assigned an overall score of 2.54/4, citing concerns over administrative responsibilities. Weeks later, a subordinate resigned and, during her exit interview, said Stern had “cognitive issues.” There had been patient complaints. Other coworkers expressed similar concerns about “possible dementia.” SAHC required Stern to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation and placed him on a paid leave of absence. SAHC agreed to Stern’s choice of the Chief of Clinical Neuropsychology at Washington University Medical School, for the evaluation. The final report indicated short-term memory deficiencies, with a level of memory functioning below expectation and stated “Stern is not believed to be fit for duty in his current position.” Stating that it could not provide a position with reduced responsibilities, SAHC terminated Stern. Stern sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted SAHC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stated that it was troubled that SAHC failed to engage in an interactive process to find reasonable accommodations to permit Stern to continue his employment, but that Stern failed to create an issue of fact as to whether he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Xiong began working as a Dane County social worker in 1990, covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provided that the Union would assist employees in pre-disciplinary, grievance, and termination processes. In 2012, Xiong’s supervisor, Fischer, learned that Xiong had forged signatures on documents, called in sick after Fischer had denied requests to be excused, failed to meet deadlines for an audit, attended divorce proceedings during work time, and moved a client from one home to another without completing required paperwork. Fischer requested a pre-disciplinary meeting, noting rules that Xiong had broken, and stating that Xiong could respond and have a Union representative present. Having taken unauthorized leave on May 22-23, Xiong did not receive Fischer’s letter until May 24, when he attended the meeting with his union steward. Xiong admitted to the allegations and to failure to pass theLong Term Care Functional Screen Test, required for certification as a social worker. A week later Xiong received a termination letter. Bypassing two steps of the grievance procedure, the Union began Xiong’s appeal with a hearing before the Chief Administrative Officer, who denied the appeal. The Union board voted not to arbitrate Xiong’s case. Rejecting the County’s severance offer, Xiong sued the Union, the Department, and Fischer. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Xiong v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Castro, Brooks, and Florez sued their former employer, DeVry University, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that DeVry retaliated against them by terminating their employment for complaining about their supervisor’s racially and ethnically derogatory remarks. DeVry transferred the supervisor three months after plaintiffs complained. After that, he neither supervised plaintiffs nor participated in the termination decisions. Evidence concerning their individual circumstances and job performance varies. The district court granted summary judgment to DeVry on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the claims by Castro and Brooks, but reversed as to Florez. Castro was terminated 30 months after the complaint because of poor performance over a sustained period. Brooks was terminated 15 months after the complaint because of multiple instances of dishonesty and inconsistent performance. Neither Castro nor Brooks raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether these reasons were pretexts for retaliation. Florez, however, raised a genuine issue of material fact about motive. He was terminated 10 months after the complaint for inconsistent performance and “volatile behavior.” DeVry has conceded that Florez’s performance did not justify his termination. Florez offered evidence that DeVry’s “volatile behavior” explanation was a pretext. View "Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Vietnam veteran, was diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression. In 2004 the VA declared him 100 percent disabled. Nonetheless, the Illinois Department of Human Services hired him that year as a “certified nurse assistant residential case worker” and assigned him to a residential facility. Two years later, he claims, a resident and members of the resident’s family assaulted plaintiff with an iron pipe and baseball bats. The Department suspended him on the complaint of the resident’s family and allegedly subsequently discharged him on the basis of an investigation by the Department of Children and Family Services that resulted in a preliminary finding that he had committed child abuse and neglect. The finding of child abuse was retracted. In 2014 he sued, alleging violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), which forbids discrimination on the basis of disability by agencies that receive federal money. The district judge dismissed, finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim and that his claim was untimely. The Department was not served with process. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, noting that it is not clear when plaintiff was discharged and that it can take a long time for a discharge to ripen. View "Rutledge v. Ill. Dept, of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Ortiz, working for a concrete products manufacturer, was in a sand storage bin trying to scrape its wall, when he sank and was engulfed by sand up to his neck. Workers tried to dig him out. Plant manager MacKenzie was notified within 10 minutes. He decided there was no emergency and left the scene. Rescue efforts were not progressing; Ortiz asked the workers to call 911. No one did. Eventually, MacKenzie called 911. The Fire Department’s Technical Rescue Team arrived within minutes. Ortiz had been trapped for 90 minutes. Using a vacuum truck to remove the sand, the team extricated Ortiz in about four hours. He sustained serious injuries to his lower body. The bin is a “permit-required confined space.” OSHA requires “procedures for summoning rescue and emergency services, for rescuing entrants … and for preventing unauthorized personnel from attempting a rescue.” The plan must specify that emergency services are to be summoned immediately and forbid others to attempt rescue. Other regulations require danger signs and a protective barrier. An OSHA inspector cited the employer for three “serious” and one “willful” violation, 29 U.S.C. 666. An ALJ imposed a penalty of $70,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review that challenged the finding of the willful violation and the finding of violation of the requirement of a barrier. View "Dukane Precast, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law