Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1981 the plaintiff began working as one of two hairdresser-manicurists at a nursing home. Mondays and Tuesdays the plaintiff would transport residents in their wheelchairs from their rooms to the nursing home’s beauty shop, do their hair, then return them to their rooms. Other days she mainly did the hair of ambulatory residents and of residents confined to their rooms. She had unrelated duties, such as helping in the laundry and carrying trays. In 2010 the plaintiff had a hysterectomy. Her doctor gave her permission to return to work eight weeks later, with the notation that she could not push over 20 pounds, raised to 50 pounds five months later. The doctor advised “you can’t be pushing and lifting” people in wheelchairs, because, over time, that would tear loose the mesh lining “and you’ll be back in for bladder repair.” The plaintiff notified her supervisor, who stated that he would not accommodate her disability. She quit. Until she was replaced, the remaining hairdresser received assistance from other staff in transporting residents. There was no indication that this diversion of staff from their normal duties was costly or impaired the care provided the residents. The district court rejected plaintiff’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the employer would have a difficult time establishing that a reasonable accommodation would be a hardship.View "Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC" on Justia Law

After a sports-related injury, Bluestein, an M.D., took intermittent time off for several months, then requested open-ended leave. She was termnted and sued Central Wisconsin Anesthesiology, for discrimination in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court concluded that Bluestein, a full partner, shareholder, and member of the board of directors of Central Wisconsin, was an employer rather than an employee at the service corporation, and was ineligible for the protections of those statutes. The court also found that Bluestein’s claims would fail as a matter of law on the merits and ordered Bluestein and her attorney to pay attorneys’ fees to Central Wisconsin for pursuing a frivolous lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment and the award of fees and declined to award additional attorneys’ fees.View "Bluestein v. Cent. WI Anesthesiology, S.C." on Justia Law

South Water Market and Local 703 of the Teamsters Union had a collective bargaining agreement that ran from 2004 through April 30, 2007. On September 12, 2007, they reached a new agreement. Abramson, Market’s bargaining representative, was supposed to draft the agreement. Murdoch, the Union’s president reminded Abramson repeatedly. By February 2008 Murdoch was worried that pension and welfare funds covering the employees would cut off participation or sue. In March, Abramson begged off, stating: “I’m having trouble with my notes.” On April 3 Murdoch sent Abramson a document with terms from Murdoch’s notes. Abramson did not reply, but Market began paying wages, and making pension and welfare contributions specified in Murdoch’s text. Murdoch also sent the document to the pension and welfare funds, which submitted bills calculated according to those terms. In July 2009 Castillo retired. He had been one of two workers in the highly-compensated “driver classification. The Murdoch document stated that Market would employ at least two drivers. After Castillo retired, it refused to provide more than one worker with the wages and benefits of the driver classification. The pension and welfare funds sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1145, seeking delinquent contributions for a second driver position. The district judge found that Market had not agreed to the terms. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the Labor Management Relations Act makes a written agreement essential to participation in a pension or welfare plan, 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5)(B), and Market does not contend that it wants to drop out of the plans or that it did withdraw Whatever reservations Abramson had were not conveyed to the funds until August 2009, much too late.View "Russ v. South Water Mkt, Inc." on Justia Law

After Continental and United Air Lines merged, they needed to produce unified seniority and longevity rosters for pilots. The Air Line Pilots Association represents all of the pilots. In 2012 the new United and the Union reached an agreement that sets pilot pay based on: rank (captain vs. first officer), type of aircraft flown, and longevity, defined as all time since the date a pilot was hired, including time spent on furlough. Pre-merger, pilots on furlough accrued seniority but not longevity. Plaintiffs challenged ancillary Agreement 25, under which pilots in active service longer than four years and seven months would receive no credit for furlough time; pilots who had four years and six months of service could claim only one month of furlough; and so on. Plaintiffs claimed that the provision slots 475 former United pilots into the table behind former Continental pilots who were hired before May 6, 2008, in violation of the main agreement, and accused the Union of inadequate representation (DFR claim). Defendants replied that the main agreement governs the future, after Agreement 25 determines the pilots’ starting positions. The district judge dismissed United as a party because disputes about the meaning of an airline industry collective bargaining agreement are within the exclusive authority of an adjustment board under the Railway Labor Act, leaving plaintiffs unable to establish both that United violated the contract and that the union did not represent workers fairly. They then argued that the Union negotiated a bad contract. The district court concluded that Agreement 25 is not irrational. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, with pilots on different sides of the issue, a compromise that favored some over others was inevitable.View "Cunningham v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l" on Justia Law

United Airlines contracts for regional air services under the “United Express” brand. One such supplier owns Trans States and GoJet Airlines. Cuff was on the payroll of Trans States, working at O’Hare Airport. He was fired after he took leave despite denial of his request under the Family and Medical Leave Act. The FMLA applies only if the employer has at least 50 employees within 75 miles of a worker’s station, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(B)(ii). Trans States had 33 employees at or within 75 miles of O’Hare, while GoJet had 343. Cuff argued that he worked for Trans States and GoJet jointly. The district court agreed and a jury awarded Cuff $28,800 in compensatory damages. The judge added $14,400 front pay in lieu of reinstatement and awarded Cuff about $325,000 in attorneys’ fees and $6,000 in costs and interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Department of Labor regulations providing that workers are covered by the FMLA when they are jointly employed by multiple firms that collectively have 50 or more workers, 29 C.F.R. 825.106(a) and that firms may be treated as a single employer when they operate a joint business, 29 C.F.R. 825.104(c), and noting several indicators that Cuff worked for both operations. The court stated that “the defense had not done its homework; it was content to leave the labor to Cuff’s team and the judge … for issue after issue.”View "Cuff v. Trans State Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Moultrie, who began working at Penn Aluminum in southern Illinois in1990 and held various positions, was demoted from his position as a forklift operator in 2009. Before his demotion, he had filed a grievance concerning a work assignment. That grievance did not allege racial discrimination. He filed another grievance, after the demotion, again not mentioning race. After his claims were rejected by the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC, Moultrie sued. Penn asserted that Moultrie was demoted because of performance problems that caused delays and other problems and about which he was repeatedly warned. Moultrie, attributed Penn’s decision to racial discrimination and retaliation and claimed that Penn’s conduct violated the collective-bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed an Illinois state-law claim as time barred and entered summary judgment against Moultrie on all remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Moultrie failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his discrimination and retaliation claims.View "Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, after coworkers made offensive comments, orally and in graffiti, about Muhammad’s race and perceived sexual orientation, Muhammad complained to management. Caterpillar responded. Walls were repainted and employees were warned that anyone caught defacing the walls would be fired. Six weeks later, Muhammad left his work station during non-break time to use the restroom, and checked the bid board before returning to work. Supervisor Edwards confronted him about use of work time to check the board. Edwards contends that Muhammad responded with disrespectful comments and walked away. Muhammad claimd that he did not act disrespectfully, but did not want to discuss it without a union representative present. Edwards suspended Muhammad and walked him out of the plant, allegedly for insubordination. After an internal investigation, the suspension was deemed appropriate. Muhammad filed a grievance through his union and was allowed to return to work. He was suspended again and later terminated based on his conduct upon his return. Following settlement of his grievance of the termination, he returned to work. He was later laid off in a reduction in force. He was subsequently rehired and remains employed at Caterpillar. Based on the 2006 incidents, Muhammad filed charges of harassment and retaliation with the EEOC. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, he sued, claiming hostile work environment and retaliation. The district court entered summary judgment for Caterpillar. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the company reasonably responded to complaints of harassment and no evidence suggested that Caterpillar suspended Muhammad because he complained.View "Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

Washington Group, an engineering, construction and management services company, offered Abraham a position as a “lead scheduler” for a project in Wisconsin. After negotiations, Washington Group sent Abraham a letter offering him the title of “project control manager,” a higher position higher in the chain of command. Abraham, who worked for the company for about a year, pursuant to his written contract before leaving the company and filing suit, claimed that Washington Group and its parent, URS, also promised him that he would perform the duties of a project control manager and then breached that promise. The defendants claim that Abraham understood that it would give him the title of project control manager for purposes of increasing his salary but he would perform the functions of a lead scheduler on a day-to-day basis. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Abraham received all of the promises set forth in his unambiguous written contract.View "Abraham v. Washington Grp. Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

The Indiana Right to Work Act became law in 2012 and provides that: A person may not require an individual to: Become or remain a member of a labor organization; Pay dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization; or Pay to a charity or third party an amount that is equivalent to or a prorate part of dues, fees, assessments or other charges required of members of a labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, IND. CODE 22‐6‐6‐8. Section 3 clarifies which substantive provisions of the Act are to be construed to apply to the building and construction industry; Section 13 provides that Sections 8‐12 of the Act apply prospectively. The Union filed suit, claiming that the Act violated the U.S. Constitution and the Indiana Constitution and that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151, preempts sections 8(2)–(3) and 3(2)–(3) of the new legislation. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the legislation is not preempted by the scheme of federal labor law and does not violate any constitutional rights.View "Sweeney v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Olendzki is a psychologist at an Illinois state prison. After he was elected to his union’s Executive Board, Olendzki began to advocate for fellow union members and to voice concerns to management. Olendzki believes that this advocacy led to hostile relationships with his superiors and caused them to retaliate against him by removing him from a hostage crisis team; ordering him to meet with mentally ill inmates without guard supervision in the same room; relocating his office; increasing his workload; filing a harassment claim against him; not providing a written justification to Olendzki’s request for advance leave time, which resulted in the denial of the request; and revising institutional directives that affected Olendzki’s job duties without Olendzki’s input. Olendzki was never fired, disciplined, or denied an employment opportunity. He sued six of his superiors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that they retaliated against him for his union advocacy, a violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Olendzki was acting as a union official, not as a public employee, when he made the statements at issue, so that they were not protected under the First Amendment.View "Olendzki v. Rossi" on Justia Law