Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Silk began working in 1986 at Moraine Valley Community College as a part-time, non-tenure track, adjunct professor. Silk’s typical teaching load included four courses during fall and spring semesters and two or three summer classes. The College finalized written contracts with adjuncts just before the start of the semester. In March 2010, Silk agreed to teach two sociology courses during the summer term. In April, Silk took a medical leave of absence for heart surgery and did not inform the College of his anticipated return date. During visits to Silk’s classes to arrange for substitute instructors, administrators discovered problems with assignments, syllabi, and attendance. Administrators informed Silk that his summer classes had been reassigned. The dean met with Silk to discuss the issues with his classes. Silk was assigned two courses for the fall 2010 semester. Issues arose during a classroom observation by administrators. The dean instructed human resources to place Silk on the “do-not-hire list” and informed Silk that there would be no more classes for him. Silk’s students filed a complaint regarding Silk’s instruction. After his termination, Silk filed suit, alleging discrimination based on age and disability and retaliation for having filed an EEOC complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the College, except with respect to the fall 2010 semester, and remandedfor determination of whether the College reduced Silk’s course load because of perceived impairment. View "Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

CentiMark, a commercial roofer, hired Turnell as a laborer in 1978. In 1988 CentiMark promoted him to Chicago District Operations Manager. In his employment agreement, Turnell agreed to a non-disclosure provision and to restrictive covenants that prohibit “engag[ing] … in any Competing Business” during his employment and for two years afterward in any of the “regions and/or divisions and/or territories” in which he “operated” for CentiMark and “solicit[ing] the trade of, or trade with,” any of CentiMark’s “customers or suppliers, or prospective customers or suppliers” during his employment and for two years afterward. Turnell became Senior Vice President and Midwest Regional Manager. The company fired him in 2013, claiming that Turnell had misappropriated company resources and covered up fraudulent billing by his wife's company. Turnell claims the real reasons were his age, health issues, and high compensation. Turnell made little effort to find a job outside commercial roofing, but accepted an offer from Windward Roofing and contacted CentiMark customers. The court found Turnell’s covenants too broad, and entered a preliminary injunction, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, that “Turnell shall not sell, attempt to sell, or help sell any products or services, or any combination thereof, related to commercial roofing to any person or entity who was a customer of Centimark Corporation as of January 8, 2013 and who is located in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, or Wisconsin” and required CentiMark to post a $250,000 bond. View "Turnell v. Centimark Corp." on Justia Law

ManWeb, an Indianapolis engineering and installation company, entered into an asset purchase agreement with Tiernan, another Indianapolis electrical contractor. Unlike ManWeb, Tiernan was party to a collective bargaining agreement with a union, under which it contributed to a multiemployer pension fund. After the asset purchase, Tiernan ceased operations. Although ManWeb continued to do the same type of work in the jurisdiction, ManWeb did not make contributions. Counsel for the Plan sent a letter to Tiernan’s former address, stating that the company had effectuated a complete withdrawal from the Plan and, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, the Plan had assessed withdrawal liability against Tiernan of $661,978.00. The letter was forwarded to ManWeb’s address and signed for by a ManWeb employee. No payments were made, nor was review or arbitration requested, despite the availability of both under the statute. The Plan filed a collection action, adding ManWeb as a defendant under a theory of successor liability. The district court granted the Plan partial summary judgment, finding that Tiernanr had waived its right to dispute the assessment of withdrawal liability, but rejected the claim of successor liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed to allow the district court to address the successor liability continuity requirement. View "Tsareff v. Manweb Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Swanson resigned from the Village of Flossmoor’s police department after suffering two strokes in 2009, six weeks apart, the second of which left him unable to perform as a detective. Swanson claimed that the Village failed to reasonably accommodate him—in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act—upon his return to work from his first stroke by not permitting him to work exclusively at a desk. He also claimed that the Village violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against him on the basis of his race and national origin, citing instances in which Village employees made racially offensive comments to him during his employment. He claimed that the Village excluded him from criminal investigations after his first stroke and then contemplated the possibility of moving him out of the investigations division entirely after his second stroke. The district court granted the Village summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Title VII claims time-barred because Swanson failed to lodge a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days after the alleged discrimination and finding the ADA claim deficient in view of his doctor’s recommendation that Swanson work “part-time” following his first stroke. View "Swanson v. Village of Flossmoor" on Justia Law

Dibble and Akemann were arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. At the time of their appointments, the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/14, provided that each arbitrator would be appointed for a term of six years, with the possibility of reappointment. The legislature passed Public Act 97–18, which was signed on June 28, 2011 and took effect three days later, ending the terms of all incumbent arbitrators effective July 1, 2011 and providing that the Governor would make new appointments. The law allowed incumbent arbitrators to serve as holdovers until the Governor made new appointments. By July 1, 2012, both Dibble and Akemann had lost their positions. They alleged that by shortening their six‐year terms as arbitrators under the prior law, Public Act 97–18 deprived them of a property interest without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were moot, and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Even if plaintiffs plausibly allege a constitutional violation, the applicable law was not clearly established under the circumstances of these cases, where a statutory amendment eliminated the property interest that a statute had previously conferred. View "Dibble v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Employees of Instant, an information-technology staffing firm sign agreements in which they promise not to solicit business from Instant’s clients, not to recruit Instant’s employees to other jobs, and not to disclose the firm’s sensitive information to outsiders. DeFazio was Instant’s Vice President until 2012, when she was fired. She was already cofounding Connect, a new tech-staffing firm, and began working there immediately, along with several coworkers she persuaded to leave Instant. Connect won business from several of Instant’s recent clients. Instant sued DeFazio and others for breaching the restrictive covenants and under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030. DeFazio counterclaimed, alleging that Instant shortchanged her on a bonus. The court concluded that no one is liable to anyone else. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that defendants did not leak or otherwise misuse Instant’s proprietary data. Defendants admitted breaching the covenants not to solicit and not to recruit, but in Illinois a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement is valid only if it serves a “legitimate business interest.” The district court concluded that neither covenant did. Tech-staffing firms do not build relationships with clients that would justify restricting their employees from setting out on their own. View "Instant Tech. LLC v. DeFazio" on Justia Law

Burks and Jones were hired as Union Pacific “Signal Helpers.” During orientation in January 2011, they were informed that they would be employed through December 2015, or until the company “moved in a different direction.” The position carried a 90-day probationary period; they were subject to a collective bargaining agreement. They were the only African-American members of their class. On February 9, 2011, Burks was told that “it wasn’t working out.” Burks lodged a complaint with Schop in Union Pacific’s Equal Employment Opportunity department alleging racial discrimination. Schop found no evidence that Burks was fired because of his race, but concluded that he had not been given an opportunity to improve and offered reinstatement in exchange for a general release with a new 90-day probationary period. Burks signed and returned to work. Burks worked for seven days before requesting a transfer. He was transferred and completed his probationary period, but was later notified that Union Pacific abolished the Signal Helper position, effective October 2011. Jones had similar experiences. The district court granted summary judgment, rejecting claims that Union Pacific denied an opportunity to take a test that was required for promotion, based on impermissible retaliation for complaints of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that positions within the seniority district became available during the relevant period. View "Burks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Gonzalez-Koeneke worked, for 12 years, as a Rockford School District bus driver. She experienced problems with children on her bus and filed incident reports with Sharp and, later, went to West, the terminal manager. She was told that she did not know how to discipline the children and was later suspended for two days for failing to perform a proper pre-trip inspection of her bus. Gonzalez-Koeneke claims that her suspension was actually retaliation for having gone to West. Her union steward told her that Wilson (a District official) wanted her to quit, but Wilson issued a “Removal Form” that same day, resulting in suspension of her bus-driver permit for three years. Gonzalez-Koeneke was terminated based on her suspended permit. She filed suit pro se, alleging violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed with prejudice, noting its standing order that a dismissal is with prejudice unless a party requests an opportunity to amend in its response. Gonzalez-Koeneke moved to set aside the judgment and to amend her complaint. The district court denied the motion, stating that she had not explained how she would amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West" on Justia Law

Lawson sold computer maintenance and support services for StorageTek. He was paid a base salary and commissions on his sales under the company’s annual incentive plan. Sun Microsystems acquired StorageTek in 2005. At the time Lawson was working on a large sale to JPMorgan Chase, but the deal did not close until 2006. If StorageTek’s 2005 incentive plan applied, Lawson would earn a commission, as high as $1.8 million. If the sale fell under Sun’s 2006 incentive plan, his commission would be about $54,000. Sun determined that the 2006 plan applied. Lawson sued for breach of contract and violation of Indiana’s Wage Claim Statute. The district court rejected the statutory wage claim but submitted the contract claim to a jury, which awarded Lawson $1.5 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The sale did not qualify for a commission under the terms of the 2005 plan. Although the original plan documents said the plan would remain in effect until superseded by a new one, a September 2005 amendment set a definite termination date for the plan year: December 25, 2005. To earn a commission under the 2005 plan, sales had to be final and invoiced by that date. View "Lawson v. Sun Microsystems, Inc." on Justia Law

Demonstrators gathered outside an abortion clinic, planning to display signs containing images of aborted fetuses. Then-Officer Lalowski was finishing an overnight shift when he noticed the demonstrators and stopped his marked police vehicle, telling demonstrators not to impede traffic or to stop anyone from entering the clinic and that he would arrest them if they did not comply. Emmerth claims Lalowski called her a “fat fucking cow.” Others claim that Lalowski used repeated profanities and threats. Lalowski concedes that the confrontation was “adversarial” but denies using profanity. The exchange lasted only minutes. Later, he decided to confront the demonstrators about their signs. Off duty, wearing plain clothes, he returned in his personal vehicle, and spoke to an officer on duty and to Emmerth, making insulting comments about her weight and touching her. Lalowski stayed for approximately 80 minutes. A demonstrator called 911 to request police assistance in dealing with him. An investigation of his conduct resulted in a report that “Lalowski’s conduct … toward the public was harsh, profane, and unruly and caused a huge disturbance.” Lalowski’s disciplinary history included five suspensions and two written reprimands. After hearings, Lalowski was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claim of retaliation for protected speech, 42 U.S.C. 1983, but vacated with respect to his Illinois law administrative review claim. View "Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines" on Justia Law