Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1986, Packer, a Ph.D. in physiology, began work as a post-doctoral fellow at Indiana University’s School of Medicine. She was appointed to the tenure-track position of assistant professor in 1994. Packer’s 1999 application for tenure on the faculty was denied, but Packer successfully grieved the denial, and in 2001, was awarded tenure. Faculty members are evaluated based on teaching, research, and service. A faculty member’s overall performance is deemed satisfactory if she meets the minimum requirements in all three areas or if she is rated excellent in either teaching or research. The University represents that Packer, in the years leading up to her termination, repeatedly failed to meet expectations with respect to publication and external funding. Packer contends that her research performance is better than the University claims; that any deficiency was because the department chairman assigned her insufficient and inappropriate lab spaces and interfered with her efforts to obtain grant money; and that male faculty members whose research performance also fell short of expectations suffered no adverse consequences. In her suit, alleging sex discrimination, the University moved for summary judgment. Packer’s counsel did not properly support the elements of her claims with specific citations to admissible record evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the University. View "Packer v. Trs .of Ind. Univ." on Justia Law

In 2012, Harden, a Caucasian, sued the Marion County Sheriff’s Department for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. He alleged that the Sheriff’s Department terminated him in retaliation for testifying on behalf of African-American police officers in a race discrimination investigation. The Department claimed that he was terminated for taking money from a detainee’s wallet. The district granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Department. Harden now appeals that decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the evidence of harassment after Harden’s testimony says something about the context in which the theft investigation was initiated, without more, it cannot support an inference that Harden’s termination was retaliatory. No reasonable jury could find that the Internal Affairs investigation into the theft was pretextual. View "Harden v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Olson worked for Bemis at its Neenah, Wisconsin factory, and was a member of the Union. He was injured on the job and later fired. The Union filed a grievance on Olson’s behalf as permitted under its collective bargaining agreement. Bemis and the Union entered into a settlement under which Bemis agreed to pay Olson $20,000 in exchange for a waiver of all legal claims against the company. Olson did not accept the deal and sued Bemis and the Union, challenging his discharge and the legitimacy of the settlement. He lost on summary judgment. Olson later filed a second suit against Bemis and the Union, this time in state court, arguing that if the settlement was a valid contract, he was entitled to the $20,000 payout. The defendants removed the case. The district court held that it had federal-question jurisdiction over Olson’s state-law claims, which were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), then dismissed for failure to state any valid claim. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed. Olson breached the waiver-of-claims clause in the settlement agreement by filing his first suit against Bemis, so the company had no obligation to pay him. View "Olson v. Bemis Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Preddie worked as a fifth-grade teacher in the Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation during the 2010–2011 school year. After Preddie was absent 23 times, the BCSC did not renew his contract. Preddie, an African-American, is diabetic, and his son suffers from sickle cell anemia. Preddie filed suit, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, and 1991. The case district court granted summary judgment in favor of the BCSC on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except as to Preddie’s FMLA claims. Material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the FMLA interference and retaliation claims. View "Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law

Wright retired after working 1982-2007 as a caseworker at the Peoria Field Office of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services after the Department ordered her to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation. The order was a response to an incident in which Wright’s comments to a child apparently caused an outbreak of violence at a unit in a psychiatric facility for children. Wright filed suit alleging, that the Department had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), by causing her constructive discharge. A jury found in favor of Wright on the ADA claim but awarded no compensatory damages. The district court granted the Department’s motion for a new trial. During the second trial, the court granted the department judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Wright had failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wright did not establish that the Department’s conduct communicated that her termination was imminent. View "Wright v. Ill. Dept. of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Miller began work as a technician at Polaris Laboratories in Indianapolis in 2009. About eight months later, Miller was fired for repeated failures to meet an average daily quota of 260 samples processed per day. Miller, who is African‐American, asserts that during her employment at Polaris she suffered from racial discrimination that had an effect on her work performance. Miller had complained to supervisors that she had been called “the colored girl’ and about other derogatory remarks. At one point, a supervisor refused to train or even talk to Miller. There was evidence that Miller was given more challenging work than others. She sued Polaris, contending that it violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted Polaris summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Miller established genuine issues of material fact on discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Miller v. Polaris Labs., LLC" on Justia Law

Barr was a tenure-track journalism professor at Western Illinois University from the fall of 2007 through the spring semester 2010, when the University declined to retain her for the next academic year. Barr contends that the decision was in retaliation for complaints she made in 2008 about racial discrimination at the school. In March she sued the University alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII. Service of this suit was never perfected. Weeks later, in June, Barr filed a second lawsuit, against the Board of Trustees, alleging that the decision not to renew her contract was retaliatory and the product of age discrimination. In the meantime, Barr’s first suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During discovery in the second case, the Board of Trustees learned of Barr’s prior lawsuit and raised res judicata as an affirmative defense. The district court rejected Barr’s arguments her first suit didn’t end in a judgment on the merits and the claims differed in the two cases and dismissed The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as an adjudication on the merits,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), and Barr’s two suits involved the same parties and core of operative facts. View "Barr v. Bd. of Tr. of W. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

Sweatt , an African-American male, worked for Union Pacific, performing manual labor jobs. After a few years, Sweatt experience pain in his shoulder and hands. It progressed to the point that Sweatt could no longer do his job. Sweatt sought a less strenuous position— Security Officer—through Union Pacific’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program. Sweatt did not get the job. Sweatt sued, alleging violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Seventh circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. Sweatt’s FELA claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to accrue before November 30, 2009, outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them time-barred. Regarding the failure to hire, the court noted that Sweatt was not forthcoming about an arrest incident during his interview for a position where honesty and integrity are paramount. View "Sweatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Timmermann’s sued its former employee, Pace, for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment, claiming that Pace had stolen merchandise and money from the company. Pace filed her answer and a counterclaim, then filed a separate action against Timmermann’s and individual employees, alleging that they had conspired to facilitate Pace’s false arrest and that, as a result, she had suffered severe and extreme emotional distress. Pace later moved to consolidate the actions. The court granted the motion with respect to discovery, but denied the motion with respect to trial and instructed Pace that she should request consolidation for trial after the close of discovery. During discovery, the court dismissed Pace’s action, concluding that her claims were actually compulsory counterclaims that should have been filed with her answer to the company’s complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that Pace’s claims against parties other than Timmermann’s were not compulsory counterclaims because FRCP 13 and 20, in combination, do not compel a litigant to join additional parties to bring what would otherwise be a compulsory counterclaim. Because Pace’s claim for abuse of process against Timmermann’s arose before the filing of her counterclaim, it was a mandatory counterclaim. View "Pace v. Timmermann's Ranch & Saddle Shop, Inc." on Justia Law