Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked for United Airlines as a ramp serviceman at O’Hare International Airport. Plaintiff twice injured his back at work. When he returned for the second time, he had several permanent work restrictions. United subsequently assigned Plaintiff to the Matrix position as part of the Product Sort work area. United later placed Plaintiff on extended illness status. Plaintiff filed suit against United for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Thereafter, Plaintiff returned to work for United in the Matrix position. Plaintiff then waived his retaliation claim and focused instead on whether United discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of United. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that United did not fail to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. View "Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired from her employment with the Fox Valley Workforce Development Board, Inc., a state job-training agency serving central Wisconsin with funding from the federal government. Approximately two years later, Plaintiff filed a qui tam action alleging that the Board violated the False Claims Act by improperly contracting services through a subsidiary corporation. Plaintiff also alleged that the Board fired her in retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Board, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims lacked factual support. Plaintiff appealed. The Seventh Circuit (1) dismissed the qui tam claim for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the qui tam action was based on publicly disclosed information and was therefore barred by the Act; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed on the merits. View "Ziebell v. Fox Valley Workforce Dev. Bd., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an occasional employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), filed an administrative claim of discrimination on the basis of her race, age, and sex. While the suit began as an administrative proceeding within the DHS, it molted into a judicial proceeding. Both the lawsuit and the administrative proceeding were based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The federal district court granted DHS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by failing to amend her original administrative complaint to add her retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s suit because it was the fault of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that the retaliation claim did not become part of the original case. Remanded. View "Moreland v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Mathew Neisler worked as a stockman in food service during his incarceration at the Waupun Correctional Institution. Three months after Neisler suffered work-related injury, he was fired for “medical” reasons. Neisler filed suit against defendant prison administrators, alleging that he had been fired because of a disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Defendants filed motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Neisler was not entitled to pursue an employment-discrimination claim under Title II. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Title II of the ADA covered Neisler’s claim but that no rational finder of fact could find disability discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Title II does not apply to a prisoner’s claim of employment discrimination in a prison job. View "Neisler v. Tuckwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of Costco Wholesale Corporation, made two requests for a medical leave under the FMLA. Costco granted both requests. During that time, Plaintiff was demoted from optical manager to cashier. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Costco and Gail Hinds, his supervisor, alleging retaliation and interference, both in violation of the FMLA, and discrimination based upon a disability and failure to accommodate, both in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s causes of action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1; (2) properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s FLMA retaliation and interference claims; and (3) properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim. Lastly, Plaintiff waived any arguments with regard to disparate treatment. View "Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is black, filed a complaint against the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) in federal court, alleging that the CTA fired him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The CTA responded that Plaintiff was fired because he violated CTA’s policy against sexual harassment. The district court granted the CTA’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to create a triable issue under either the direct or indirect methods of proving unlawful discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s case failed under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. View "Smith v. Chicago Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Hooper, a family practice physician, was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2000. He must regularly see a psychologist to maintain his Illinois medical license. In 2009, Proctor hired Hooper to work in its Peoria outpatient clinics. In 2010 Hooper revealed his bipolar disorder for the first time to Proctor and inquired about Proctor’s long term disability benefit. Hooper had experienced an incident and believed he needed time off. He was granted immediate paid medical leave. Hooper determined he was not eligible for long term disability, because his condition was preexisting. Hooper did not return to work after he was cleared by a psychiatrist, repeatedly told that the psychiatrist had cleared him, and warned that if he did not contact Proctor by a certain date regarding his return, he would be fired. His employment was terminated. Hooper sued Proctor under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Proctor. Hooper’s complaint failed to mention any facts to put Proctor on notice that he was pursuing a failure to accommodate claim, which would fail even when considered on the merits because Hooper did not require accommodations. Hooper failed to create an issue of fact that would raise an inference of disability discrimination. View "Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of electrical workers, claimed that their respective employers, in collusion with Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority (MPEA, which used electricians supplied by the employers) wrongfully terminated them, in violation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and federal labor law and circumvented the CBA-mandated hiring process and that their union, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, failed to adequately represent them in the CBA-mandated grievance process. The district court denied motions to dismiss four counts, but dismissed a declaratory judgment motion against MPEA and two employers, and the claim of state law tortious interference with contracts against MPEA. The district court held that, as a political subdivision, MPEA is not an “employer” under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 185. Plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of the tortious interference claim against MPEA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that jurisdiction was created by the need to interpret the CBA. With respect to political subdivisions, section 301 preempts not only claims “founded directly” on the collective bargaining agreement, but also state law claims that indirectly implicate a collective bargaining agreement. View "Healy v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth." on Justia Law

In 2000, Huri began working at the Circuit Court of Cook County. Her manner of dress marked her as a follower of Islam. Huri is from Saudi Arabia. From 2002-2010, she worked as a child care attendant—the only one who was an Arab, and the only one who was a Muslim— under McCullum, a devout (and allegedly vocal) Christian. Huri filed internal complaints regarding McCullum’s behavior. McCullum became aware of those complaints and told Huri that the Chief Judge’s Office was uninterested in — and tired of—Huri’s complaints. McCullum apparently complained about Huri. In2010, Huri was transferred to the Court Reporters’ Office, where, Huri alleges, she was also treated badly and subject to retaliation for filing Equal Employment Opportunity complaints. The district court dismissed Huri’s suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Seventh CIrcuit reversed, concluding that Huri had stated a claim of hostile work environment and that Huri’s superiors were not protected by qualified immunity. View "Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge, Cook County" on Justia Law

In 1995 Barrett began work at the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) as an account technician. IDOC employees can be fired if they accumulate 12 unauthorized absences from work; unauthorized absences accrue on an employee’s record but are automatically expunged if the employee has a clean attendance history for a period of 24 consecutive months. Barrett was fired in 2010 after accumulating 12 unauthorized absences over a period of seven years. She claims that three of these absences (in 2003, 2004, and 2005) were for family or medical care and were protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. In 2012 she sued IDOC for violating her rights under the FMLA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that the suit was time-barred. An FMLA suit must be filed “not later than 2 years after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought.” The alleged FMLA violations occurred, and the limitations period began to run, when IDOC denied Barrett’s requests for leave and classified the three contested absences as unauthorized—not, as she claimed, when she was fired years later as a consequence of her overall attendance record. View "Barrett v. Ill. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law