Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

To fix a 2004 Teamsters election, Bania and the union president diverted ballots by changing members’ addresses in the database. They collected those ballots and cast falsified votes. After an investigation, they employed the same fraud during a second election. Bania was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and theft from a labor organization (18 U.S.C. 371), four counts of mail fraud (13 U.S.C. 1341 and 1346), and six counts of embezzling, stealing, and unlawfully and willfully abstracting and converting property and other assets of a labor organization (29 U.S.C. 501(c)). In 2009, the court sentenced Bania to concurrent 40-month terms, departing from the low-end of the guidelines, 97 months, and ordered Bania to pay $900,936 in restitution, reflecting salaries paid to co-defendants and expenses of the second election. The court later rejected Bania’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in disregarding Bania’s instruction to appeal. In 2012, Bania completed his prison term. In 2013, the district court denied Bania’s motion for early termination of supervised release because of his outstanding financial obligation. Bania did not challenge that rationale, but argued that the restitution calculation improperly totaled the loss he intended to cause, rather than the loss actually caused. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision not to terminate supervised release. Bania filed an unsuccessful “Motion to Terminate Order of Restitution and Order of Forfeiture.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Bania’s motion. The time to appeal his sentence has long passed. View "United States v. Bania" on Justia Law

Stern worked at St. Anthony’s Health Center (SAHC) as Chief Psychologist, with supervisory, administrative, and clinical responsibilities. In 2010, Stern received an annual performance evaluation that assigned an overall score of 2.54/4, citing concerns over administrative responsibilities. Weeks later, a subordinate resigned and, during her exit interview, said Stern had “cognitive issues.” There had been patient complaints. Other coworkers expressed similar concerns about “possible dementia.” SAHC required Stern to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation and placed him on a paid leave of absence. SAHC agreed to Stern’s choice of the Chief of Clinical Neuropsychology at Washington University Medical School, for the evaluation. The final report indicated short-term memory deficiencies, with a level of memory functioning below expectation and stated “Stern is not believed to be fit for duty in his current position.” Stating that it could not provide a position with reduced responsibilities, SAHC terminated Stern. Stern sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted SAHC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stated that it was troubled that SAHC failed to engage in an interactive process to find reasonable accommodations to permit Stern to continue his employment, but that Stern failed to create an issue of fact as to whether he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Xiong began working as a Dane County social worker in 1990, covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provided that the Union would assist employees in pre-disciplinary, grievance, and termination processes. In 2012, Xiong’s supervisor, Fischer, learned that Xiong had forged signatures on documents, called in sick after Fischer had denied requests to be excused, failed to meet deadlines for an audit, attended divorce proceedings during work time, and moved a client from one home to another without completing required paperwork. Fischer requested a pre-disciplinary meeting, noting rules that Xiong had broken, and stating that Xiong could respond and have a Union representative present. Having taken unauthorized leave on May 22-23, Xiong did not receive Fischer’s letter until May 24, when he attended the meeting with his union steward. Xiong admitted to the allegations and to failure to pass theLong Term Care Functional Screen Test, required for certification as a social worker. A week later Xiong received a termination letter. Bypassing two steps of the grievance procedure, the Union began Xiong’s appeal with a hearing before the Chief Administrative Officer, who denied the appeal. The Union board voted not to arbitrate Xiong’s case. Rejecting the County’s severance offer, Xiong sued the Union, the Department, and Fischer. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Xiong v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Castro, Brooks, and Florez sued their former employer, DeVry University, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that DeVry retaliated against them by terminating their employment for complaining about their supervisor’s racially and ethnically derogatory remarks. DeVry transferred the supervisor three months after plaintiffs complained. After that, he neither supervised plaintiffs nor participated in the termination decisions. Evidence concerning their individual circumstances and job performance varies. The district court granted summary judgment to DeVry on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the claims by Castro and Brooks, but reversed as to Florez. Castro was terminated 30 months after the complaint because of poor performance over a sustained period. Brooks was terminated 15 months after the complaint because of multiple instances of dishonesty and inconsistent performance. Neither Castro nor Brooks raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether these reasons were pretexts for retaliation. Florez, however, raised a genuine issue of material fact about motive. He was terminated 10 months after the complaint for inconsistent performance and “volatile behavior.” DeVry has conceded that Florez’s performance did not justify his termination. Florez offered evidence that DeVry’s “volatile behavior” explanation was a pretext. View "Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Vietnam veteran, was diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression. In 2004 the VA declared him 100 percent disabled. Nonetheless, the Illinois Department of Human Services hired him that year as a “certified nurse assistant residential case worker” and assigned him to a residential facility. Two years later, he claims, a resident and members of the resident’s family assaulted plaintiff with an iron pipe and baseball bats. The Department suspended him on the complaint of the resident’s family and allegedly subsequently discharged him on the basis of an investigation by the Department of Children and Family Services that resulted in a preliminary finding that he had committed child abuse and neglect. The finding of child abuse was retracted. In 2014 he sued, alleging violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), which forbids discrimination on the basis of disability by agencies that receive federal money. The district judge dismissed, finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim and that his claim was untimely. The Department was not served with process. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, noting that it is not clear when plaintiff was discharged and that it can take a long time for a discharge to ripen. View "Rutledge v. Ill. Dept, of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Ortiz, working for a concrete products manufacturer, was in a sand storage bin trying to scrape its wall, when he sank and was engulfed by sand up to his neck. Workers tried to dig him out. Plant manager MacKenzie was notified within 10 minutes. He decided there was no emergency and left the scene. Rescue efforts were not progressing; Ortiz asked the workers to call 911. No one did. Eventually, MacKenzie called 911. The Fire Department’s Technical Rescue Team arrived within minutes. Ortiz had been trapped for 90 minutes. Using a vacuum truck to remove the sand, the team extricated Ortiz in about four hours. He sustained serious injuries to his lower body. The bin is a “permit-required confined space.” OSHA requires “procedures for summoning rescue and emergency services, for rescuing entrants … and for preventing unauthorized personnel from attempting a rescue.” The plan must specify that emergency services are to be summoned immediately and forbid others to attempt rescue. Other regulations require danger signs and a protective barrier. An OSHA inspector cited the employer for three “serious” and one “willful” violation, 29 U.S.C. 666. An ALJ imposed a penalty of $70,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review that challenged the finding of the willful violation and the finding of violation of the requirement of a barrier. View "Dukane Precast, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Hess, an attorney, had worked on a number of medical-malpractice cases before his law firm, Kanoski terminated his employment. Many of these cases settled after Hess’s termination, and Hess was not compensated. He sued under his employment agreement and under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, adding claims of tortious interference, wrongful discharge, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. In 2011, the district court dismissed each of Hess’s claims. On remand the district court held that Hess was not entitled to compensation for the post-termination settlements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on its interpretation of Hess’s employment contract provisions that Hess would receive bonus pay in the amount of 15 percent of all fees “generated over the base salary (or $5,000 per month),” that the bonus shall increase to 25 percent “on all fees received annually in excess of $750,000.00,” and that that, “where the Corporation retains clients upon Employees [sic] termination that Employee has no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the Employee is to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for all work done while an Employee of the Corporation.” View "Hess v. Kanoski & Associates" on Justia Law

Window washers employed or formerly employed by CCS filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, which requires an employer to pay hourly workers at least one and a half times their normal hourly wage for hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week, which CCS has not done for the plaintiffs. There is an exception where: the worker’s regular pay exceeds one and a half times the federal minimum wage (conceded by plaintiffs); “more than half his compensation for a representative period represents commissions on goods or services”; and he is employed by “a retail or service establishment.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CCS with regard to its status as a retail or service establishment and, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of CCS on the commission requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that FLSA is intended to encourage employers to spread out full‐time work among different employees. Giving plaintiffs overtime pay would not further that purpose because it was not shown that they are on average working more than 2,000 hours a year. CCS has an admirable safety record without paying its workers for overtime; plaintiffs are well paid. View "Alvarado v. Corp. Cleaning Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Hutchens is a black woman. A large-scale layoff in the Chicago public schools system’s Professional Development Unit, where she worked, required the unit to decide whether to retain her or a white woman, Glowacki, who Hutchens argues was less qualified. She claimed that the unit’s director, Rivera, preferred whites to blacks. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that their justification for the replacement that was not merely a “pretext.” The Seventh Circuit reversed as to racial discrimination (42 U.S.C. 1983) and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. A reasonable jury could credit Hutchens’ evidence while rejecting that of the defendants, and impressed by Hutchens’ credentials, her seniority over Glowacki, her earlier receipt of National Board Certification, her other credentials superior to Glowacki’s, her writing skills, and her toughness in teaching inmates of Cook County Jail year after year, could conclude that she was better qualified for the job than Glowacki. That reasonable jury might nevertheless deem Hutchens a victim not of racism but of error, ineptitude, carelessness, or personal like or dislike, unrelated to race. View "Hutchens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Dr. Simpson, an African-American was recruited to apply for a position at BDCH in 2010. BDCH’s CEO offered Simpson employment with the concurrence of BDCH’s COO. Both were aware of Simpson’s race. BDCH paid the recruiter $12,000. BDCH’s Physician Employment Agreement stated that Simpson “must apply for, obtain and maintain” active medical staff membership and clinical privileges. BDCH was to pay Simpson a $20,000 signing bonus “within five (5) days after first day of employment,” contingent on Simpson’s obtaining medical staff privileges and fulfilling other conditions of the employment agreement. Simpson applied for medical staff privileges at BDCH, stating that he was certified with the American Board of Family Physicians and held an unrestricted license to practice medicine in Indiana and Illinois. He also indicated that he was a defendant in two medical malpractice cases involving wrongful death, but did not disclose that these claims were not covered by malpractice insurance. Simpson noted that he had been placed on academic probation during his first year of residency. The Committee denied his application for staff privileges. Simpson sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of BDCH. Simpson failed to show that the Committee’s concerns were untrue, unreasonable, or pretexts for discrimination. View "Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps." on Justia Law