Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dibble and Akemann were arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. At the time of their appointments, the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/14, provided that each arbitrator would be appointed for a term of six years, with the possibility of reappointment. The legislature passed Public Act 97–18, which was signed on June 28, 2011 and took effect three days later, ending the terms of all incumbent arbitrators effective July 1, 2011 and providing that the Governor would make new appointments. The law allowed incumbent arbitrators to serve as holdovers until the Governor made new appointments. By July 1, 2012, both Dibble and Akemann had lost their positions. They alleged that by shortening their six‐year terms as arbitrators under the prior law, Public Act 97–18 deprived them of a property interest without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were moot, and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Even if plaintiffs plausibly allege a constitutional violation, the applicable law was not clearly established under the circumstances of these cases, where a statutory amendment eliminated the property interest that a statute had previously conferred. View "Dibble v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Employees of Instant, an information-technology staffing firm sign agreements in which they promise not to solicit business from Instant’s clients, not to recruit Instant’s employees to other jobs, and not to disclose the firm’s sensitive information to outsiders. DeFazio was Instant’s Vice President until 2012, when she was fired. She was already cofounding Connect, a new tech-staffing firm, and began working there immediately, along with several coworkers she persuaded to leave Instant. Connect won business from several of Instant’s recent clients. Instant sued DeFazio and others for breaching the restrictive covenants and under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030. DeFazio counterclaimed, alleging that Instant shortchanged her on a bonus. The court concluded that no one is liable to anyone else. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that defendants did not leak or otherwise misuse Instant’s proprietary data. Defendants admitted breaching the covenants not to solicit and not to recruit, but in Illinois a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement is valid only if it serves a “legitimate business interest.” The district court concluded that neither covenant did. Tech-staffing firms do not build relationships with clients that would justify restricting their employees from setting out on their own. View "Instant Tech. LLC v. DeFazio" on Justia Law

Burks and Jones were hired as Union Pacific “Signal Helpers.” During orientation in January 2011, they were informed that they would be employed through December 2015, or until the company “moved in a different direction.” The position carried a 90-day probationary period; they were subject to a collective bargaining agreement. They were the only African-American members of their class. On February 9, 2011, Burks was told that “it wasn’t working out.” Burks lodged a complaint with Schop in Union Pacific’s Equal Employment Opportunity department alleging racial discrimination. Schop found no evidence that Burks was fired because of his race, but concluded that he had not been given an opportunity to improve and offered reinstatement in exchange for a general release with a new 90-day probationary period. Burks signed and returned to work. Burks worked for seven days before requesting a transfer. He was transferred and completed his probationary period, but was later notified that Union Pacific abolished the Signal Helper position, effective October 2011. Jones had similar experiences. The district court granted summary judgment, rejecting claims that Union Pacific denied an opportunity to take a test that was required for promotion, based on impermissible retaliation for complaints of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that positions within the seniority district became available during the relevant period. View "Burks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Gonzalez-Koeneke worked, for 12 years, as a Rockford School District bus driver. She experienced problems with children on her bus and filed incident reports with Sharp and, later, went to West, the terminal manager. She was told that she did not know how to discipline the children and was later suspended for two days for failing to perform a proper pre-trip inspection of her bus. Gonzalez-Koeneke claims that her suspension was actually retaliation for having gone to West. Her union steward told her that Wilson (a District official) wanted her to quit, but Wilson issued a “Removal Form” that same day, resulting in suspension of her bus-driver permit for three years. Gonzalez-Koeneke was terminated based on her suspended permit. She filed suit pro se, alleging violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed with prejudice, noting its standing order that a dismissal is with prejudice unless a party requests an opportunity to amend in its response. Gonzalez-Koeneke moved to set aside the judgment and to amend her complaint. The district court denied the motion, stating that she had not explained how she would amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West" on Justia Law

Lawson sold computer maintenance and support services for StorageTek. He was paid a base salary and commissions on his sales under the company’s annual incentive plan. Sun Microsystems acquired StorageTek in 2005. At the time Lawson was working on a large sale to JPMorgan Chase, but the deal did not close until 2006. If StorageTek’s 2005 incentive plan applied, Lawson would earn a commission, as high as $1.8 million. If the sale fell under Sun’s 2006 incentive plan, his commission would be about $54,000. Sun determined that the 2006 plan applied. Lawson sued for breach of contract and violation of Indiana’s Wage Claim Statute. The district court rejected the statutory wage claim but submitted the contract claim to a jury, which awarded Lawson $1.5 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The sale did not qualify for a commission under the terms of the 2005 plan. Although the original plan documents said the plan would remain in effect until superseded by a new one, a September 2005 amendment set a definite termination date for the plan year: December 25, 2005. To earn a commission under the 2005 plan, sales had to be final and invoiced by that date. View "Lawson v. Sun Microsystems, Inc." on Justia Law

Demonstrators gathered outside an abortion clinic, planning to display signs containing images of aborted fetuses. Then-Officer Lalowski was finishing an overnight shift when he noticed the demonstrators and stopped his marked police vehicle, telling demonstrators not to impede traffic or to stop anyone from entering the clinic and that he would arrest them if they did not comply. Emmerth claims Lalowski called her a “fat fucking cow.” Others claim that Lalowski used repeated profanities and threats. Lalowski concedes that the confrontation was “adversarial” but denies using profanity. The exchange lasted only minutes. Later, he decided to confront the demonstrators about their signs. Off duty, wearing plain clothes, he returned in his personal vehicle, and spoke to an officer on duty and to Emmerth, making insulting comments about her weight and touching her. Lalowski stayed for approximately 80 minutes. A demonstrator called 911 to request police assistance in dealing with him. An investigation of his conduct resulted in a report that “Lalowski’s conduct … toward the public was harsh, profane, and unruly and caused a huge disturbance.” Lalowski’s disciplinary history included five suspensions and two written reprimands. After hearings, Lalowski was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claim of retaliation for protected speech, 42 U.S.C. 1983, but vacated with respect to his Illinois law administrative review claim. View "Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines" on Justia Law

Shell worked for the City of Anderson Transit System (CATS) as a Mechanic’s Helper on the day shift for 12 years. According to the job description for the position, a Mechanic’s Helper may occasionally drive buses to field locations. A Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) is required to drive the CATS buses. Shell’s hearing and vision impairments prevent him from obtaining a CDL. Shell never drove a bus. When general manager Blackwell was appointed at CATS as part of personnel changes made by the new mayor, he informed Shell that his employment would be terminated unless he obtained a CDL, as the job description required it. After he was fired, Shell sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), for failure to accommodate his disability and alleged that his termination was politically motivated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. A jury should decide whether the city violated the ADA; the factual record did not establish as a matter of law that driving a bus was an essential function of the Mechanic’s Helper position. View "Shell v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the Democratic primary preceding the 2010 election, the candidates for Sheriff were Miller, a St. Joseph County Police Department sergeant, and Grzegorek. Grzegorek won the general election. Miller sought to be appointed either Assistant Chief or Warden of the county jail. Grzegorek appointed as Assistant Chief a man who had been Sheriff from 1985 to 1998 and retained the current Warden. The head of the Detective Bureau, an appointee of the new Sheriff, stated that Miller should take charge of the Property Room. The Department had accumulated about 1000 guns, which needed to be sorted. Miller took the position, which involved no change in compensation or rank, but months later, expressed dissatisfaction. He was offered a position in the Family Violence Unit. He declined, and continued in the Property Room until the sorting was complete, then returned to the Detective Bureau. Miller claims that his assignment to the Property Room was degrading and that he was not asked about his interest in other vacant positions that would have been promotions. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of racial hostility. Miller’s qualifications were less impressive than those of the persons appointed to the positions he wanted. View "Miller v. St. Joseph County" on Justia Law

Locke, a parolee, sued Haessig, a state official, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause, based on how Haessig responded to Locke’s complaint that her subordinate, a parole officer, was sexually harassing Locke. Locke provided evidence that Haessig was told of the harassment, failed to intervene or investigate, and then threatened to retaliate against Locke for complaining. The district court denied Haessig’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Haessig’s claim that she lacked the required intent to discriminate. Accepting Locke’s version of the facts, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Locke. Haessig was told of Locke’s complaints, but never met with him to discuss the allegations or tried to protect him from further harassment. According to Locke, after hearing of his complaint, Haessig expressed anger toward Locke and said he would never get off of his electronic ankle monitor until he was discharged from parole. A reasonable jury could infer intent to discriminate. That was clearly established law in 2008 when the events took place. Haessig had reasonable notice that her alleged actions were unlawful and so is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Locke v. Haessig" on Justia Law

Mintz started at Caterpillar in 2005. In 2007, Mintz was promoted to manufacturing engineer: an intermediary between the design department and the production floor, supervised by Turpen. Mintz moved to a different assembly line and, in 2011, began reporting to Rumler. Mintz’s duties included managing “grief” and engineering change orders; grief refers to discrepancy between what was ordered and what employees are scheduled to build. Mintz’s 2010 evaluation, prepared by Turpen, included an overall rating of “3B-Valued Performance.” The section that involved grief and change orders stated “does not meet.” His first review of 2011 resulted in a lower “3C” rating. Mintz, the only African American engineer working in the area at Caterpillar, believed that his rating was based on race. For the third quarter, Mintz received a “4-Needs Improvement,” indicating potential termination. Rumler assigned others to assist Mintz in resolving deficiencies. He allowed Mintz to work overtime and during a shutdown. Mintz’s 2011 year-end evaluation was “4”with a “does not meet” assessment of grief and change orders. His performance had worsened, causing tear down hours and assembly line down time. Mintz claimed racial discrimination. The year-end evaluation resulted in a $9,500 difference in his bonus payment. Mintz had no evidence of any race-related comments or jokes. He did not identify any Caterpillar employee that he believes was treated better than him. In 2012, Mintz transferred to another department where he remains employed. In his suit, claiming violation of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Caterpillar. Mintz was not meeting legitimate expectations and had no evidence that his complaint of race discrimination caused his evaluation. View "Mintz v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law