Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sedgwick is a claims management services company. Bagwe, who was born in India, began working in Sedgwick’s Chicago office in 2001. She was promoted to Assistant Manager II in 2005. She was asked to serve as Interim Operations Manager in 2007 and was promoted to Operations Manager. A Managing Director made the promotion decision. Bagwe’s direct supervisor, counseled against promoting Bagwe, indicating that Bagwe had poor leadership skills and had not provided sufficient direction to subordinates. In the following months, one of Bagwe’s subordinates asked to be reassigned; Bagwe repeatedly complained about her compensation; Bagwe had confrontations with and made accusations against coworkers; and Bagwe was the subject of performance improvement plan. In 2009 she was terminated with statements that she had a “continuing lack of trust” that had “become a distraction to the business.” Her replacement was a white, American male. Bagwe filed claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Illinois Human Rights Act, claiming that Sedgwick had paid her a comparatively low salary because of her race and national origin and that she was terminated for retaliatory and racially discriminatory reasons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, noting that Bagwe had not identified a similarly-situated employee who was paid more. View "Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

BeavEx is a same-day delivery service that uses 104 couriers to carry out its customers’ orders throughout Illinois. By classifying its couriers as independent contractors instead of employees, Beav-Ex attempted to avoid the requirements of state and federal employment laws, including the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115, which prohibits an employer from taking unauthorized deductions from its employees’ wages. Plaintiffs, and the putative class, were or are couriers who allege that they should have been classified as employees of BeavEx for purposes of the IWPCA, and that any deductions taken from their wages were illegal. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts any state law that is “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier.” The district court held that the FAAAA does not preempt the IWPCA and denied BeavEx’s motion for summary judgment. The court also denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class but granted their motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs are employees under the IWPCA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of BeavEx’s motion for summary judgment, vacated the denial of class certification, and remanded for further proceeding View "Costello v. BeavEx, Inc." on Justia Law

Jaburek, a woman of Mexican descent, began working for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) at its Des Plaines, Illinois, office in 1987. After various promotions and raises, followed by reassignment to her earlier position, there was a dispute about her responsibilities. She filed suit, alleging that the FAA paid her less than other employees who did the same work that she did but did not share her protected class status, and that the FAA retaliated against her for complaining about such discrimination, asserting: failure to promote in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.; violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d); and a Title VII retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the FAA, stating that Jaburek failed to produce the necessary evidence to establish prima facie claims for any of her causes of action. View "Jaburek v. Foxx" on Justia Law

In 2000, Kubiak, a Chicago patrol officer for 14 years, was detailed to the Office of News Affairs, as a media liaison. In 2012, Zala, another media liaison, allegedly ran toward Kubiak, screaming, “Who the fuck do you think you are, you stupid bitch?” He swung his hand back as if to strike her. Officer Perez tried to calm Zala. Kubiak called Director Stratton, stating that Zala had previously directed similar outbursts toward her. During the call, Zala continued to berate and intimidate her. Kubiak alleges that Zala has a history of violence. Stratton told Kubiak that she had spoken with Zala and would not discuss the incident further. Kubiak’s supervising Lieutenant also declined to discuss the incident. Kubiak initiated an Internal Affairs Division investigation, which was “sustained.” Within days, Kubiak was reassigned as a patrol officer on a midnight shift in an allegedly dangerous neighborhood. Perez was also reassigned to patrol. Kubiak, the most senior ONA member, and Perez were the only officers reassigned although others had requested transfer. Kubiak alleges that Zala was never reprimanded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Kubiak’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, concluding that Kubiak’s speech was not constitutionally protected since Kubiak did not speak as a private citizen and did not speak on a matter of public concern. View "Kubiak v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former Chicago taxi drivers, paid a “shift fee,” a lease payment that allows the driver to operate one of the defendants’ taxis and earn income. Weekly fees range from $500 to $800 or more. Drivers also pay operating expenses, including fuel, airport taxes, upkeep, and sometimes insurance payments. The drivers do not earn traditional wages or overtime pay. Their only source of income is what they make in fares and tips from passengers. The drivers contend that they often receive less than minimum wage and for some shifts, pay more for fees and expenses than they receive from fares and tips. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of their class action suit under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115 and asserting unjust enrichment. The Act defines “wages” as compensation owed by the employer pursuant to an employment agreement between the parties. Even if the drivers were employees under an employment agreement, that agreement did not obligate defendants to compensate the drivers. The Act provides no substantive relief beyond what the underlying employment contract requires. View "Enger v. Chicago Carriage Cab Corp." on Justia Law

Tate filed suit pro se, claiming that his former employer, which provides non‐emergency medical transportation, discriminated against him and then having retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). The court dismissed, without allowing amendment, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a complaint seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The judge stated that Tate’s complaint contained “little more than conclusory legal jargon.’” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiff was not required to plead more elaborately, except with regard to his claim of disability discrimination. Tate used a complaint form supplied by the district court. The form does not require, nor permit, extensive factual detail; it provides six lines for listing facts. Plaintiff’s only seriously deficient allegation concerns the disability, which is not named or otherwise identified. The court dismissed the suit before expiration of the 21‐day period during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint without the court’s approval. The judge should not only have complied with the rule; he should have told the plaintiff what is required to allege disability discrimination. View "Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., Inc" on Justia Law

Carothers, an African-American woman, was hired by Cook County Juvenile Detention Center (JDC) in 2005 as an Administrative Assistant-Hearing Officer, inputting data and creating reports, and serving as a hearing officer for juvenile detainee grievances. In 2009, Carothers had a physical altercation with a detainee during a riot. Carothers injured her hands, went on a leave of absence, and obtained a worker’s compensation settlement. HR acknowledged that Carothers had been released to return with a restriction precluding her from interacting with the detainees, which her job required, and suggested that Carothers review available positions. Carothers replied that she could not find a position that accommodated her restriction. HR replied that she should apply for disability benefits. In March, 2010, Carothers returned to her job. She had to be taken from work in an ambulance following Physical Restraint Techniques training and Deescalation training. In 2011, HR submitted a “Disciplinary Recommendation” because Carothers refused to file for disability and could not obtain a release to return to full duty. A Hearing Officer recommended discharge due to more than 10 unauthorized absences, and failure to follow instructions. The JDC discharged Carothers, who sued, alleging that she had developed an anxiety disorder and that termination constituted discrimination on account of disability, race, and sex, and retaliation for her EEOC claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Carothers v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

In 2012, the National Labor Relations Board found that Big Ridge violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158, by threatening employees with mine closure and job loss based on their support of the union and discharging employee Waller because of his union support. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, finding that the Board lacked a quorum because three of the Board’s five members were improperly appointed under the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In 2014, a validly constituted Board considered the case anew and again found that Big Ridge violated the Act. The Seventh Circuit denied Big Ridge’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order, holding hold that the Board had jurisdiction to consider the case anew with a properly constituted Board. The Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in Waller’s discharge; Big Ridge has not met its burden to show that it would have discharged Waller despite his union activities. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Big Ridge, Inc." on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an enforcement action under Section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐6, claiming that CVS Pharmacy violates Title VII by offering a severance agreement, with waivers of claims against CVS, that could deter terminated employees from filing charges with the EEOC or participating in EEOC proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment for CVS, interpreting Title VII as requiring the EEOC to conciliate its claim before bringing a civil suit. The EEOC had refused to engage in conciliation. The court was also skeptical that an employer’s decision to offer a severance agreement to terminated employees could serve as the basis for a “pattern or practice” suit under Title VII, without any allegation that the employer engaged in retaliatory or discriminatory employment practices. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Section 707(e), the EEOC is required to comply with all of the pre‐suit procedures contained in Section 706 when it pursues “pattern or practice” violations. Because the EEOC has not alleged that CVS engaged in discrimination or retaliation by offering the Agreement to terminated employees, the EEOC failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Woodward employees, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Woodward falsely certified helicopter engine parts that it sold to the government. Plaintiffs had complained that the sensors at issue did not meet quality standards and had refused to work on the order. Following an investigation, a Defense Contract Management Agency Technical Specialist concluded that there was “nothing either incorrect or wrong with the procedures, assembly, or testing of the sensors.” The government continues to order, pay for, and use Woodward’s sensor The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Woodward, agreeing that even if Woodward made false statements to the government, no reasonable jury could find that it made the statements knowingly or that the statements were material. View "Marshall v. Woodward, Inc." on Justia Law