Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Boston worked at U.S. Steel for 18 years before she was laid off in 2008, along with other employees. While on layoff status, Boston remained eligible to bid on posted positions for which she was qualified. Between September 2010 and January 2012, Boston was awarded, worked temporarily at, and was subsequently disqualified from, three different clerical positions at the plant. Boston claimed that the first disqualification was based on her age (61) and a preference for having a man in the job. Boston filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but did not file suit. After two subsequent disqualifications, she filed an EEOC complaint asserting that she was laid off in January 2012 in retaliation for an earlier EEOC discrimination charge she had filed in October 2010. She later filed suit under Title VII and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act ADEA, with a common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of U.S. Steel. Boston did not present enough evidence to prevail under the direct method, indirect method, or cat’s paw theory. View "Boston v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

The EEOC investigated Aerotek staffing agency for compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and served a subpoena requesting information: about all persons that Aerotek referred from its Illinois facilities for employment by clients; regarding all job requisition requests by Aerotek clients nationwide; about persons hired into internal positions at Aerotek’s Illinois facilities; and documents related to Aerotek’s analysis of its workforce. Aerotek partially complied. EEOC’s initial review revealed hundreds of discriminatory job requests by clients at 62 of Aerotek’s 286 facilities. EEOC issued another request for information about individuals assigned to clients including names, dates of birth, contact information and the names of the clients to whom they were assigned. Aerotek again partially complied, excluding client names and the names and contact information for workers hired by those clients. Instead, Aerotek created a code system and supplied numerical identifiers for clients and workers. Aerotek refused to produce unredacted information. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order to enforce the subpoenas. The inquiry is within the authority of the EEOC and the information sought is clearly relevant to its investigation of age-related discrimination. Aerotek did not claim that the request is too indefinite; production of this information would not impose an unreasonable or undue burden. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Aerotek, Inc." on Justia Law

Staffing Network provided 80 full‐time employees for ReaderLink, including an on‐site manager, pickers, and stockers. Pickers work on a production line, selecting books to fill orders, and placing books in boxes. Stockers ensure that pickers have an adequate supply of books. Barrera began working as a picker in 2004. Except for once punching the clock too early, Barrera worked for eight years without incident. In 2012, while filling a large order, a stocker said that he would work no faster for $8.25 an hour and was sent home. Other workers, including Barrera, became upset. After referring to contacting the Department of Human Rights, Barrera was told to collect her things and go home. Barrera initially refused. Others came to Barrera’s defense. Later, having been told to leave and not come back, Barrera surmised that she had been terminated, applied for unemployment benefits, and filed an unfair labor practice charge. An ALJ found violation of 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1); rejected claims that Barrera was not terminated or that any discharge was justified; found that Barrera did not lose the protection of the Act under the Atlantic Steel Co.factors; and ordered that Barrera be offered reinstatement and lost earnings. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted the NLRB’s petition for enforcement. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Staffing Network Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Mercedes-Benz of Orlando dealership service department had 37 technicians in 2008, who were paid by the job rather than by the hour. The International Association of Machinists began a campaign to organize the technicians. During the campaign, the dealership held “educational” meetings with the technicians, engaged in lay-offs, and received information about the unionization efforts from a pro-union technician. The technicians voted in favor of unionizing; the dealership contested the result. A decline in business accelerated and, without attempting to bargain with the union, the dealership reduced the “book times” for some pre-paid maintenance jobs and laid off more technicians. In 2009, a two-member NLRB panel affirmed certification of the union. In 2010, after the Supreme Court held that the Act requires the Board to decide cases with a minimum of three members, a new order affirmed the certification determination. In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit enforced the Board order. The NLRB then filed an unfair practices complaint. An ALJ found that the employers engaged in unfair labor practices aimed at coercing their employees’ choices before the union election and frustrating their employees’ protected concerted activities after the election; fired an employee due to anti-union animus; and unlawfully made multiple changes to working conditions without bargaining with the union. The NLRB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit enforced the order. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Contemporary Cars, Inc." on Justia Law

Officer Homoky was under investigation by the Hobart Police Department for officer misconduct and was ordered to submit to a voice stress test, a type of lie detector. He was told that if he did not comply, he would be subject to dismissal. Homoky refused to sign a release form because his participation was not voluntary, and was charged with insubordination and placed on administrative leave. He was later assigned to garage duty, which included scrubbing toilets. Homoky had filed suit, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and abuse of process under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, finding no constitutional violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that forcing him to sign the release form under threat of dismissal deprived him of his right against self-incrimination in violation of the Constitution. The department informed him that any statement made would not be used against him in a criminal proceeding, so it was free to compel him to answer any question, even incriminating ones. View "Homoky v. Ogden" on Justia Law

In 2009-2011, Callahan frequently drove a taxicab in Chicago. She does not own a cab, nor does she own a medallion that represents the city’s permission to operate a taxi. She leased both from owners by the week, day, or half day. Callahan asserts that her net proceeds (fares and tips, less lease fees and gasoline) averaged less than the minimum wages required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. Callahan contends that Chicago must make up the difference because its regulations (Chicago sets rates that taxis may charge) are confiscatory and are so extensive that Chicago must be treated as her employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Callahan does not own any asset whose market value has been reduced by the regulation of taxi fares. Persons who own cabs or medallions are (potentially) adversely affected by caps on what owners can charge; Callahan owns her own time, but Chicago does not require her to devote any of that time to taxi driving. Extensive regulation does not make the government the employer of the regulated parties. View "Callahan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In November 2010, Board of Education Chief Area Officer Coates sent Bordelon , the long-tenured principal of the Kozminski Academy, notice of a pre‐discipline hearing based on insubordination in failing to respond to a parent issue; failing to arrange a requested meeting regarding the arrest of Kozminski students; and failing to respond to Coates’s email. Bordelon received a five‐day suspension without pay, which he never served. In December 2010, Coates evaluated Bordelon as needing improvement, noting that Kozminski was on academic probation for a second year with test scores trending downward. Coates reassigned Bordelon to home with full pay pending an investigation into improperly replacing asbestos‐containing tile at Kozminski; purchasing irregularities; and tampering with school computers in a manner that impeded Board access to Kozminski’s records. In early 2011, Kozminski's Local School Council voted to not renew Bordelon’s contract. Bordelon, age 63, believed that Coates, exercised undue influence over the decision, based his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, stating that that Bordelon did not prove discrimination and that there was substantial evidence of independent reasons for not renewing Bordelon’s contract, making it unlikely that Coates influenced the Board. View "Bordelon v. Bd of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The 1983 Shakman Accord resulted from resolution of political patronage litigation; to eliminate political considerations in employment decisions the city agreed to create and implement a hiring plan to effectuate the goal of eradicating political patronage. Shakman “adds speech and political affiliation to the list” of impermissible bases of employment discrimination delineated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Eight applicants for the position of police officer with the Chicago Police Department, disqualified from consideration, sued the city, claiming violations of the city’s 2011 Hiring Plan, violation of the Shakman Accord, and equal protection violations under the Illinois Constitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals of the Shakman claims, which were filed beyond the 180-day time limit and were, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.. View "Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Deets, a white construction worker, worked for MTA on a federally assisted project to build a bridge (the Stan Musial Veteran’s Memorial Bridge) across the Mississippi River. MTA’s collective bargaining agreement defined seniority for purposes of layoffs and recalls. The Missouri Department of Transportation’s contract with MTA contained federally mandated goals for participation by minorities (14.7%) and women (6.9%) on the project. Deets claimed racial discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, asserting that he was laid off because management was concerned about meeting minority participation goals. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants, finding material disputes concerning the basis for the layoff: statements to Deets about “minority numbers” and the immediate hiring of a replacement. View "Deets v. Massman Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Stark, an excavation and paving company, typically handles about 250 jobs per year in central and southern Illinois. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued Stark several citations at two worksites in 2008, following inspections. Another OSHA inspection, 17 days later, resulted in a citation for a willful excavation cave-in protection violation. The Secretary proposed penalties of $2000 for the eyewear violation, $35,000 for the spoil piles violation, and $70,000 each for the cave-in protections violations. An ALJ affirmed the citation for the eyewear violation and the $2000 penalty, affirmed the spoil piles violation and awarded a $20,000 penalty, and determined that the cave-in protection violations were serious violations rather than willful violations and imposed a $7,000 penalty for each, for a total penalty of $36,000. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission affirmed as to the spoil piles violation and the serious cave-in protection violation, but vacated the eyewear violation. As to the earlier cave-in protection violation, the Commission determined that it should be characterized as willful rather than serious and assessed a penalty of $60,000, for a total penalty of $87,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Stark failed to demonstrate that it had a safety policy that was effectively enforced. View "Stark Excavating, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law