Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law

Wright retired after working 1982-2007 as a caseworker at the Peoria Field Office of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services after the Department ordered her to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation. The order was a response to an incident in which Wright’s comments to a child apparently caused an outbreak of violence at a unit in a psychiatric facility for children. Wright filed suit alleging, that the Department had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), by causing her constructive discharge. A jury found in favor of Wright on the ADA claim but awarded no compensatory damages. The district court granted the Department’s motion for a new trial. During the second trial, the court granted the department judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Wright had failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wright did not establish that the Department’s conduct communicated that her termination was imminent. View "Wright v. Ill. Dept. of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Miller began work as a technician at Polaris Laboratories in Indianapolis in 2009. About eight months later, Miller was fired for repeated failures to meet an average daily quota of 260 samples processed per day. Miller, who is African‐American, asserts that during her employment at Polaris she suffered from racial discrimination that had an effect on her work performance. Miller had complained to supervisors that she had been called “the colored girl’ and about other derogatory remarks. At one point, a supervisor refused to train or even talk to Miller. There was evidence that Miller was given more challenging work than others. She sued Polaris, contending that it violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted Polaris summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Miller established genuine issues of material fact on discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Miller v. Polaris Labs., LLC" on Justia Law

Barr was a tenure-track journalism professor at Western Illinois University from the fall of 2007 through the spring semester 2010, when the University declined to retain her for the next academic year. Barr contends that the decision was in retaliation for complaints she made in 2008 about racial discrimination at the school. In March she sued the University alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII. Service of this suit was never perfected. Weeks later, in June, Barr filed a second lawsuit, against the Board of Trustees, alleging that the decision not to renew her contract was retaliatory and the product of age discrimination. In the meantime, Barr’s first suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During discovery in the second case, the Board of Trustees learned of Barr’s prior lawsuit and raised res judicata as an affirmative defense. The district court rejected Barr’s arguments her first suit didn’t end in a judgment on the merits and the claims differed in the two cases and dismissed The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as an adjudication on the merits,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), and Barr’s two suits involved the same parties and core of operative facts. View "Barr v. Bd. of Tr. of W. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

Sweatt , an African-American male, worked for Union Pacific, performing manual labor jobs. After a few years, Sweatt experience pain in his shoulder and hands. It progressed to the point that Sweatt could no longer do his job. Sweatt sought a less strenuous position— Security Officer—through Union Pacific’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program. Sweatt did not get the job. Sweatt sued, alleging violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Seventh circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. Sweatt’s FELA claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to accrue before November 30, 2009, outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them time-barred. Regarding the failure to hire, the court noted that Sweatt was not forthcoming about an arrest incident during his interview for a position where honesty and integrity are paramount. View "Sweatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Timmermann’s sued its former employee, Pace, for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment, claiming that Pace had stolen merchandise and money from the company. Pace filed her answer and a counterclaim, then filed a separate action against Timmermann’s and individual employees, alleging that they had conspired to facilitate Pace’s false arrest and that, as a result, she had suffered severe and extreme emotional distress. Pace later moved to consolidate the actions. The court granted the motion with respect to discovery, but denied the motion with respect to trial and instructed Pace that she should request consolidation for trial after the close of discovery. During discovery, the court dismissed Pace’s action, concluding that her claims were actually compulsory counterclaims that should have been filed with her answer to the company’s complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that Pace’s claims against parties other than Timmermann’s were not compulsory counterclaims because FRCP 13 and 20, in combination, do not compel a litigant to join additional parties to bring what would otherwise be a compulsory counterclaim. Because Pace’s claim for abuse of process against Timmermann’s arose before the filing of her counterclaim, it was a mandatory counterclaim. View "Pace v. Timmermann's Ranch & Saddle Shop, Inc." on Justia Law

Silk began working in 1986 at Moraine Valley Community College as a part-time, non-tenure track, adjunct professor. Silk’s typical teaching load included four courses during fall and spring semesters and two or three summer classes. The College finalized written contracts with adjuncts just before the start of the semester. In March 2010, Silk agreed to teach two sociology courses during the summer term. In April, Silk took a medical leave of absence for heart surgery and did not inform the College of his anticipated return date. During visits to Silk’s classes to arrange for substitute instructors, administrators discovered problems with assignments, syllabi, and attendance. Administrators informed Silk that his summer classes had been reassigned. The dean met with Silk to discuss the issues with his classes. Silk was assigned two courses for the fall 2010 semester. Issues arose during a classroom observation by administrators. The dean instructed human resources to place Silk on the “do-not-hire list” and informed Silk that there would be no more classes for him. Silk’s students filed a complaint regarding Silk’s instruction. After his termination, Silk filed suit, alleging discrimination based on age and disability and retaliation for having filed an EEOC complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the College, except with respect to the fall 2010 semester, and remandedfor determination of whether the College reduced Silk’s course load because of perceived impairment. View "Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

CentiMark, a commercial roofer, hired Turnell as a laborer in 1978. In 1988 CentiMark promoted him to Chicago District Operations Manager. In his employment agreement, Turnell agreed to a non-disclosure provision and to restrictive covenants that prohibit “engag[ing] … in any Competing Business” during his employment and for two years afterward in any of the “regions and/or divisions and/or territories” in which he “operated” for CentiMark and “solicit[ing] the trade of, or trade with,” any of CentiMark’s “customers or suppliers, or prospective customers or suppliers” during his employment and for two years afterward. Turnell became Senior Vice President and Midwest Regional Manager. The company fired him in 2013, claiming that Turnell had misappropriated company resources and covered up fraudulent billing by his wife's company. Turnell claims the real reasons were his age, health issues, and high compensation. Turnell made little effort to find a job outside commercial roofing, but accepted an offer from Windward Roofing and contacted CentiMark customers. The court found Turnell’s covenants too broad, and entered a preliminary injunction, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, that “Turnell shall not sell, attempt to sell, or help sell any products or services, or any combination thereof, related to commercial roofing to any person or entity who was a customer of Centimark Corporation as of January 8, 2013 and who is located in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, or Wisconsin” and required CentiMark to post a $250,000 bond. View "Turnell v. Centimark Corp." on Justia Law

ManWeb, an Indianapolis engineering and installation company, entered into an asset purchase agreement with Tiernan, another Indianapolis electrical contractor. Unlike ManWeb, Tiernan was party to a collective bargaining agreement with a union, under which it contributed to a multiemployer pension fund. After the asset purchase, Tiernan ceased operations. Although ManWeb continued to do the same type of work in the jurisdiction, ManWeb did not make contributions. Counsel for the Plan sent a letter to Tiernan’s former address, stating that the company had effectuated a complete withdrawal from the Plan and, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, the Plan had assessed withdrawal liability against Tiernan of $661,978.00. The letter was forwarded to ManWeb’s address and signed for by a ManWeb employee. No payments were made, nor was review or arbitration requested, despite the availability of both under the statute. The Plan filed a collection action, adding ManWeb as a defendant under a theory of successor liability. The district court granted the Plan partial summary judgment, finding that Tiernanr had waived its right to dispute the assessment of withdrawal liability, but rejected the claim of successor liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed to allow the district court to address the successor liability continuity requirement. View "Tsareff v. Manweb Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Swanson resigned from the Village of Flossmoor’s police department after suffering two strokes in 2009, six weeks apart, the second of which left him unable to perform as a detective. Swanson claimed that the Village failed to reasonably accommodate him—in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act—upon his return to work from his first stroke by not permitting him to work exclusively at a desk. He also claimed that the Village violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against him on the basis of his race and national origin, citing instances in which Village employees made racially offensive comments to him during his employment. He claimed that the Village excluded him from criminal investigations after his first stroke and then contemplated the possibility of moving him out of the investigations division entirely after his second stroke. The district court granted the Village summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Title VII claims time-barred because Swanson failed to lodge a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days after the alleged discrimination and finding the ADA claim deficient in view of his doctor’s recommendation that Swanson work “part-time” following his first stroke. View "Swanson v. Village of Flossmoor" on Justia Law