Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kuttner began working as a DuPage County deputy sheriff in 1998. In an October 2009 complaint, Sheriff Zaruba asserted that, several months earlier, Kuttner, in uniform, visited the home of a person who owed money to her boyfriend. The debtor’s father had answered the door and told Kuttner that his son was not home. Kuttner left a business card listing her name and a company called “Team in Focus.” Kuttner stipulated to the facts and admitted to violating two rules: by “conduct unbecoming” an officer and improper wearing of the uniform. Other disciplinary charges were dropped. The Merit Commission determined that Kuttner’s conduct was serious enough to warrant discharge. The EEOC declined action. Kuttner sued, claiming sex discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) and alleging that Kuttner was fired and denied a promotion because of her sex and that the sheriff’s policies regarding jail staffing discriminated against female employees. Her lawyer sought the personnel files of more than 30 employees in an effort to find a “similarly situated” employee who was treated differently. The judge imposed limits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed those limits and summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Kuttner v. Zaruba" on Justia Law

Chaib worked for GEO Group, a private company that managed an Indiana correctional facility. In 2011-2012, Chaib filed several complaints of racism and workplace harassment with the human resources department and her supervisor. She was injured at work in March 2012, when a remotely-operated metal gate hit her head. Chaib suffered a concussion, GEO Group became suspicious that Chaib was malingering, had an investigator videotape her in public places, and sent the videos to a neurologist whom Chaib was scheduled to visit, ahead of the appointment and without Chaib’s knowledge. The neurologist opined to GEO Group that Chaib was likely malingering. Chaib returned to work after six weeks. She was ultimately fired for “unbecoming conduct” because she improperly extended her medical leave. Chaib sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e., and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, race, and national origin, and retaliation for her reports of workplace discrimination. Chaib also alleged, under Indiana law, that GEO Group had retaliated against her for filing a workers’ compensation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of GEO. Chaib did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that GEO Group terminated Chaib for discriminatory reasons View "Chaib v. Geo Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Child Services oversees state child protection services, child support enforcement, and the Indiana foster care system. For nine years, Nuñez and Martinez worked as investigators in the DCS Gary office. In 2014, they sued for violations of the overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a), claiming that DCS required them to work during lunch and to remain on call after their shifts, despite being paid for only 40 hours per week. The district court dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, rejecting an argument that Indiana had given consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. States must explicitly waive sovereign immunity, not explicitly preserve it. Indiana did not do so. View "Nunez v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs." on Justia Law

Hill and Roberts applied for firefighter positions with the Chicago Fire Department in 1995, but were not hired because of their scores on a pre-employment examination. They joined a class of roughly 6,000 similarly-situated applicants who argued that the hiring process had an unjustified adverse impact on African-American applicants. In 2011, the court ordered the city to hire 111 class members who were denied employment based on examination scores and to provide compensation to others. The court specified a hiring process with strict deadlines. In October 2011, plaintiffs were notified that they would need to complete a physical abilities test, a drug screening, and a background check. By January 5, 2012, both successfully completed these requirements. On February 22-23, they were notified—allegedly for the first time—that they also needed to pass a medical screening and received offers of employment conditioned on medical screening. Both men complied with the city’s requests concerning identified medical conditions, but they were not hired. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued right-to-sue letters. Their complaint alleged discrimination against Roberts because of his bronchitis and against Hill because of his asthma and past problems with a hernia and kidney stones. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that plaintiffs did not adequately allege violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. View "Hill v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Boss, an African-American engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 2002 to 2011, sued HUD under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging workplace discrimination; retaliation for a prior EEOC discrimination complaint; and hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Boss, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1, which requires a summary judgment movant to submit a statement of material facts consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with specific references to the record. The court’s discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been repeatedly upheld. Boss could not identify any fact that the court ignored that would have materially altered the Title VII analysis. The court noted that Boss’ arguments and evidence were impermissibly relied upon the conclusions of an ALJ who, in 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 EEOC complaint; the ALJ had no personal knowledge of this case. Boss failed to prove a materially adverse employment action. He was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but there was no evidence of comments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work environment. View "Boss v. Castro" on Justia Law

Beverly, a former Abbott employee whose employment was terminated on October 20, 2010, filed suit against Abbott. She alleged that during her employment, Abbott had discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her German nationality in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as on the basis of her disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court denied Abbott’s motion for summary judgment and the parties engaged in a private mediation. During mediation, the parties signed a handwritten agreement stating that Beverly demanded $210,000 and mediation costs in exchange for dismissing the lawsuit. Abbott later accepted Beverly’s demand and circulated a more formal settlement proposal. After Beverly refused to execute the draft proposal, Abbott moved to enforce the original handwritten agreement. The court found that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement and granted Abbott’s motion to enforce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the handwritten agreement was valid and enforceable, since its material terms were clearly conveyed and consented to by both parties, and the existence and content of the draft proposal do not affect enforceability. View "Beverly v. Abbott Labs., Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. Liu, an Asian woman, began working at Stroger Hospital in 1984. Liu says that, beginning in 2003, her supervisors sent a disproportionate number of her cases to review committees as compared to white male colleagues. In 2004, Liu treated a 19-year-old with appendicitis non-operatively and the patient suffered a heart attack, resulting in a clash between Liu and administration regarding her preference for non-operative treatment. After several incidents involving her refusal to conform to policy and to treat appendicitis surgically, her supervisor suspended Liu’s surgical privileges and limited her to “low complexity” cases. The Peer Review Committee investigated several cases and recommended that the suspension continue until Liu completed counseling, “with the goals of gaining insight into her problems, accepting responsibility.” The Executive Medical Staff concurred. in 2010, Liu was terminated because, during the proceedings, she accessed patient records to try to support her position, violating HIPAA and the Hospital System Privacy Policy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Liu’s claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) & 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Liu presented only sparse evidence of animus based on her race, sex, and national origin, none of it linked to the challenged decisions, and did not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the stated reasons for discipline were honest. View "Liu v. Cook County, Ill." on Justia Law

In 2012, Pierce began working as a Zoetis sales representative. Pierce had several unpleasant encounters with her supervisor, Heuchert, and others. Pierce complained about Heuchert’ to Human Resources, which she alleges, prompted retaliation. Zoetis’ human resources director initiated an investigation, after which all sales representatives were notified that their sales quotas were being adjusted. Pierce alleges that her quotas were adjusted upward more substantially than those of other employees. Pierce also attributes increased difficulty in receiving expense reimbursements to retaliation. In 2013, Pierce took time off for foot surgery. Around that same time, Human Resources informed Pierce that the investigation had concluded and that Heuchert would be disciplined. Pierce returned to work, but was fired three weeks later for failure to meet the increased sales goals. Pierce sued, alleging Indiana state-law claims of wrongful termination and tortious interference with a business relationship. The district court dismissed, citing Indiana’s employment at will doctrine and noting that Pierce failed to follow prerequisites for bringing suit under the Indiana Civil Rights Law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of the behavior Pierce identified in her complaint was taken within the scope of Heuchert’s duties as Pierce’s manager, and could not form the basis of a tortious interference claim. View "Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against USPS for employment discrimination based on race and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 and 2000e-3, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USPS and plaintiff appealed. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that USPS has waived any timeliness arguments with regard to the denial of the non-competitive transfer at issue. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination where another officer's better performance in an interview is unquestionably a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis to hire one candidate over another. The court also concluded that plaintiff has developed no independent age discrimination argument in either the district court or in this appeal supporting his ADEA claims. Furthermore, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails where, plaintiff failed to present any direct or circumstantial evidence that the filing of the EEO complaint was the cause of his direct supervisor's, Captain Williams, rejection of the doctor’s note. Alternatively, a reasonable jury could not find a causal connection between the filing of plaintiff's informal EEO complaint and the activity of Captain Williams, as plaintiff's proffered pattern does not support a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent. Finally, plaintiff's retaliation claim also fails under the indirect method of proof because plaintiff failed to proffer any employees who are similarly situated for comparison purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Formella v. Brennan" on Justia Law

After being terminated by Logansport when he was 61-years-old, plaintiff filed suit against the company under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted Logansport's motion for summary judgment. The ADEA defines “employer” as someone who has twenty or more employees for each working day, in each of twenty or more calendar weeks, in the calendar year of (or in the year preceding) the discriminatory act. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Logansport was not an "employer" under the ADEA because it did not have twenty or more employees. View "Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc." on Justia Law