Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In March 2009, Wheatley injured her foot at her home. During the months that followed, she was unable to work and saw several doctors. Her employer granted her leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) plus four additional weeks of leave, but informed her that if she could not return to work when that time period expired, her employment would be terminated. She claims she told her supervisor that she would be able to return to work wearing a walking boot, but the supervisor was doubtful that such an accommodation would be allowed because Wheatley needed to be able to climb a ladder to do her job. She applied for disability benefits and Aetna Insurance determined that she was totally disabled from her occupation. Wheatley then filed suit claiming violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. The evidence presented by Wheatley was insufficient to allow a jury to conclude that she could perform the essential duties of the position if permitted to wear the medical boot and forego the ladder duties. View "Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet" on Justia Law

Schal Bovis, a Chicago-area general contractor, was a party to collective bargaining agreement, 2005-2008, that created the Fringe Benefit Funds and limited Schal’s ability to subcontract work “coming within the jurisdictional claims of the Union” (carpenter’s work). Schal was required to get any non-union subcontractor to sign the Agreement, or to keep track of hours worked by the subcontractor and pay the Funds benefit contributions for those hours. The Agreement stated:“the Union agrees that it will not interfere with existing practices of other unions affiliated with the Building Trades.” The Funds filed suit under the Labor Management Relations Act,, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a), alleging that Schal failed to make fringe benefit payments for work performed by nonunion labor. The court granted summary judgment to the Funds then held a bench trial on damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment on two claims. A non-union subcontractor should be considered a single employer with a union signatory who performed the work, so that the Funds cannot claim benefits for the work performed in one claim. With respect to the second claim, the court held that the Agreement prevented the Union from claiming work which was the existing practice of other trade unions. View "Chicago Reg'l Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Schal Bovis, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, Calumet River Fleeting fired a boat operator. The Union, which represents operators in three states, filed a grievance. Calumet refused to participate in arbitration. In 2006, Calumet and the Union had signed a memorandum of agreement binding Calumet to the terms of the Great Lakes Floating Agreement, a collective bargaining agreement that covers marine construction. The agreement contained an “evergreen clause” requiring the employer to adhere to the terms of each successive edition of the agreement until the agreement was properly terminated. In September 2008, Calumet terminated its participation in the Floating Agreement, meaning that contractors who were signatories to the Agreement could no longer hire Calumet without violating the Agreement’s subcontracting provision. Less than two years later, Selvick (Calumet’s owner) organized a new company, Selvick Marine, which signed a memorandum of agreement with the Union. The district court granted summary judgment to Calumet, holding that it was no longer a party to any agreement with the Union that might have required arbitration. The Union appealed, arguing that an earlier arbitration award in an unrelated proceeding had found that Calumet was an alter ego of Selvick Marine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the alter ego argument. View "Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating​ Eng'rsi" on Justia Law

Epic Systems sent an email to employees, containing an arbitration agreement mandating that wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through individual arbitration and that the employees waived “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding.” The agreement included a clause stating that if the “Waiver of Class and Collective Claims” was unenforceable, “any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.” It stated that employees were “deemed to have accepted this Agreement” if they “continue[d] to work at Epic.”.The following day, Lewis, a “technical writer” at Epic, followed instructions for registering his agreement. Later, Lewis had a dispute with Epic, and sued Epic in federal court, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and Wisconsin law. Lewis responded that the arbitration clause interfered with employees’ right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection and was unenforceable. The district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, and is also unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1. View "Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

Twenty-year-veteran Deputy Yahnke supported the Sheriff’s opponent in a 2006 election. The prior Sheriff had approved Yahnke’s request to work as the part-time Maple Park police chief. After the new Sheriff took office, Yahnke was injured while working as a Deputy Sheriff and began receiving disability benefits. The Sheriff advised Yahnke that his secondary employment was suspended until he could return to work in the Sheriff’s office. At a party, Yahnke openly discussed running for the Sheriff’s position in 2010. Based on the Sheriff’s inquiry, the Illinois Attorney General concluded that secondary employment presented a potential conflict of interest. The Sheriff initiated an investigation, which concluded that Yahnke continued to work for Maple Park while his secondary employment was suspended. The Sheriff notified Yahnke that he was seeking his removal for cause. After the Sheriff terminated Yahnke’s employment, Yahnke sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the due process claim but vacated on the political affiliation count. A process existed for Yahnke to challenge his termination: a hearing before the Merit Commission or a grievance followed by arbitration The finder of fact could conclude that the Sheriff rejected lesser sanctions in favor of termination because Yahnke expressed a desire to run against the Sheriff, which is enough to defeat summary judgment. View "Yahnke v. County of Kane" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board determined that Polycon had violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5), by refusing to sign a collective bargaining agreement after agreeing to its terms because employees of Polycon were circulating a petition to decertify the union as their collective bargaining representative. The Seventh Circuit enforced its order, directing Polycon to sign the agreement and comply with its terms until it expires. The decertification petition may have been signed by a majority of the employees as early as May 9, and by May 22 clearly commanded a majority, but either date was too late for Polycon to repudiate a collective bargaining agreement to which the company had agreed on May 3. Polycon’s challenge bordered on the frivolous. Polycon could have asked for correction of any material mistakes before signing the contract but could not refuse to review and sign it because of the mere possibility that it contained a mistake. View "Polycon Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

From 2005-2009, Assaf was medical director for Trinitiy's epilepsy clinic. Trinity terminated his employment; Assaf filed suit. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in 2010,under which Assaf would be employed by Trinity from 2009 until at least 2011 as Director of the Neuroscience Program. The position never materialized. Assaf obtained summary judgment on his claim for breach of that settlement agreement. Assaf sought lost salary for the years in which he was to have been employed under the agreement, and lost professional fees during that time. The court rejected the claim for lost professional fees ,holding that Assaf failed to provide an adequate estimate of the loss, then entered judgment without trial awarding Assaf his salary for 2009-2011 and compensatory damages totaling $172,759 plus $15,000 in attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to professional fees. On remand, Assaf sought to establish that his professional fees from EEG video monitoring and follow‐up of epilepsy patients decreased as a result of Trinity’s failure to rehire him. The court used a verdict form asking the jury “Did Dr. Assaf prove that he sustained damages as explained in these instructions.“ The jury responded “No.” Judgment was entered for Trinity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Assaf had no valid claim to damages for lost professional fees, so any errors were harmless. View "Assaf v. Trinity Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Columbia hired Professor Roberts in 1999. Roberts achieved tenure in 2003 and began creating a custom textbook, with the help of a colleague and graduate students. Roberts worked with McGraw‐Hill and used materials from three existing textbooks plus limited original material. The cover page of the custom text states, “Peer review, class testing, and accuracy are primarily the responsibility of the author(s).” The first time Roberts saw the completed textbook was when he purchased it after his students for the 2004 fall semester arrived in class having purchased the textbook. Roberts then noticed several errors, such as omitting the reference to the text. Roberts called McGraw‐Hill, but did not follow up with details. He provided his students with a corrected reference page. Roberts and his colleagues did not use the custom text again due to the errors and its price. Roberts made no further efforts to ensure McGraw‐Hill corrected the omissions. Roberts updated his curriculum vitae twice, listing the text as his publication. In 2011, Roberts, then about 50 years old, had several conflicts with the department chair, which Roberts believed were based on age discrimination. After a plagiarism investigation, Roberts was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection, on summary judgment, of his claims of breach of contract and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. View "Roberts v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law

Central States is multiemployer pension fund. Bulk Transport is a Fund member and made contributions to the pension account of its employee, Loniewski. Bulk had certified that Loniewski was entitled by a collective bargaining agreement to participate in the Fund although the agreement was limited to Bulk’s drivers. Loniewski was a Bulk mechanic for 40 years. Bulk now denies that he was covered and has demanded that Central States refund $49,000 that Bulk had contributed to Loniewski’s pension account between 2002 and 2012. The Fund denied the request and sought a declaratory judgment. The district judge rejected Bulk’s claim. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 amends ERISA by imposing liabilty on employers who withdraw, partially or completely, from participation in an underfunded multiemployer pension fund, 29 U.S.C. 1381. Central States also assessed Bulk with withdrawal liability of $740,000 for the years 2010 through 2012, which Bulk challenged as excessive. At Bulk’s request, the court barred the Fund from enforcing its rules, which require arbitration of such a dispute by and conforming to the procedures of the American Arbitration Association. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the refund, but reversed with respect to the arbitration rules. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Pension Funds v. Bulk Transp. Corp." on Justia Law

Wells worked as a “computer navigator” at the Winnebago County courthouse, helping pro se litigants deal with the judicial system’s requirements. She claimed that before her departure to take a better job, state and county officials discriminated against her on the basis of her race (she is black) and disability (chronic fatigue syndrome). The district court granted summary judgment to the county, finding any discrimination attributable to state workers and that the record would not allow a reasonable jury to find actionable discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Evidence would permit a jury to find that Winnebago County was Wells’s employer, the entity responsible for complying with federal employment discrimination statutes, regardless of the identity of the person whose acts are complained of, but Wells was treated the same as the other computer navigators, who were white. She did not contend that any supervisor said anything about race or used language with racial connotations. Time off had been granted as an accommodation of her disability and Wells did not substantiate the medical need for any additional accommodation. View "Wells v. Winnebago County" on Justia Law