Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an employee of Costco Wholesale Corporation, made two requests for a medical leave under the FMLA. Costco granted both requests. During that time, Plaintiff was demoted from optical manager to cashier. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Costco and Gail Hinds, his supervisor, alleging retaliation and interference, both in violation of the FMLA, and discrimination based upon a disability and failure to accommodate, both in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s causes of action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1; (2) properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s FLMA retaliation and interference claims; and (3) properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim. Lastly, Plaintiff waived any arguments with regard to disparate treatment. View "Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is black, filed a complaint against the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) in federal court, alleging that the CTA fired him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The CTA responded that Plaintiff was fired because he violated CTA’s policy against sexual harassment. The district court granted the CTA’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to create a triable issue under either the direct or indirect methods of proving unlawful discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s case failed under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. View "Smith v. Chicago Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Hooper, a family practice physician, was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2000. He must regularly see a psychologist to maintain his Illinois medical license. In 2009, Proctor hired Hooper to work in its Peoria outpatient clinics. In 2010 Hooper revealed his bipolar disorder for the first time to Proctor and inquired about Proctor’s long term disability benefit. Hooper had experienced an incident and believed he needed time off. He was granted immediate paid medical leave. Hooper determined he was not eligible for long term disability, because his condition was preexisting. Hooper did not return to work after he was cleared by a psychiatrist, repeatedly told that the psychiatrist had cleared him, and warned that if he did not contact Proctor by a certain date regarding his return, he would be fired. His employment was terminated. Hooper sued Proctor under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Proctor. Hooper’s complaint failed to mention any facts to put Proctor on notice that he was pursuing a failure to accommodate claim, which would fail even when considered on the merits because Hooper did not require accommodations. Hooper failed to create an issue of fact that would raise an inference of disability discrimination. View "Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of electrical workers, claimed that their respective employers, in collusion with Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority (MPEA, which used electricians supplied by the employers) wrongfully terminated them, in violation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and federal labor law and circumvented the CBA-mandated hiring process and that their union, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, failed to adequately represent them in the CBA-mandated grievance process. The district court denied motions to dismiss four counts, but dismissed a declaratory judgment motion against MPEA and two employers, and the claim of state law tortious interference with contracts against MPEA. The district court held that, as a political subdivision, MPEA is not an “employer” under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 185. Plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of the tortious interference claim against MPEA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that jurisdiction was created by the need to interpret the CBA. With respect to political subdivisions, section 301 preempts not only claims “founded directly” on the collective bargaining agreement, but also state law claims that indirectly implicate a collective bargaining agreement. View "Healy v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth." on Justia Law

In 2000, Huri began working at the Circuit Court of Cook County. Her manner of dress marked her as a follower of Islam. Huri is from Saudi Arabia. From 2002-2010, she worked as a child care attendant—the only one who was an Arab, and the only one who was a Muslim— under McCullum, a devout (and allegedly vocal) Christian. Huri filed internal complaints regarding McCullum’s behavior. McCullum became aware of those complaints and told Huri that the Chief Judge’s Office was uninterested in — and tired of—Huri’s complaints. McCullum apparently complained about Huri. In2010, Huri was transferred to the Court Reporters’ Office, where, Huri alleges, she was also treated badly and subject to retaliation for filing Equal Employment Opportunity complaints. The district court dismissed Huri’s suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Seventh CIrcuit reversed, concluding that Huri had stated a claim of hostile work environment and that Huri’s superiors were not protected by qualified immunity. View "Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge, Cook County" on Justia Law

In 1995 Barrett began work at the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) as an account technician. IDOC employees can be fired if they accumulate 12 unauthorized absences from work; unauthorized absences accrue on an employee’s record but are automatically expunged if the employee has a clean attendance history for a period of 24 consecutive months. Barrett was fired in 2010 after accumulating 12 unauthorized absences over a period of seven years. She claims that three of these absences (in 2003, 2004, and 2005) were for family or medical care and were protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. In 2012 she sued IDOC for violating her rights under the FMLA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that the suit was time-barred. An FMLA suit must be filed “not later than 2 years after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought.” The alleged FMLA violations occurred, and the limitations period began to run, when IDOC denied Barrett’s requests for leave and classified the three contested absences as unauthorized—not, as she claimed, when she was fired years later as a consequence of her overall attendance record. View "Barrett v. Ill. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Woods told a coworker at the Berwyn Fire Department that “he wanted to kill somebody, all of them” and that his children were going to “go over there” and “tune them up,” referring to his coworkers and superiors. Chief O’Halloran looked into the statements and eventually recommended termination. A three-member panel for the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners conducted a hearing. Woods was represented by counsel, who gave opening and closing statements, put on witnesses, cross-examined others, made and won objections, and presented exhibits. After the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Woods based largely on the testimony of the co-worker to whom Woods made the statement. Woods filed suit asserting discrimination and unlawful retaliation and attempted to proceed under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, which applies in employment discrimination cases when a biased subordinate (O’Halloran) who lacks decision-making power uses the formal decision-maker (the Board) as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Woods’s claims, noting the full and independent evidentiary hearing and the Board’s almost complete reliance on the co-worker’s testimony. View "Woods v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law

Arroyo worked as a Volvo material handler, 2005-2011. Arroyo was a member of the U.S. Army Reserve. She deployed twice to Iraq and Kuwait: 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 and took leave for training and other military activities. She received more than 900 days of military leave from Volvo. There is evidence, including internal emails, suggesting that her supervisors were frustrated from the beginning about her absences. After her 2009-2010 deployment Arroyo declined a voluntary severance package and returned to work. Arroyo was diagnosed with PTSD. Arroyo took three months FMLA and disability leave. Volvo granted accommodations, including: a quiet place to meditate; a mentor; time off for counseling; and breaks and support during anxiety attacks. Other requested accommodations—a more flexible schedule, use of earplugs or headphones in both ears, day-to-day guidance, putting all communications in writing, and disability awareness training—were under review when she was terminated for violation of Volvo’s attendance policy. The district court rejected her claims for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 , and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to discrimination claims under USERRA and the ADA, stating that Arroyo raised genuine, material factual issues. View "Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

Caterpillar bought a South Milwaukee factory that manufactures strip-mining equipment and became the employer party to a collective-bargaining agreement with a United Steelworkers local union. Two months later, a crane operator (a member of the bargaining unit) was killed when a 36-ton crawler crushed him after shifting while being rotated by the crane. He had been lying underneath the crawler to unhook chains attaching it to the crane. Police officers, OSHA agents, company executives, and local union officials, converged within hours on the accident scene. The local union’s officials were not safety specialists. The president of the local union informed Caterpillar’s regional manager that a member of the national union’s emergency response team would come to inspect the accident site. The manager promised to cooperate but changed his mind and, the next day, refused to allow the union investigator to enter the factory. The company stated that because it was cooperating with the police and with OSHA, no further investigation was warranted. The Seventh Circuit enforced the National Labor Relations Board’s order requiring Caterpillar to allow the union’s investigator access to the site. The materials shown the investigator were not an adequate substitute for on-site investigation, and the investigation itself would impose trivial costs on the company. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law

Boutros worked for Avis Rent A Car as a courtesy bus driver at O’Hare Airport. He had worked for Avis before a short stint in the military. After he was honorably discharged for unsatisfactory performance, Avis did not want to rehire him, but did so. One night in May 2008, Boutros informed his supervisor that the fire extinguisher on his bus inexplicably discharged, spraying fire retardant near the driver’s seat. He reported no injury at the time, but the next morning he claimed that chemicals from the discharge had harmed him. Avis launched an investigation and eventually fired Boutros for dishonesty and insubordination in connection with his shifting accounts of the fire-extinguisher accident. Boutros sued, claiming that Avis fired him because of his race and subjected him to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. A jury rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the appeal was frivolous and issuing an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules. View "Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC" on Justia Law