Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Southern Illinois University (SIU) hired Dr. Hatcher as an assistant professor of political science. In 2010 Hatcher assisted a graduate student in making a sexual harassment complaint about a faculty member. Hatcher was up for tenure and promotion to associate professor in 2011. Hatcher had received positive annual evaluations. Her external reviewers all recommended tenure.The political science department voted in favor of promotion and tenure. The College of Liberal Arts committee voted 5‐4 in favor of tenure and 5‐4 against promotion, noting Hatcher’s success in teaching and service, but expressing concern about her lack of academic publications in prestigious journals. The dean recommended that she receive neither tenure nor promotion. The provost agreed. Hatcher was denied tenure and, later, fired. Two male professors in Hatcher’s department were promoted and awarded tenure. The Review Board found that the provost did not sufficiently explain his decision; the Chancellor agreed, but declined to reverse the denial. Hatcher filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Her subsequent suit was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Hatcher did not produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that SIU was lying about its reason for denying her tenure; she was not engaging in speech protected under Title VII or by the First Amendment when she assisted the student with the sexual harassment report. The court reversed dismissal of her claim of retaliation for filing a charge with the EEOC. View "Hatcher v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

In 1994, Shott, a tenured associate professor of biostatistics at Rush University, sued, claiming discrimination by refusing to make reasonable accommodations for her religion (Orthodox Judaism) and disability (rheumatoid arthritis). A jury rejected Shott’s claim of religious discrimination but awarded her $60,000 for disability discrimination. She sued Rush again in 2011, alleging that Rush refused to increase her salary or promote her in retaliation for her earlier lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Rush. While that lawsuit was pending, Shott sued Katz (42 U.S.C. 1981), whom she had occasionally helped with statistical analysis, alleging that, in retaliation for her litigation Katz impeded her career advancement by rebuffing her invitations to collaborate. Katz was also Shott’s treating rheumatologist; she claimed he failed to timely respond to requests for prescription refills, requiring her to have an examination every six months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that Shott had not alleged that Katz’s medical care affected Shott's employment. Nor did the examination requirement amount to a material adverse action. “If she was not willing to comply with that obviously reasonable condition, she should have tried to find a new doctor, not filed a federal civil rights lawsuit.” Shott failed to allege a sufficient “nexus” between Katz’s refusal to collaborate and her career advancement; Katz’s decisions about what research to pursue, and with whom, are protected by the First Amendment. View "Shott v. Katz" on Justia Law

In 2011, Horning won the subcontract for roofing work at the Dayton Veterans Affairs Medical Center. The Davis‐Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. 3141–43, requires contractors who perform construction for the federal government to pay their workers the “prevailing wage.” Department of Labor regulations at that time set the base rate for a Dayton Sheet Metal Worker at $26.41 per hour; the fringe benefit rate was another $16.82 an hour. The workers were properly classified and received the appropriate base rate. All employees who work at Horning for more than 90 days are eligible for insurance; some receive vacation days. After a year, they become eligible for matching contributions to a 401(k) account. Accountants advised Horning about the amount to deposit into its benefits trust to comply with ERISA and Davis‐Bacon. Horning deducted a flat hourly fee from the paycheck of each Medical Center worker, regardless of whether the employee was eligible for any benefits. The amount did not correspond to the actual monetary value of the benefits each individual employee received. The Union filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729–3733, rather than filing under Davis-Bacon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Horning. Under the False Claims Act, the Union had to show that Horning knowingly made false statements (or misleading omissions) that were material to the government’s payment decision. The Union did not proffer enough evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Horning acted with such knowledge. View "Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. v. Horning Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Felix suffers from mental health disabilities, including PTSD, major depressive disorder, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and phobia. She takes prescribed medication and attends counseling. Felix was employed from 1998 to 2013 in the Appleton Division of Motor Vehicles customer service facility, administering road tests, performing clerical duties, and collecting fees. She “was punctual, reliable, friendly with customers, and patient with new drivers.” She excelled in administering road tests, but did not meet expectations in financial accountability. A 2011 rule change precluded an overall rating of satisfactory if the employee did not meet expectations in specified areas, including financial accountability. Felix was given an overall evaluation of unsatisfactory and was placed on probation. Her difficulties persisted. Her employer's procedures called for a final performance improvement plan which, if not completed successfully, would result in her discharge. Felix began to experience panic attacks and notified her supervisor of her anxiety disorders. One panic attack included hysterical screaming and self-harm. Her co-workers called 911. She did not return to work. An independent medical examiner concluded that she “remains at increased risk for potentially violent behavior toward self and others within the workplace.” Her employment was terminated. She sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Felix, reasoning that she was discharged not solely because of her disabilities but based on workplace behavior that indicated that she posed a safety risk to herself and others. View "Felix v. Wis. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

William Charles Construction (WCC) entered into a labor agreement with the Illinois Department of Transportation for the “Biggsville” construction project to expand a section of Rt. 34 to four lanes. A jurisdictional dispute between two unions, each claiming the right for their member drivers to operate large trucks involved in the excavation work, was resolved by an arbitrator. Later, a Joint Grievance Committee (JGC) determined, under a subordinated collective bargaining agreement, that WCC owed the Teamsters back pay and fringe benefit contributions ($1.4 million) for having assigned the operation of heavy trucks to the International Union of Operating Engineers rather than the Teamsters. A second JGC award determined that WCC was liable for two days’ back pay for having assigned work to two Teamsters in violation of other Teamsters’ seniority rights. WCC filed a declaratory action under the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185. The court granted the Teamsters summary judgment, finding that WCC filed its complaint outside the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to the Teamsters and dismissed the Teamsters’ counterclaim for enforcement of one of the JGC awards. WCC's challenge to the awards is not barred by the statute of limitations because WCC did not receive notice of their final entry. The greater of the two JGC awards is void because WCC did not agree to arbitration by the JGC. View "William Charles Constr. Co., LLC v. Teamsters Local Union 627" on Justia Law

Simpson, a registered nurse, began working at St. James Health in 2008 and was not reprimanded until after 2009 when Kelly, a Caucasian woman, became the manager of Simpson’s department. From October 2010 through September 2011 Kelly disciplined Simpson four times. The discipline was progressive. The fourth incident resulted in termination of Simpson’s employment. After the EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter, Simpson filed suit, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The employer claimed that she had not been performing up to expectations and could not identify a similarly situated co-worker who was treated more favorably, noting that Simpson was not disputing the existence of the complaints from patients and their families. The district court granted St. James summary judgment, reasoning that Simpson had established a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method, but lacked evidence that the explanation for firing her was pretextual. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Simpson did not even establish a prima facie case of discrimination, let alone that the proffered explanation was pretextual. View "Simpson v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

During his 28 years at the City of Anderson Transit System (CATS), Brown developed diabetes and became unable to maintain his commercial driver’s license (CDL). He was then working as a dispatcher, which did not require a CDL. Brown was active in the Democratic Party. In 2004, the city elected Mayor Smith, a Republican, and Brown was demoted to the position of mechanic’s helper. Although possession of a CDL was listed in the job description, CATS granted Brown an accommodation. Years later, when Smith was defeated by a Democrat, Brown was promoted to a street‐supervisor position. Possession of a CDL was listed in the job description. His supervisors were aware of his inability to obtain a CDL when they promoted him. Brown worked as a street supervisor until he was fired in 2012—shortly after Smith was reelected--due to Brown's inability to “obtain CDL.” In a suit alleging disability discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), a jury awarded Brown damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The essential‐function issue is a factual question that was properly put before the jury, and the jury instructions, that it could consider “the amount of time spent on the job performing the function in question,” were consistent with federal regulations and precedent. View "Brown v. Smith" on Justia Law

Baptist began working at Ford’s assembly plant, operating a forklift. Less than three months later, Baptist inadvertently hit a pillar, injuring his left wrist. He visited Ford’s medical department and submitted an injury report. An investigator and Ford’s physician doubted Baptist’s account of his injury; Baptist did not report the incident properly and refused to release medical records from a prior workers’ compensation case against another employer involving an injury to his other wrist. Ford paid for Baptist’s initial visit to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Heller. The parties are litigating Baptist’s workers’ compensation claim. After working two months, Baptist again sought medical attention. Dr. Heller diagnosed him with a complete ligament tear, recommended surgery, indicated that Baptist was not able to perform the essential function of his job, and cleared him to return to work if he did not lift or grip over five pounds with his left hand. Disagreeing with Ford's doctor, Baptist believed that this prevented him from operating the forklift and asked for another position. He did not work for several days. Ford suspended him for one month. When Baptist returned, he was told that the only available work was as a forklift driver. Baptist later testified that he was told that he would be fired unless he agreed to state that his injury did not happen at work. The company denied this assertion. Baptist was discharged for having three consecutive absences without justification. In a suit alleging retaliation for exercising his workers’ compensation rights, the court granted Ford summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A triable issue exists regarding whether Baptist was put to the impracticable choice between keeping his job or giving up a key argument for workers’ compensation. View "James Baptist v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

In 2009, a growth was discovered on Venita’s pancreas. She was told that cancer could not be ruled out without further testing. She told her supervisor, Linda. Because Venita did not have health insurance and needed money for the testing and other medical care, she asked if she could forgo taking a vacation and receive extra pay instead. Linda agreed. During the following week, Venita was scheduled for jury duty, but called in sick. She did not go to work or jury service. One week later, Linda fired Venita. The employer claimed that Venita had pretended she was at jury duty,, so that she would get paid for the week (she had used all of her paid sick days for the year). Another employee reported seeing Venita around town. Venita sued, claiming she was fired because Linda thought she had a disability. A jury disagreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument the trial judge abused his discretion by excluding evidence from Venita’s diary, indicating that Linda had given her the week off, and challenges to rulings concerning her multiple attempts to impeach Linda’s trial testimony about messages and conversations between Venita and Linda. View "Miller v. GreenLeaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C." on Justia Law

McCurdy, a Williamson County Sheriff’s Department patrol deputy, applied for a job with the Southern Illinois Enforcement Group, which investigates drug crimes. She was selected, subject to a background check. While that check was conducted, she remained in her deputy’s post. Agent Braddy, who conducted the check, recommended that she not be hired after discovering that McCurdy had recently filed for bankruptcy and was in a long-term relationship with Mohring, who belonged to a biker gang associated with criminal activity. The Group had previously hired a male who was in financial difficulty and had some criminal associates; he was fired for stealing drugs and money from the unit. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, McCurdy alleged that she would have been promoted immediately had she been a man and that the Group gave her more scrutiny than it does male applicants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting McCurdy’s hiring theory, but vacated with respect to her delay theory. Agent Braddy testified that she investigated McCurdy exactly the same way as she investigates other applicants. Employers are entitled to learn from their errors. Braddy’s findings constituted sex-neutral reasons for not hiring McCurdy. The district court did not resolve disputes concerning the delay theory. View "McCurdy v. Fitts" on Justia Law