Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, current and former Chicago taxi drivers, paid a “shift fee,” a lease payment that allows the driver to operate one of the defendants’ taxis and earn income. Weekly fees range from $500 to $800 or more. Drivers also pay operating expenses, including fuel, airport taxes, upkeep, and sometimes insurance payments. The drivers do not earn traditional wages or overtime pay. Their only source of income is what they make in fares and tips from passengers. The drivers contend that they often receive less than minimum wage and for some shifts, pay more for fees and expenses than they receive from fares and tips. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of their class action suit under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115 and asserting unjust enrichment. The Act defines “wages” as compensation owed by the employer pursuant to an employment agreement between the parties. Even if the drivers were employees under an employment agreement, that agreement did not obligate defendants to compensate the drivers. The Act provides no substantive relief beyond what the underlying employment contract requires. View "Enger v. Chicago Carriage Cab Corp." on Justia Law

Tate filed suit pro se, claiming that his former employer, which provides non‐emergency medical transportation, discriminated against him and then having retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). The court dismissed, without allowing amendment, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a complaint seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The judge stated that Tate’s complaint contained “little more than conclusory legal jargon.’” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiff was not required to plead more elaborately, except with regard to his claim of disability discrimination. Tate used a complaint form supplied by the district court. The form does not require, nor permit, extensive factual detail; it provides six lines for listing facts. Plaintiff’s only seriously deficient allegation concerns the disability, which is not named or otherwise identified. The court dismissed the suit before expiration of the 21‐day period during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint without the court’s approval. The judge should not only have complied with the rule; he should have told the plaintiff what is required to allege disability discrimination. View "Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., Inc" on Justia Law

Carothers, an African-American woman, was hired by Cook County Juvenile Detention Center (JDC) in 2005 as an Administrative Assistant-Hearing Officer, inputting data and creating reports, and serving as a hearing officer for juvenile detainee grievances. In 2009, Carothers had a physical altercation with a detainee during a riot. Carothers injured her hands, went on a leave of absence, and obtained a worker’s compensation settlement. HR acknowledged that Carothers had been released to return with a restriction precluding her from interacting with the detainees, which her job required, and suggested that Carothers review available positions. Carothers replied that she could not find a position that accommodated her restriction. HR replied that she should apply for disability benefits. In March, 2010, Carothers returned to her job. She had to be taken from work in an ambulance following Physical Restraint Techniques training and Deescalation training. In 2011, HR submitted a “Disciplinary Recommendation” because Carothers refused to file for disability and could not obtain a release to return to full duty. A Hearing Officer recommended discharge due to more than 10 unauthorized absences, and failure to follow instructions. The JDC discharged Carothers, who sued, alleging that she had developed an anxiety disorder and that termination constituted discrimination on account of disability, race, and sex, and retaliation for her EEOC claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Carothers v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

In 2012, the National Labor Relations Board found that Big Ridge violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158, by threatening employees with mine closure and job loss based on their support of the union and discharging employee Waller because of his union support. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, finding that the Board lacked a quorum because three of the Board’s five members were improperly appointed under the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In 2014, a validly constituted Board considered the case anew and again found that Big Ridge violated the Act. The Seventh Circuit denied Big Ridge’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order, holding hold that the Board had jurisdiction to consider the case anew with a properly constituted Board. The Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in Waller’s discharge; Big Ridge has not met its burden to show that it would have discharged Waller despite his union activities. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Big Ridge, Inc." on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an enforcement action under Section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐6, claiming that CVS Pharmacy violates Title VII by offering a severance agreement, with waivers of claims against CVS, that could deter terminated employees from filing charges with the EEOC or participating in EEOC proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment for CVS, interpreting Title VII as requiring the EEOC to conciliate its claim before bringing a civil suit. The EEOC had refused to engage in conciliation. The court was also skeptical that an employer’s decision to offer a severance agreement to terminated employees could serve as the basis for a “pattern or practice” suit under Title VII, without any allegation that the employer engaged in retaliatory or discriminatory employment practices. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Section 707(e), the EEOC is required to comply with all of the pre‐suit procedures contained in Section 706 when it pursues “pattern or practice” violations. Because the EEOC has not alleged that CVS engaged in discrimination or retaliation by offering the Agreement to terminated employees, the EEOC failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Woodward employees, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Woodward falsely certified helicopter engine parts that it sold to the government. Plaintiffs had complained that the sensors at issue did not meet quality standards and had refused to work on the order. Following an investigation, a Defense Contract Management Agency Technical Specialist concluded that there was “nothing either incorrect or wrong with the procedures, assembly, or testing of the sensors.” The government continues to order, pay for, and use Woodward’s sensor The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Woodward, agreeing that even if Woodward made false statements to the government, no reasonable jury could find that it made the statements knowingly or that the statements were material. View "Marshall v. Woodward, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for United Airlines as a ramp serviceman at O’Hare International Airport. Plaintiff twice injured his back at work. When he returned for the second time, he had several permanent work restrictions. United subsequently assigned Plaintiff to the Matrix position as part of the Product Sort work area. United later placed Plaintiff on extended illness status. Plaintiff filed suit against United for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Thereafter, Plaintiff returned to work for United in the Matrix position. Plaintiff then waived his retaliation claim and focused instead on whether United discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of United. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that United did not fail to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. View "Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired from her employment with the Fox Valley Workforce Development Board, Inc., a state job-training agency serving central Wisconsin with funding from the federal government. Approximately two years later, Plaintiff filed a qui tam action alleging that the Board violated the False Claims Act by improperly contracting services through a subsidiary corporation. Plaintiff also alleged that the Board fired her in retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Board, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims lacked factual support. Plaintiff appealed. The Seventh Circuit (1) dismissed the qui tam claim for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the qui tam action was based on publicly disclosed information and was therefore barred by the Act; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed on the merits. View "Ziebell v. Fox Valley Workforce Dev. Bd., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an occasional employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), filed an administrative claim of discrimination on the basis of her race, age, and sex. While the suit began as an administrative proceeding within the DHS, it molted into a judicial proceeding. Both the lawsuit and the administrative proceeding were based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The federal district court granted DHS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by failing to amend her original administrative complaint to add her retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s suit because it was the fault of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that the retaliation claim did not become part of the original case. Remanded. View "Moreland v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Mathew Neisler worked as a stockman in food service during his incarceration at the Waupun Correctional Institution. Three months after Neisler suffered work-related injury, he was fired for “medical” reasons. Neisler filed suit against defendant prison administrators, alleging that he had been fired because of a disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Defendants filed motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Neisler was not entitled to pursue an employment-discrimination claim under Title II. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Title II of the ADA covered Neisler’s claim but that no rational finder of fact could find disability discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Title II does not apply to a prisoner’s claim of employment discrimination in a prison job. View "Neisler v. Tuckwell" on Justia Law