Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hillmann began working for the Chicago Parks District in 1973. Later he became a Department of Streets and Sanitation truck driver. In 1984 he developed cervical radiculopathy, a work-related injury. In 1995 he entered into an accommodation agreement with the city and was reassigned as chief timekeeper. He never performed all of the duties required by the job description, but he performed the essential functions and other tasks as directed by his supervisor. In 2000 a new supervisor gave Hillmann duties that required use of his injured arm.. Hillmann experienced various difficulties until his position was eliminated in 2002, in a city-wide reduction in forces. He sued, alleging that he was targeted because he asserted his rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. A jury found in Hillmann’s favor on the IWCA claim and awarded damages. The judge rejected the ADA claim. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city; neither claim should have been tried. To prevail on his claim that he was discharged for exercising his rights under the IWCA, Hillmann needed to prove causation. No evidence suggests that the RIF decision-maker knew about Hillmann’s claim. The ADA claim likewise fails for lack of proof of causation. Hillmann has no evidence that the city withheld raises or targeted him for the RIF based on his ADA accommodation. View "Hillmann v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Union erected a giant inflatable rat and an inflatable fat cat during a labor dispute in Grand Chute, Wisconsin. Both are staked to the ground in the highway median, to prevent the wind from blowing them away. Grand Chute forbids private signs on the public way and defines signs to mean “[a]ny structure, part thereof, or device attached thereto” that conveys a message. The Union removed them at the town's request and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the First Amendment. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and, a year later, granted the town summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the case may be moot because the construction that led to the use of demonstrative inflatables was complete; the Union was no longer picketing. The court also noted that the town amended its code and changed the definition of a sign. If the Union persists in seeking damages, the district court must weigh the probability of a fresh dispute between this union and Grand Chute and the risk that it would be over too quickly to allow judicial review to apply the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine and must address the validity of current ordinances, rather than one that was changed before the final judgment. View "Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Local Union v. Town of Grand Chute" on Justia Law

Rupcich was fired from her job of 25 years at a Jewel Food Store in 2012 for wheeling a 25-pound bag of birdseed in a grocery cart past the last cash register without paying for it. Rupcich said that she wheeled the birdseed past the last cash register by accident, as she rushed home to care for her sick grandson after her shift ended. Jewel claimed to define “misappropriation” and theft to be strict liability violations that do not require a showing of intent. Her union decided not to dispute Rupcich’s termination with Jewel in arbitration or even process it through the collectively bargained grievance procedure. Local 881 abandoned her case because Rupcich admitted she took the bag of birdseed past the last cash register in her store without paying for it, despite substantial evidence that Rupcich had made an inadvertent mistake. The district court granted Local 881 summary judgment on breach of fair duty of representation and breach of contract claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a reasonable juror could determine that Local 881’s actions were arbitrary and outside the “wide range of reasonableness” afforded unions in the grievance process, View "Rupcich v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Riano was a hospital corpsman in the Navy. As a civilian, he became a registered nurse. In 2004 he began working as a registered nurse for the Veterans Health Administration, While examining male patients for genital warts, Riano manipulated their penises with his hands, attempting to induce erections. He used words like “pecker” and “balls,” rather than medical terms. The agency found his examination technique and his language to be inappropriate. His employment was terminated. He appealed and was given a hearing that included representation by counsel, live testimony from medical experts, written testimony from patients, and a written report from an investigator who had interviewed the patients. The appeals board affirmed his termination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Riano’s argument that he was not allowed to call patients to testify live to show that some patients were comfortable with his technique and language or that complaining patients had ulterior motives. The board’s decision to affirm Riano’s termination was based on its determination that his technique and language were inappropriate. That was a professional judgment that did not turn on the patients’ subjective views. View "Riano v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Amglo’s President, Christian, visited Amglo’s Illinois facility. Employees complained to her and to the Illinois manager, Czajkowska, about low wages. Christian stated that Amglo would not raise wages. The next morning, the 94 employees went on strike and asked to speak to Amglo’s owner. Christian responded: “He will tell us to get rid of half of you.” Czajkowska offered resignation forms and stated that they could quit. Christian explained that companies can move production to China and Mexico (where Amglo had plants). The next morning, Christian and Czajkowska ordered employees to return to work or get off the company’s property. Several employees returned to work, with no raise. Weeks later, the 50 striking employees signed an unconditional offer to return to work without a raise. Christian said that she could not say how many would be recalled; Amglo was transferring work to Mexico “because of the situation.” Amglo soon recalled all but 22 employees, telling those people that there were no jobs available, but, if jobs opened, they would be recalled before any new hiring. The NLRB charged Amglo with unfair labor practices by threatening to fire employees for striking and transferring work in retaliation for the strike. The Board ordered Amglo to return the transferred work to Illinois, to offer full reinstatement, and to make employees whole for earnings and benefits lost because of the transfer. The Seventh Circuit enforced the order as supported by substantial evidence. View "Amglo Kemlite Labs., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Teledyne terminated Shekar’s employment; 10 days later Teledyne sought injunctive relief, alleging that Shekar had accessed or attempted to access Teledyne’s servers, containing confidential information. There was a large data transfer between a Teledyne server and Shekar’s laptop computer on the day he was terminated. Before his termination, Shekar emailed Teledyne’s confidential information to his personal email addresses and saved it on his computers. Shekar refused to return electronic equipment provided by Teledyne for Shekar’s use at home. Teledyne asserted violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The district court issued a temporary restraining order requiring Shekar to return Teledyne’s electronic information and equipment and later granted Teledyne’a preliminary injunction, noting Shekar’s failure to comply with the TRO. The injunction required Shekar to provide “unrestricted access” to all of his devices that were capable of storing electronic information. The court later found Shekar in contempt for not producing several devices, not accounting for Teledyne’s electronic information, and not providing complete and truthful answers to interrogatories. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over Shekar’s appeal of his motion to vacate the preliminary injunction, which the court characterized as a “belated appeal” of the preliminary injunction. Since Shekar cannot appeal the preliminary injunction, he cannot appeal the contempt order while the underlying litigation remains pending. View "Teledyne Techs. Inc. v. Shekar" on Justia Law

Hively began teaching as a part‐time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech in 2000. In 2013, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that she had been “discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation” as she had been “blocked from fulltime [sic] employment without just cause.” After exhausting the procedural requirements in the EEOC, she filed suit, pro se, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Title VII). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title VII does not apply to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. The court relied on precedent, but acknowledged the EEOC’s criticism of its position and that “It seems unlikely that our society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted, passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on who they date, love, or marry.” View "Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Elkhart Community Schools (ECS), has employed Riley, an African‐American female, as a teacher since 1980. She has an administrator’s license and is pursuing her doctorate in education. In 2010, she was named the ECS Teacher of the Year. From 2005-2013, Riley unsuccessfully applied for 12 different administrative positions with ECS. Riley filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge, claiming that race, sex, and age discrimination were the reasons that ECS had not promoted her. The EEOC sent Riley a right to sue letter. Riley filed suit, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for ECS on all counts, dismissing some claims on procedural grounds, and dismissing the remaining claims because Riley had failed to produce sufficient evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Of the positions for which action was not time-barred, one was given to an African-American woman; Riley did not apply for two; and one position was a lateral move so that Riley did not suffer an adverse employment action. Riley did not produce evidence of pretext with respect to other positions. ECS produced the list of factors that the screening committee considered in recommending candidates. View "Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Schs." on Justia Law

Since 2004, Poullard, an African-American man, has worked at the North Chicago Veterans Affairs Medical Center as a training specialist. He received a promotion to the GS‐11 pay grade in 2006, but since then, has received neither a permanent promotion nor a raise. He filed suit, alleging that the refusal to promote him or increase his salary constituted discrimination based on sex and race and that he was subjected to unlawful retaliation and a hostile work environment based on the same lack of pay and recognition, and other incidents. The court rejected the claims on summary judgment, concluding that some claims were time‐barred based on Poullard's failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies under 29 C.F.R. 1614.105(a). On the timely claims, the court held that Poullard had not suffered an adverse employment action and that a reasonable jury could not find that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While it appears that Poullard may not have been managed well or fairly, three arguably race‐tinged remarks, even in combination with the pay disparity and a letter of admonishment, did not show that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment. View "Poullard v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Schaefer, a server at Walker’s Illinois Original® Pancake House restaurants, alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201–19, and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1 to 105/15. Those laws provide that tips count toward the minimum wage. In Illinois, employers must pay at least 60% of the normal minimum wage (the tip-credit rate). Because the Illinois tip-credit rate is higher than the federal minimum, the restaurants paid servers the Illinois rate. Schaefer contends that, until May 2011, the restaurants failed to give servers information that federal law requires as a condition of paying a tip-credit wage and that servers spent some of their time doing non-tipped duties such as slicing mushrooms and tidying up, so that the restaurants had to pay the full minimum wage for that time. The district court certified the suit as a class action on behalf of approximately 500 servers, then granted summary judgment to the restaurants. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed, citing a Department of Labor regulation, 29 C.F.R. 531.56(e), that describes “related duties” that may be performed by a tipped employee without requiring the employer to pay the full cash wage. The restaurants adequately informed servers about the tip-credit law. View "Schaefer v. Walker Bros. Enters., Inc." on Justia Law