Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Boss, an African-American engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 2002 to 2011, sued HUD under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging workplace discrimination; retaliation for a prior EEOC discrimination complaint; and hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Boss, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1, which requires a summary judgment movant to submit a statement of material facts consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with specific references to the record. The court’s discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been repeatedly upheld. Boss could not identify any fact that the court ignored that would have materially altered the Title VII analysis. The court noted that Boss’ arguments and evidence were impermissibly relied upon the conclusions of an ALJ who, in 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 EEOC complaint; the ALJ had no personal knowledge of this case. Boss failed to prove a materially adverse employment action. He was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but there was no evidence of comments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work environment. View "Boss v. Castro" on Justia Law

Beverly, a former Abbott employee whose employment was terminated on October 20, 2010, filed suit against Abbott. She alleged that during her employment, Abbott had discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her German nationality in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as on the basis of her disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court denied Abbott’s motion for summary judgment and the parties engaged in a private mediation. During mediation, the parties signed a handwritten agreement stating that Beverly demanded $210,000 and mediation costs in exchange for dismissing the lawsuit. Abbott later accepted Beverly’s demand and circulated a more formal settlement proposal. After Beverly refused to execute the draft proposal, Abbott moved to enforce the original handwritten agreement. The court found that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement and granted Abbott’s motion to enforce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the handwritten agreement was valid and enforceable, since its material terms were clearly conveyed and consented to by both parties, and the existence and content of the draft proposal do not affect enforceability. View "Beverly v. Abbott Labs., Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. Liu, an Asian woman, began working at Stroger Hospital in 1984. Liu says that, beginning in 2003, her supervisors sent a disproportionate number of her cases to review committees as compared to white male colleagues. In 2004, Liu treated a 19-year-old with appendicitis non-operatively and the patient suffered a heart attack, resulting in a clash between Liu and administration regarding her preference for non-operative treatment. After several incidents involving her refusal to conform to policy and to treat appendicitis surgically, her supervisor suspended Liu’s surgical privileges and limited her to “low complexity” cases. The Peer Review Committee investigated several cases and recommended that the suspension continue until Liu completed counseling, “with the goals of gaining insight into her problems, accepting responsibility.” The Executive Medical Staff concurred. in 2010, Liu was terminated because, during the proceedings, she accessed patient records to try to support her position, violating HIPAA and the Hospital System Privacy Policy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Liu’s claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) & 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Liu presented only sparse evidence of animus based on her race, sex, and national origin, none of it linked to the challenged decisions, and did not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the stated reasons for discipline were honest. View "Liu v. Cook County, Ill." on Justia Law

In 2012, Pierce began working as a Zoetis sales representative. Pierce had several unpleasant encounters with her supervisor, Heuchert, and others. Pierce complained about Heuchert’ to Human Resources, which she alleges, prompted retaliation. Zoetis’ human resources director initiated an investigation, after which all sales representatives were notified that their sales quotas were being adjusted. Pierce alleges that her quotas were adjusted upward more substantially than those of other employees. Pierce also attributes increased difficulty in receiving expense reimbursements to retaliation. In 2013, Pierce took time off for foot surgery. Around that same time, Human Resources informed Pierce that the investigation had concluded and that Heuchert would be disciplined. Pierce returned to work, but was fired three weeks later for failure to meet the increased sales goals. Pierce sued, alleging Indiana state-law claims of wrongful termination and tortious interference with a business relationship. The district court dismissed, citing Indiana’s employment at will doctrine and noting that Pierce failed to follow prerequisites for bringing suit under the Indiana Civil Rights Law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of the behavior Pierce identified in her complaint was taken within the scope of Heuchert’s duties as Pierce’s manager, and could not form the basis of a tortious interference claim. View "Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against USPS for employment discrimination based on race and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 and 2000e-3, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USPS and plaintiff appealed. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that USPS has waived any timeliness arguments with regard to the denial of the non-competitive transfer at issue. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination where another officer's better performance in an interview is unquestionably a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis to hire one candidate over another. The court also concluded that plaintiff has developed no independent age discrimination argument in either the district court or in this appeal supporting his ADEA claims. Furthermore, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails where, plaintiff failed to present any direct or circumstantial evidence that the filing of the EEO complaint was the cause of his direct supervisor's, Captain Williams, rejection of the doctor’s note. Alternatively, a reasonable jury could not find a causal connection between the filing of plaintiff's informal EEO complaint and the activity of Captain Williams, as plaintiff's proffered pattern does not support a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent. Finally, plaintiff's retaliation claim also fails under the indirect method of proof because plaintiff failed to proffer any employees who are similarly situated for comparison purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Formella v. Brennan" on Justia Law

After being terminated by Logansport when he was 61-years-old, plaintiff filed suit against the company under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted Logansport's motion for summary judgment. The ADEA defines “employer” as someone who has twenty or more employees for each working day, in each of twenty or more calendar weeks, in the calendar year of (or in the year preceding) the discriminatory act. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Logansport was not an "employer" under the ADEA because it did not have twenty or more employees. View "Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc." on Justia Law

Boston worked at U.S. Steel for 18 years before she was laid off in 2008, along with other employees. While on layoff status, Boston remained eligible to bid on posted positions for which she was qualified. Between September 2010 and January 2012, Boston was awarded, worked temporarily at, and was subsequently disqualified from, three different clerical positions at the plant. Boston claimed that the first disqualification was based on her age (61) and a preference for having a man in the job. Boston filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but did not file suit. After two subsequent disqualifications, she filed an EEOC complaint asserting that she was laid off in January 2012 in retaliation for an earlier EEOC discrimination charge she had filed in October 2010. She later filed suit under Title VII and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act ADEA, with a common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of U.S. Steel. Boston did not present enough evidence to prevail under the direct method, indirect method, or cat’s paw theory. View "Boston v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

The EEOC investigated Aerotek staffing agency for compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and served a subpoena requesting information: about all persons that Aerotek referred from its Illinois facilities for employment by clients; regarding all job requisition requests by Aerotek clients nationwide; about persons hired into internal positions at Aerotek’s Illinois facilities; and documents related to Aerotek’s analysis of its workforce. Aerotek partially complied. EEOC’s initial review revealed hundreds of discriminatory job requests by clients at 62 of Aerotek’s 286 facilities. EEOC issued another request for information about individuals assigned to clients including names, dates of birth, contact information and the names of the clients to whom they were assigned. Aerotek again partially complied, excluding client names and the names and contact information for workers hired by those clients. Instead, Aerotek created a code system and supplied numerical identifiers for clients and workers. Aerotek refused to produce unredacted information. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order to enforce the subpoenas. The inquiry is within the authority of the EEOC and the information sought is clearly relevant to its investigation of age-related discrimination. Aerotek did not claim that the request is too indefinite; production of this information would not impose an unreasonable or undue burden. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Aerotek, Inc." on Justia Law

Staffing Network provided 80 full‐time employees for ReaderLink, including an on‐site manager, pickers, and stockers. Pickers work on a production line, selecting books to fill orders, and placing books in boxes. Stockers ensure that pickers have an adequate supply of books. Barrera began working as a picker in 2004. Except for once punching the clock too early, Barrera worked for eight years without incident. In 2012, while filling a large order, a stocker said that he would work no faster for $8.25 an hour and was sent home. Other workers, including Barrera, became upset. After referring to contacting the Department of Human Rights, Barrera was told to collect her things and go home. Barrera initially refused. Others came to Barrera’s defense. Later, having been told to leave and not come back, Barrera surmised that she had been terminated, applied for unemployment benefits, and filed an unfair labor practice charge. An ALJ found violation of 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1); rejected claims that Barrera was not terminated or that any discharge was justified; found that Barrera did not lose the protection of the Act under the Atlantic Steel Co.factors; and ordered that Barrera be offered reinstatement and lost earnings. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted the NLRB’s petition for enforcement. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Staffing Network Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Mercedes-Benz of Orlando dealership service department had 37 technicians in 2008, who were paid by the job rather than by the hour. The International Association of Machinists began a campaign to organize the technicians. During the campaign, the dealership held “educational” meetings with the technicians, engaged in lay-offs, and received information about the unionization efforts from a pro-union technician. The technicians voted in favor of unionizing; the dealership contested the result. A decline in business accelerated and, without attempting to bargain with the union, the dealership reduced the “book times” for some pre-paid maintenance jobs and laid off more technicians. In 2009, a two-member NLRB panel affirmed certification of the union. In 2010, after the Supreme Court held that the Act requires the Board to decide cases with a minimum of three members, a new order affirmed the certification determination. In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit enforced the Board order. The NLRB then filed an unfair practices complaint. An ALJ found that the employers engaged in unfair labor practices aimed at coercing their employees’ choices before the union election and frustrating their employees’ protected concerted activities after the election; fired an employee due to anti-union animus; and unlawfully made multiple changes to working conditions without bargaining with the union. The NLRB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit enforced the order. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Contemporary Cars, Inc." on Justia Law