Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

William Charles Construction (WCC) entered into a labor agreement with the Illinois Department of Transportation for the “Biggsville” construction project to expand a section of Rt. 34 to four lanes. A jurisdictional dispute between two unions, each claiming the right for their member drivers to operate large trucks involved in the excavation work, was resolved by an arbitrator. Later, a Joint Grievance Committee (JGC) determined, under a subordinated collective bargaining agreement, that WCC owed the Teamsters back pay and fringe benefit contributions ($1.4 million) for having assigned the operation of heavy trucks to the International Union of Operating Engineers rather than the Teamsters. A second JGC award determined that WCC was liable for two days’ back pay for having assigned work to two Teamsters in violation of other Teamsters’ seniority rights. WCC filed a declaratory action under the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185. The court granted the Teamsters summary judgment, finding that WCC filed its complaint outside the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to the Teamsters and dismissed the Teamsters’ counterclaim for enforcement of one of the JGC awards. WCC's challenge to the awards is not barred by the statute of limitations because WCC did not receive notice of their final entry. The greater of the two JGC awards is void because WCC did not agree to arbitration by the JGC. View "William Charles Constr. Co., LLC v. Teamsters Local Union 627" on Justia Law

Simpson, a registered nurse, began working at St. James Health in 2008 and was not reprimanded until after 2009 when Kelly, a Caucasian woman, became the manager of Simpson’s department. From October 2010 through September 2011 Kelly disciplined Simpson four times. The discipline was progressive. The fourth incident resulted in termination of Simpson’s employment. After the EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter, Simpson filed suit, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The employer claimed that she had not been performing up to expectations and could not identify a similarly situated co-worker who was treated more favorably, noting that Simpson was not disputing the existence of the complaints from patients and their families. The district court granted St. James summary judgment, reasoning that Simpson had established a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method, but lacked evidence that the explanation for firing her was pretextual. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Simpson did not even establish a prima facie case of discrimination, let alone that the proffered explanation was pretextual. View "Simpson v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

During his 28 years at the City of Anderson Transit System (CATS), Brown developed diabetes and became unable to maintain his commercial driver’s license (CDL). He was then working as a dispatcher, which did not require a CDL. Brown was active in the Democratic Party. In 2004, the city elected Mayor Smith, a Republican, and Brown was demoted to the position of mechanic’s helper. Although possession of a CDL was listed in the job description, CATS granted Brown an accommodation. Years later, when Smith was defeated by a Democrat, Brown was promoted to a street‐supervisor position. Possession of a CDL was listed in the job description. His supervisors were aware of his inability to obtain a CDL when they promoted him. Brown worked as a street supervisor until he was fired in 2012—shortly after Smith was reelected--due to Brown's inability to “obtain CDL.” In a suit alleging disability discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), a jury awarded Brown damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The essential‐function issue is a factual question that was properly put before the jury, and the jury instructions, that it could consider “the amount of time spent on the job performing the function in question,” were consistent with federal regulations and precedent. View "Brown v. Smith" on Justia Law

Baptist began working at Ford’s assembly plant, operating a forklift. Less than three months later, Baptist inadvertently hit a pillar, injuring his left wrist. He visited Ford’s medical department and submitted an injury report. An investigator and Ford’s physician doubted Baptist’s account of his injury; Baptist did not report the incident properly and refused to release medical records from a prior workers’ compensation case against another employer involving an injury to his other wrist. Ford paid for Baptist’s initial visit to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Heller. The parties are litigating Baptist’s workers’ compensation claim. After working two months, Baptist again sought medical attention. Dr. Heller diagnosed him with a complete ligament tear, recommended surgery, indicated that Baptist was not able to perform the essential function of his job, and cleared him to return to work if he did not lift or grip over five pounds with his left hand. Disagreeing with Ford's doctor, Baptist believed that this prevented him from operating the forklift and asked for another position. He did not work for several days. Ford suspended him for one month. When Baptist returned, he was told that the only available work was as a forklift driver. Baptist later testified that he was told that he would be fired unless he agreed to state that his injury did not happen at work. The company denied this assertion. Baptist was discharged for having three consecutive absences without justification. In a suit alleging retaliation for exercising his workers’ compensation rights, the court granted Ford summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A triable issue exists regarding whether Baptist was put to the impracticable choice between keeping his job or giving up a key argument for workers’ compensation. View "James Baptist v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

In 2009, a growth was discovered on Venita’s pancreas. She was told that cancer could not be ruled out without further testing. She told her supervisor, Linda. Because Venita did not have health insurance and needed money for the testing and other medical care, she asked if she could forgo taking a vacation and receive extra pay instead. Linda agreed. During the following week, Venita was scheduled for jury duty, but called in sick. She did not go to work or jury service. One week later, Linda fired Venita. The employer claimed that Venita had pretended she was at jury duty,, so that she would get paid for the week (she had used all of her paid sick days for the year). Another employee reported seeing Venita around town. Venita sued, claiming she was fired because Linda thought she had a disability. A jury disagreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument the trial judge abused his discretion by excluding evidence from Venita’s diary, indicating that Linda had given her the week off, and challenges to rulings concerning her multiple attempts to impeach Linda’s trial testimony about messages and conversations between Venita and Linda. View "Miller v. GreenLeaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C." on Justia Law

McCurdy, a Williamson County Sheriff’s Department patrol deputy, applied for a job with the Southern Illinois Enforcement Group, which investigates drug crimes. She was selected, subject to a background check. While that check was conducted, she remained in her deputy’s post. Agent Braddy, who conducted the check, recommended that she not be hired after discovering that McCurdy had recently filed for bankruptcy and was in a long-term relationship with Mohring, who belonged to a biker gang associated with criminal activity. The Group had previously hired a male who was in financial difficulty and had some criminal associates; he was fired for stealing drugs and money from the unit. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, McCurdy alleged that she would have been promoted immediately had she been a man and that the Group gave her more scrutiny than it does male applicants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting McCurdy’s hiring theory, but vacated with respect to her delay theory. Agent Braddy testified that she investigated McCurdy exactly the same way as she investigates other applicants. Employers are entitled to learn from their errors. Braddy’s findings constituted sex-neutral reasons for not hiring McCurdy. The district court did not resolve disputes concerning the delay theory. View "McCurdy v. Fitts" on Justia Law

In March 2009, Wheatley injured her foot at her home. During the months that followed, she was unable to work and saw several doctors. Her employer granted her leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) plus four additional weeks of leave, but informed her that if she could not return to work when that time period expired, her employment would be terminated. She claims she told her supervisor that she would be able to return to work wearing a walking boot, but the supervisor was doubtful that such an accommodation would be allowed because Wheatley needed to be able to climb a ladder to do her job. She applied for disability benefits and Aetna Insurance determined that she was totally disabled from her occupation. Wheatley then filed suit claiming violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. The evidence presented by Wheatley was insufficient to allow a jury to conclude that she could perform the essential duties of the position if permitted to wear the medical boot and forego the ladder duties. View "Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet" on Justia Law

Schal Bovis, a Chicago-area general contractor, was a party to collective bargaining agreement, 2005-2008, that created the Fringe Benefit Funds and limited Schal’s ability to subcontract work “coming within the jurisdictional claims of the Union” (carpenter’s work). Schal was required to get any non-union subcontractor to sign the Agreement, or to keep track of hours worked by the subcontractor and pay the Funds benefit contributions for those hours. The Agreement stated:“the Union agrees that it will not interfere with existing practices of other unions affiliated with the Building Trades.” The Funds filed suit under the Labor Management Relations Act,, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a), alleging that Schal failed to make fringe benefit payments for work performed by nonunion labor. The court granted summary judgment to the Funds then held a bench trial on damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment on two claims. A non-union subcontractor should be considered a single employer with a union signatory who performed the work, so that the Funds cannot claim benefits for the work performed in one claim. With respect to the second claim, the court held that the Agreement prevented the Union from claiming work which was the existing practice of other trade unions. View "Chicago Reg'l Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Schal Bovis, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, Calumet River Fleeting fired a boat operator. The Union, which represents operators in three states, filed a grievance. Calumet refused to participate in arbitration. In 2006, Calumet and the Union had signed a memorandum of agreement binding Calumet to the terms of the Great Lakes Floating Agreement, a collective bargaining agreement that covers marine construction. The agreement contained an “evergreen clause” requiring the employer to adhere to the terms of each successive edition of the agreement until the agreement was properly terminated. In September 2008, Calumet terminated its participation in the Floating Agreement, meaning that contractors who were signatories to the Agreement could no longer hire Calumet without violating the Agreement’s subcontracting provision. Less than two years later, Selvick (Calumet’s owner) organized a new company, Selvick Marine, which signed a memorandum of agreement with the Union. The district court granted summary judgment to Calumet, holding that it was no longer a party to any agreement with the Union that might have required arbitration. The Union appealed, arguing that an earlier arbitration award in an unrelated proceeding had found that Calumet was an alter ego of Selvick Marine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the alter ego argument. View "Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating​ Eng'rsi" on Justia Law

Epic Systems sent an email to employees, containing an arbitration agreement mandating that wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through individual arbitration and that the employees waived “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding.” The agreement included a clause stating that if the “Waiver of Class and Collective Claims” was unenforceable, “any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.” It stated that employees were “deemed to have accepted this Agreement” if they “continue[d] to work at Epic.”.The following day, Lewis, a “technical writer” at Epic, followed instructions for registering his agreement. Later, Lewis had a dispute with Epic, and sued Epic in federal court, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and Wisconsin law. Lewis responded that the arbitration clause interfered with employees’ right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection and was unenforceable. The district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, and is also unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1. View "Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp." on Justia Law