Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alamo worked for the Chicago Fire Department. He alleges that in 2009, after a transfer, other firefighters began harassing him, calling him “spic” and “f--king Puerto Rican,” and stealing Alamo’s food. Alamo also alleges that the number of times he was assigned to work at different locations was excessive when compared to assignments given to non-Latino colleagues. His supervisor, Lieutenant Bliss, did not remedy the behavior. At one point, Alamo called 911 about a “chest bump” incident but did not press charges because of pressure from the Chief. The next day, Alamo experienced chest pain, dizziness, and a migraine. A physician diagnosed him with a work-related chest contusion, work-related stress, and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder and ordered medical leave. The Medical Section Chief stated the Department would not pay for treatment. After Alamo had been on medical leave for six months, he obtained written authorization to return to work without restrictions, but the Department required additional documentation. Alamo filed a charge with the EEOC. The Department continued to request additional records. Alamo filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and against Bliss, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of his hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims. The complaint describes an investigation into his fitness to work that was so onerous that it could not be completed in four months and sufficiently alleged retaliation. View "Alamo v. Bliss" on Justia Law

In 2013, Scheurer applied to work at Richelieu which outsourced its staffing needs to Remedy, a temporary staffing agency. The application form she signed with Remedy for placement with Richelieu contained an arbitration agreement. She was assigned to work for Richelieu, but that assignment ended after some months. About a year later, Remedy placed Scheurer with Fromm. Scheurer alleges that while working at Fromm, her supervisor sexually harassed her and that Fromm took no serious action to address the sexual harassment and instead fired her. Fromm tried to arrange a work situation that would have separated Scheurer from the supervisor, but when that proved “impossible,” Fromm asked Remedy to assign Scheurer to another client. Scheurer filed suit against Fromm, but not Remedy, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐2(a)(1) & 2000e‐3(a). Fromm argued that arbitration should be compelled under the contract law principle of equitable estoppel and because Fromm was a third‐party beneficiary of the Remedy agreement. The district court denied Fromm’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no basis for finding that Fromm relied on Scheurer’s arbitration agreement since Fromm did not even know about it and Fromm was not a third‐party beneficiary of Remedy’s agreement with Scheurer. View "Scheurer v. Fromm Family Foods, LLC" on Justia Law

Lauth, then 54, began working at Covance in 2006, as a shift supervisor. His performance reviews noted needed improvements in his communication style and that staff members had expressed discontent with Lauth’s supervision and communication style, eventually stating that Lauth “appears unreceptive to take help and/or suggestions from others” and that Lauth “must improve … [his] working relationship with his fellow shift supervisors.” In a 2011 meeting, Lauth’s supervisor asked Lauth when he planned to retire. Lauth submitted a complaint regarding another employee, for what Lauth characterized as “bullying.” Lauth was unhappy with the result and filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming age discrimination and retaliation. The EEOC issued a dismissal. A new supervisor at Covance wanted to dismiss Lauth based on his “argumentative and insubordinate” interactions. Warnings and complaints continued. In 2012, Lauth was terminated. Based on his EEOC charge, Lauth filed suit, alleging age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court granted Covance summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lauth failed to provide evidence, other than his belief that Covance’s assessments of his workplace behavior were mistaken, from which a jury could infer that Covance terminated him because of his age. View "Lauth v. Covance, Inc." on Justia Law

Baines alleged that when her former employer, Walgreens, refused to rehire her in 2014, it intentionally retaliated against her for complaining about race discrimination several years earlier. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted Walgreens summary judgment. The court said it found no evidence linking Baines’ protected activity (filing EEOC charges) and Walgreens’ adverse employment actions (failing to rehire her). The Seventh Circuit reversed. While Baines did not offer direct evidence of a causal link, she offered sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy the summary judgment standard. She offered evidence that the manager who handled her earlier EEOC charges intervened in the 2014 decision not to rehire her, and did so in ways that deviated significantly from Walgreens’ standard hiring procedures. Walgreens offered no explanation for this unusual behavior. Other circumstantial evidence included missing records of Baines’ application and her interview scores, a decision to hire instead someone less qualified, and dishonest answers from Walgreens decision-makers when asked to explain their decisions. If a jury believes Baines’ evidence, it could reasonably find that Walgreens unlawfully retaliated against her. View "Baines v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

The Union (IUOE) challenged Wisconsin’s right-to-work law, which provides: No person may require, as a condition of obtaining or continuing employment, an individual to do any of the following: … Become or remain a member of a labor organization [or] 3. Pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges or expenses of any kind or amount, or provide anything of value, to a labor organization. Wis. Stat. 111.04(3)(a). IUOE, which had entered into several conditional union-security agreements with employers, filed suit. IUOE argued that Act was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3), and constituted a taking of affected unions’ property without just compensation. The district court determined that the Seventh Circuit’s 2014 decision upholding Indiana’s nearly-identical law controlled and dismissed IUOE’s complaint with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge of preemption under the NLRA, even though the right-to-work laws prohibits the payment of any dues or fees to unions, and finding the takings claim premature. View "International Union of Operating Engineers v. Schimel" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found reasonable cause to believe that Chicago Police Department violated Title VII by harassing Officer Sommerfield based on his national origin, German, and religion, Jewish. Sommerfield alleged that his complaints led to retaliation. He filed another EEOC charge alleging retaliation. The agency again found reasonable cause. After years of litigation in his subsequent 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 suit, a jury awarded Sommerfield $30,000, rejecting his retaliation claim. Sommerfield’s lawyer requested $1.5 million in attorney’s fees, which the district court reduced to $430,000. The attorney claimed to have worked 3,742 hours at an hourly rate of $395; the judge reduced the hours to 2,878 and the rate to $300, which yielded a lodestar of $863,000. The judge took into account the modest degree of success Sommerfield had achieved and halved the lodestar. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s decisions to grant partial summary judgment for the city by confining the discrimination counts to the question whether a fellow officer’s statements had created a hostile work environment; eliminating two counts for lack of any evidence that would permit a finding that Sommerfield’s injury resulted from an express policy, a widespread practice, or a policymaker’s final action; and restricting the retaliation claim period. View "Sommerfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Vidmar, Manney, and Gomez were discharged from the Milwaukee Police Department, for cause, by Police Chief Flynn. Their benefits and pay stopped immediately. They appealed their terminations to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, which rejected their appeals. They were permanently discharged. The former officers claimed that their employment did not end when they were discharged by the chief because they were entitled to employment until the conclusion of their appeals. They alleged that they were denied constitutional due process and wages. The district court rejected their claims and granted judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Wisconsin law, the former officers had no property interest in employment once they were discharged for cause by Chief Flynn. They were provided a full and adequate appellate process, and their discharges were upheld in accordance with Wisconsin law. They were not entitled to wages for the period of time between their discharge and the conclusion of their appeal under Wisconsin law as they were not employed during that time. View "Milwaukee Police Association v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Hyatt and Local 1 are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that prohibits the hotel’s managerial employees from performing work normally performed by bargaining-unit employees absent an emergency. The CBA provides for the arbitration of any disputes not resolved by the grievance procedure. In 2013-2014, there were several incidents in which managers performed bargaining-unit work in circumstances that Local 1 did not regard as emergencies. The union took grievances to arbitration; both resulted in awards in Local 1's favor. Ninety days passed without Hyatt filing a petition to vacate; the union filed a petition to confirm the awards (Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a)). The union alleged that Hyatt “has failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to comply with” the awards. Local 1 cited 41 examples of managers allegedly performing bargaining unit work in 2015. The Seventh Circuit affirmed confirmation of the awards, rejecting Hyatt’s argument that the matter was either moot or did not present an appropriate case for confirmation. The district court’s “modest action” places the court’s contempt power behind the prospective relief ordered by the arbitrators, while reserving the merits of pending or future grievances for arbitration. Local 1 has conceded that any contempt petition would be based solely on the outcome of arbitrations post-dating the confirmation order. Confirming the awards does not undermine the agreement to resolve disputes through arbitration. View "Unite Here Local 1 v. Hyatt Corp." on Justia Law

Workers in Waupaca foundries alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, by not treating the time that workers spend changing clothes and showering on-site after a shift to be compensable “work” time. They alleged that they end their shifts covered in a layer of “foundry dust,” which can irritate the skin and cause lung disease if inhaled. FLSA authorizes collective actions by employees on behalf of “similarly situated” employees. Unlike class actions under FRCP 23, collective actions under FLSA require would-be members to opt in (voluntarily join). The district judge ruled that he would “conditionally certify” the class since the plaintiffs showed a “reasonable basis” for believing that all the class members were similarly situated. After discovery, the judge would determine whether plaintiffs who had opted in were actually similarly situated. After several hundred current and former employees from three states opted in, Waupaca moved to decertify the class. The plaintiffs, deciding to proceed with only Waupaca’s Wisconsin employees, moved to certify a Rule 23 class just for Wisconsin state-law claims, and did not oppose the decertification of Indiana and Tennessee employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Waupaca’s request to decertify the entire FSLA class; division of the FLSA class into three subclasses and their transfer to district courts in their respective states; and Rule 23 ceritfication of the Wisconsin claims. View "DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc." on Justia Law

From 2008-2012, Stuckey worked as an AutoZone manager and was transferred between Chicago-area stores several times. None of the transfers entailed any loss in pay, benefits, or responsibilities. In 2012 he was transferred again, this time from a store on Kedzie Avenue that serves a largely Hispanic clientele. Stuckey never reported for work at his new assignment. He filed an EEOC complaint. Stuckey is black; he claimed that AutoZone transferred him out of the Kedzie location in an effort to make it a “predominantly Hispanic” store. The EEOC filed suit on Stuckey’s behalf alleging that the transfer violated 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(2), an infrequently litigated provision of Title VII that makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees … in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for AutoZone, holding that the transfer was not an adverse employment action. The court rejected EEOC’s argument that the statute does not require the claimant to prove that the challenged action adversely affected his employment opportunities or status. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AutoZone, Inc." on Justia Law